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Numerous studies have examined the neural substrates of intertemporal decision‐making, but few have systematically investigated separate neural representations of the two attributes of future rewards (i.e., the amount of the reward and the delay time). More importantly, no study has used the novel analytical method of representational connectivity analysis (RCA) to map the two dimensions' functional brain networks at the level of multivariate neural representations. This study independently manipulated the amount and delay time of rewards during an intertemporal decision task. Both univariate and multivariate pattern analyses showed that brain activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and lateral frontal pole cortex (LFPC) was modulated by the amount of rewards, whereas brain activity in the DMPFC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was modulated by the length of delay. Moreover, representational similarity analysis (RSA) revealed that even for the regions of the DMPFC that overlapped between the two dimensions, they manifested distinct neural activity patterns. In terms of individual differences, those with large delay discounting rates (k) showed greater DMPFC and LFPC activity as the amount of rewards increased but showed lower DMPFC and DLPFC activity as the delay time increased. Lastly, RCA suggested that the topological metrics (i.e., global and local efficiency) of the functional connectome subserving the delay time dimension inversely predicted individual discounting rate. These findings provide novel insights into neural representations of the two attributes in intertemporal decisions, and offer a new approach to construct task‐based functional brain networks whose topological properties are related to impulsivity. DMPFC represented both amount and delay‐time with distinct activation patterns. RCA‐based amount‐related and time‐related networks topological properties can predict k.

Purpose To study the variations of delay discounting rates as a function of fluency, contents, and functions of future thoughts in healthy subjects. Background Delay discounting (DD) is a concept that can measure a frequent tendency toward smaller, yet immediate rewards, while a delayed reward is greater in value. DD describes people's choices in intertemporal decisions and is associated with self‐control. Future thinking (FT) and having a vivid imagination of the future can reduce individuals’ DD rates. However, constructing a specific episodic future representation was merely studied in relation to DD. Although fluency and contents of future thoughts have been reported related to various disorders and behaviors, their association with DD has not been previously addressed. Methods The present study applies a verbal fluency task named the personal future task (PFT), the functions of future thinking scale (FoFTS), and the 27‐item delay discounting questionnaire (DDQ) in order to assess fluency, contents, and functions of future thoughts, and delay discounting in healthy subjects (N = 114, Female = 64%, Male = 36%, Mage = 34.22, SDage = 7.15). Results Findings indicate that fluency of future thoughts is associated with DD. Among the contents of FT categories, financial contents (future thoughts about money and real estate matters), and regarding functions of FT, engaging in FT for planning are related to DD. Due to the final model, the above‐mentioned correlated variables can be considered as significant predictors of intertemporal choices when controlling for education and gender (R2 = 0.4, Adjusted R2 = 0.33, F = 5.186, p‐value = 0.001). Conclusion The frequency of future thoughts one can generate, specifically future thoughts about financial contents, is associated with less short‐sighted intertemporal decisions. The former relationship is enhanced for longer delays (e.g., 5–10 years). Besides, individuals who frequently engage in FT for planning (planning out sequences of actions) discount future rewards to a lesser extent. Graphical

According to the positive time-discounting assumption of intertemporal decision-making, people prefer to undergo negative events in the future rather than in the present. However, negative discounting has been identified in the intertemporal choice and loss domains, which refers to people’s preference to experience negative events earlier rather than later. Studies have validated and supported the \"anticipated dread\" as an explanation for negative discounting. This study again explored the effect of anticipated dread on intertemporal choice using content analysis; that is, having participants identify anticipated dread among reasons for negative discounting. This study also validated the effect of anticipated dread on negative discounting by manipulating anticipated dread. This study adds empirical and direct evidence for the role of anticipated dread in negative discounting.

The possible cognitive effect of sense of agency (SoA) has attracted increasing attention. Previous findings suggest that SoA has an effect on action control, time perception, and memory. Here we investigated whether SoA can also influence decision-making. We conducted two experiments, in which we induced high or low predictability by manipulating the contingency between keypresses (action) and ball movements (effect), before assessing SoA and risk-taking (in Experiment 1); and induced both predictability and short or long time delay of action-effect, before assessing SoA, risk-taking, and intertemporal decision-making (in Experiment 2). Higher predictability increased SoA and promoted risk-taking, but did not impact intertemporal decision-making; Shorter delay increased SoA and promoted Larger-Later options, but did not impact risk-taking decision-making. While our findings suggest that some decision-making processes are affected by the same factors as SoA is, we did not find any evidence for any direct impact of SoA on decision-making.

The tendency to make unhealthy choices is hypothesized to be related to an individual's temporal discount rate, the theoretical rate at which they devalue delayed rewards. Furthermore, a particular form of temporal discounting, hyperbolic discounting, has been proposed to explain why unhealthy behavior can occur despite healthy intentions. We examine these two hypotheses in turn. We first systematically review studies which investigate whether discount rates can predict unhealthy behavior. These studies reveal that high discount rates for money (and in some instances food or drug rewards) are associated with several unhealthy behaviors and markers of health status, establishing discounting as a promising predictive measure. We secondly examine whether intention-incongruent unhealthy actions are consistent with hyperbolic discounting. We conclude that intention-incongruent actions are often triggered by environmental cues or changes in motivational state, whose effects are not parameterized by hyperbolic discounting. We propose a framework for understanding these state-based effects in terms of the interplay of two distinct reinforcement learning mechanisms: a \"model-based\" (or goal-directed) system and a \"model-free\" (or habitual) system. Under this framework, while discounting of delayed health may contribute to the initiation of unhealthy behavior, with repetition, many unhealthy behaviors become habitual; if health goals then change, habitual behavior can still arise in response to environmental cues. We propose that the burgeoning development of computational models of these processes will permit further identification of health decision-making phenotypes.

