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This article analyses the formal and lived organisation of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). We show that the party is exceptional among what is usually understood as the populist radical right (PRR) party family, at least from an organisational perspective: The AfD sharply contradicts the “standard model” of PRR party organisation, which emphasises “charismatic” leadership and the centralisation of power as key features. Instead, studying the AfD’s efforts to adopt some elements of a mass-party organisation and its relatively decentralised decision-making underlines the importance of “movement-party” strategy, collective leadership, and internal democracy—concepts that are usually associated with Green and left-wing parties. Our analysis shows how the party’s organisation is essential for understanding its development more broadly as it reflects and reinforces sharp intra-party conflict. From this perspective, the case of the AfD sheds new light on the relationship between PRR party organisation and electoral success, indicating the importance of strong ties to parts of society over effective internal management as long as demand for anti-immigration parties is high. We conclude that even though AfD quickly built up a relatively inclusive organisational structure, the role of both its leadership and its rank-and-file is still a matter of controversy.

In this article, we focus on the candidate selection processes of Podemos in Spain and the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S – Five Star Movement) in Italy, processes which are related to intra-party democracy. With a mixed-methods approach (including novel data from the expert survey PoPES, 31 semi-structured interviews with party representatives and militants, and analysis of party documents, statutes and leader speeches) and a comparative perspective, we explore candidate selection in the context of the broader organizational party structures over time. We find that: (1) Podemos functions like a typical centralized party, whereas M5S is a deviant case with strong and centralized control over party organization but decentralized mechanisms for candidate selection; (2) both these logics of centralization of power undermine the parties’ democratic credentials but have different consequences in terms of cohesion (expulsions/departures in M5S and splintering in Podemos); and (3) in both cases, the parties’ organizational culture and symbolic tools legitimate their top-down features.

Does the demand for more direct democracy by populist parties have any implications for their internal decision-making? To answer this question, a novel large-scale research project analyses the 2017 candidate selection of all Bundestag parties, including the populist Alternative for Germany. Some 1,334 individual nominations of seven parties are compared using quantitative indicators along three dimensions of intra-party democracy (IPD): competition between aspirants for candidacy, inclusion of members and nomination-related communication. It shows that the AfD is living up to its promise of practising grassroots democracy: in all results it ranks at the top by a wide margin. A new populist organizational model seems to have emerged following neither the classic hierarchical and leader-oriented mode of many other European right-wing populist parties nor the delegate assembly mode typical of German parties. Our further development of IPD concepts, newly elaborated measuring methods and surprising empirical evidence improve the understanding of democratic decision-making in populist parties.

Popular sovereignty requires that citizens perceive themselves as being able to act and implement decisions, and that they are de facto causally connected to mechanisms of decision making. I argue that the two most common understandings of the exercise of popular sovereignty—which center on direct decision making by the people as a whole and the indirect exercise of democratic agency by elected representatives, respectively—are inadequate in this respect, and go on to suggest a complementary account that stresses the central role of internally democratic and participatory political parties in actualising popular sovereignty, drawing on the democratic theory of Hans Kelsen.

Political parties around the world are adopting primaries to select leaders and legislative candidates. While a large, though inconclusive, literature has emerged in the American context to explore the consequences of primaries, little attention has been devoted to other national contexts. Exploring patterns of financial donation, this study examines whether individuals who supported a losing leadership candidate are less likely to exhibit subsequent financial commitment to the party compared to those donors whose preferred candidate won the internal election. Drawing upon a novel dataset that includes tens of thousands of donors to recent leadership elections in Canada, we demonstrate that intra-party winners (i.e. those who supported the winning leadership candidate) are more likely to be financially committed to the party in the year after the election than those who supported losers. Results suggest that open and inclusive elections, while participatory in nature, may come at a cost for political parties as losers withdraw from the party in the wake of their loss.

Digital platforms play a dominant role in shaping (part of) the public sphere and are increasingly being adopted by political parties. These platforms connect people to various services, such as taxis and food delivery, by utilizing social media and Big Data to personalize their offerings. Political parties have embraced a similar approach, leading to the digitalization of political movements in two distinct forms: the gradual adaptation of existing parties, and the emergence of new (digital) parties. Most existing research on digital parties has primarily focused on movements in Western Europe, such as the Spanish Podemos, the Italian Five Star Movement, and the German Pirate Party. Shifting the focus to Eastern Europe and examining the case of the Czech Republic provides a unique opportunity. This paper specifically delves into the Czech Pirate Party, offering a comprehensive analysis of its intra-party democracy and power relations within the digital landscape. The analysis draws upon seven interviews conducted with party members, and an examination of party documents and websites. By addressing the question of who wields power in Czech Pirate Party, this study aims to contribute to the ongoing discourse surrounding digital parties.

This article focuses on the impact of online participation platforms on the internal organization and democracy of a set of emerging political parties such as the Five Star Movement, Podemos, France Insoumise, the Pirate Parties and Barcelona en Comu. Taking cue from the recent publication of Paolo Gerbaudo's book The Digital Party, the article argues that digital parties can be divided in two ideal party types: the platform party and the networked party. Whereas the platform party is highly centralized, led by a charismatic leader, and strictly focused on the electoral competition, the networked party is a more decentralized ideal party type, which allows policy proposals and leadership positions emerge from the network itself. The article concludes by noting that while it would be easy to cast these two variants of the digital party as an alternative between political realism and political idealism, both types of parties face symmetrical challenges such as how to move beyond plebiscitarian consultations and how to scale deliberation from the local level to the national level.

Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' suggests that oligarchic party rule is inevitable, yet many parties have shown a strong commitment to intra-party democracy. However, Turkey's akp is a typified case of Michels' law, displaying an explicit commitment to intra-party democracy, only to later abandon it. I ask what factors have facilitated this transformation. Why does the iron law of oligarchy display itself in some parties but not in others? I argue that intra-party democracy owes its existence to three indicators - inclusiveness, decentralisation and institutionalisation. Conversely, it should be observed that a party shifting from democratic to oligarchic or personalistic intra-party rule will display decreasing levels of these three indicators in terms of policy formation and candidate selection. By tracing akp's internal party operations since its founding in 2001, I demonstrate a gradual deterioration in these indicators, reflecting a gradual deterioration of democracy within the party to oligarchy and then to personalism.

This study examined the challenges of intra-party democracy in Uganda’s four major political parties (NRM, FDC, DP, UPC) using a cross-sectional design with both quantitative and qualitative methods, guided by party institutionalization theory. Data from party members via questionnaires and top leaders through interviews revealed significant obstacles, with 77% of challenges classified as substantial and requiring urgent attention while 23% categorized as moderate. The commercialization of politics was the most critical issue, scoring 87.2%, disadvantaging weaker candidates and disrupting internal party dynamics. The study emphasized the urgent necessity for reforms in Uganda’s political parties, including institutional reforms, changes to the party funding formula, strengthening legal frameworks, and grassroots engagement to foster fair competition and promote intra-party democracy.

Does European integration contribute to, or even accelerate, the erosion of intra-party democracy? This book analyses the impact of European Union (EU) membership on power dynamics, focusing on the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party (PS), and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Utilising a principal-agent framework, it investigates who within the parties determines EU policies and selects EU specialists. Drawing on original interviews with EU experts from Labour, the PS, the SPD and the Party of European Socialists (PES), as well as an e-mail questionnaire, this book reveals that European policy has remained in the hands of the party leadership. The study also suggests that the party grassroots are interested in the EU, but that interest rarely translates into influence. As regards the selection of EU specialists, this book highlights that the parties' processes are highly political, often informal, and in some cases, undemocratic.