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"Introspection"
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Investigating pristine inner experience : moments of truth
\"This book shows how to apprehend inner experience in high fidelity and demonstrates that such apprehension can be fascinating and of fundamental importance\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
AU Introspection and Symmetry under non-trivial unawareness
This note discusses the relationship between AU Introspection (i.e., an agent is unaware of some event, then she is unaware of that she is unaware of the event) and Symmetry (i.e., an agent is unaware of some event if and only if she is unaware of the complement set) for non-trivial unawareness (i.e., there is an event an agent is unaware of). without Negative Introspection using a set-theoretical approach in standard state-space models. Previous studies have explored the equivalence between Negative Introspection and AU Introspection, or the equivalence between Negative Introspection and Symmetry, by assuming Necessitation of the knowledge operator. As a corollary, AU Introspection is equivalent to Symmetry. However, no studies have shown the relationship between AU Introspection and Symmetry without Necessitation. Therefore, we explore this issue. Our main result shows that if the knowledge operator satisfies Monotonicity, Truth, and Positive introspection, then Modica and Rustichini’s definition of unawareness leads to the equivalence of AU Introspection and Symmetry. In other words, we show that both AU Introspection and Symmetry hold without clashing with non-trivial unawareness.
Journal Article
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.
Journal Article
The Myopia Discrepancy Phenomenon
The origin of subjective visual perceptions is still not fully understood. Existing instruments do not work at sufficient resolution to observe microscopic processes in the brain in situ.We present a preliminary empirical phenomenological study. A light spot at the resolution limit of the healthy eye is observed by visual introspection under ametropic, especially myopic conditions. We would like to discuss this as yet undescribed phenomenon of visual perception, particularly from the point of view of Gestalt theory. The phenomenon consists in the discrepancy that instead of a correspondingly blurred version of the spot, a surprisingly sharp and complex structure is perceived that completely contradicts our expectation. Since the shape perceived under these conditions does not contain any geometric information from objects in the physical external world, we postulate that the shape contains morphological information about its formation process. We present our phenomenon, including geometric and radiometric considerations, the first-person perceptions in our preliminary study, as well as our reasoning.
Journal Article
Conscience et autoconscience dans l’enseignement / apprentissage d’une langue-culture : pourquoi ? quoi ? comment ?
The article introduces different approaches to (self-)awareness, as presented in this issue of Glottodidactica. Its first part discusses the advantages of developing (self-)awareness – in relation to the foreign language teacher and the foreign language learner. The general concept of savoir-être competence (existential competence) is also mentioned. In the second part possible research perspectives in this area and examples of research are given. The third part lists techniques and tools which can be used to stimulate teacher and student self-awareness.
Journal Article
The role of metacognition in human social interactions
Metacognition concerns the processes by which we monitor and control our own cognitive processes. It can also be applied to others, in which case it is known as mentalizing. Both kinds of metacognition have implicit and explicit forms, where implicit means automatic and without awareness. Implicit metacognition enables us to adopt a we-mode, through which we automatically take account of the knowledge and intentions of others. Adoption of this mode enhances joint action. Explicit metacognition enables us to reflect on and justify our behaviour to others. However, access to the underlying processes is very limited for both self and others and our reports on our own and others' intentions can be very inaccurate. On the other hand, recent experiments have shown that, through discussions of our perceptual experiences with others, we can detect sensory signals more accurately, even in the absence of objective feedback. Through our willingness to discuss with others the reasons for our actions and perceptions, we overcome our lack of direct access to the underlying cognitive processes. This creates the potential for us to build more accurate accounts of the world and of ourselves. I suggest, therefore, that explicit metacognition is a uniquely human ability that has evolved through its enhancement of collaborative decision-making.
Journal Article
The illusion of conscious experience
Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand.
Journal Article
Me, Myself, and (I), (D), or (R)? Partisanship and Political Cognition through the Lens of Implicit Identity
Novel national survey data (spanning eight years), a parsimonious definition of identity, and a new Implicit Association Test are brought together to examine “implicit party identity” for the first time. This offers the most direct evidence available that voters associate themselves with their party at a visceral level, sometimes in a more or less pronounced way than they realize or report. This pre-introspection, automatic association relates strongly to voter evaluation and interpretation of the political world. Comparisons with standard explicit measures and three key outcomes (affect, differential evaluation, and motivated processing) offer insight regarding the nature, distribution, and measurement of party identification. Explicit and implicit measures largely corroborate each other in distinguishing between Democrats, Republicans, and Independents but deviate in registering partisan intensity. “Leaners” appear closer to partisans than to pure independents, and implicit identity yields a more graduated relationship than explicit party identification with outcomes of political cognition.
Journal Article
Understanding and Detecting Hallucinations in Neural Machine Translation via Model Introspection
Neural sequence generation models are known to “hallucinate”, by producing outputs that are unrelated to the source text. These hallucinations are potentially harmful, yet it remains unclear in what conditions they arise and how to mitigate their impact. In this work, we first identify internal model symptoms of hallucinations by analyzing the relative token contributions to the generation in contrastive hallucinated vs. non-hallucinated outputs generated via source perturbations. We then show that these symptoms are reliable indicators of natural hallucinations, by using them to design a lightweight hallucination detector which outperforms both model-free baselines and strong classifiers based on quality estimation or large pre-trained models on manually annotated English-Chinese and German-English translation test beds.
Journal Article