Previous studies have explored the effects of time poverty and money worship on intertemporal decision making based on a resource scarcity perspective. However, how the pace of life affects intertemporal decision making has not been examined. Furthermore, manipulating time perceptions can influence intertemporal decision-making preferences. Based on the perspective of time perception differences, it remains unknown how views of time or temporal focus affect the intertemporal decision making of individuals with different pace of life. To address these issues, study 1 adopted a correlational study to initially explore the relationship between the pace of life and intertemporal decision making. Studies 2 and 3 used manipulation experiments to examine the effects of the pace of life and view of time and temporal focus and pace of life on intertemporal decision making. The results suggest that the faster the life pace, the more recent rewards are preferred. Views of time and temporal focus manipulations can influence the intertemporal decision making of faster-paced individuals, making them prefer smaller–sooner (SS) payoffs under a linear view of time or future temporal focus and larger–later (LL) payoffs under a circular view of time or past temporal focus. However, the manipulation does not affect the intertemporal decision of slower-paced individuals. Our study examined the effect of the pace of life on intertemporal decision making based on a resource scarcity perspective, and found boundary conditions for the influence of the view of time and temporal focus on intertemporal decision making based on the perspective of differences in people’s perception of time.

According to the positive time-discounting assumption of intertemporal decision-making, people prefer to undergo negative events in the future rather than in the present. However, negative discounting has been identified in the intertemporal choice and loss domains, which refers to people’s preference to experience negative events earlier rather than later. Studies have validated and supported the \"anticipated dread\" as an explanation for negative discounting. This study again explored the effect of anticipated dread on intertemporal choice using content analysis; that is, having participants identify anticipated dread among reasons for negative discounting. This study also validated the effect of anticipated dread on negative discounting by manipulating anticipated dread. This study adds empirical and direct evidence for the role of anticipated dread in negative discounting.

Background Decision-making impairments are central to substance use disorder (SUD), particularly in evaluating immediate versus delayed outcomes. However, conventional behavioral analyses provide limited insight into underlying cognitive mechanisms. This study applies the Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) to investigate intertemporal decision-making in female SUD across both gain and loss contexts, addressing a significant gap in understanding context-dependent decision processes. Methods The study compared 100 females with opioid use disorder to 86 female controls using intertemporal choice tasks in both gain and loss contexts. Participants made choices between smaller-immediate and larger-delayed monetary options across varying magnitudes, delay lengths, and reward differences. Behavioral preferences were analyzed using delay discounting models, while cognitive mechanisms were examined using hierarchical drift diffusion modeling to extract decision parameters (drift rates, thresholds, bias, non-decision time). Results Behaviorally, the SUD group showed stronger preferences for immediate rewards in gain scenarios and stronger avoidance of immediate losses in loss scenarios compared to controls. Delay discounting analysis revealed significantly lower discount rates in the SUD group in loss contexts ( p  <.001). DDM analysis demonstrated that the SUD group exhibited lower decision thresholds across contexts, reflecting impulsive decision characteristics. Additionally, they showed lower drift rates in gain scenarios, indicating reduced sensitivity to non-substance rewards, but higher drift rates in loss scenarios, suggesting heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes. These decision patterns varied systematically with monetary and temporal parameters. Conclusions This study reveals distinct context-dependent decision biases in female SUD, characterized by computational signatures that differ markedly between gain and loss domains. These findings enhance our understanding of SUD-related decision mechanisms beyond traditional behavioral measures and suggest potential computational targets for individualized assessment and intervention approaches, though these clinical implications remain exploratory and require extensive validation before practical implementation.

Although procrastination has been extensively studied, precrastination remains an unsolved puzzle. Precrastination is the tendency to start tasks as soon as possible, even at the cost of extra effort. Using the near bucket paradigm with 81 undergraduate students, this study examined the relationship between precrastination and time perspective, proactive personality, and subjects’ differential performance in intertemporal decision-making. The results confirmed the cognitive-load-reduction (CLEAR) hypothesis. Precrastination was found to be positively predicted by the future time dimension of time perspective and negatively predicted by proactive personality. In addition, there is a significant positive correlation between precrastination and delay discounting of intertemporal decision-making, which exists only for the loss situation.

To investigate the mechanism of episodic foresight of different valences on intertemporal decision-making, this study examined the mediating role of future self-continuity in the influence of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making and the moderating role of perceived control in two experiments. The results found that (1) future self-continuity mediated the effect of episodic foresight on individuals' intertemporal decision-making; and (2) perceived control moderated the indirect effect of episodic foresight on intertemporal decision-making through future self-continuity. Under low perceived control, individuals with positive episodic foresight had stronger future self-continuity and preferred future options, while individuals with negative episodic foresight had lower future self-continuity. In contrast, under high perceived control, individuals with different episodic foresight potencies did not show significant differences in their future self-continuity levels, but all showed higher levels and tended to choose the delayed option when faced with an intertemporal choice. From the perspective of the self-cognition, this study provided new insights into the relationship between episodic foresight and intertemporal decision-making and the psychological mechanisms of intertemporal decision-making.