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Does cooperating require the inhibition of selfish urges? Or does \"rational\" self-interest constrain cooperative impulses? I investigated the role of intuition and deliberation in cooperation by meta-analyzing 67 studies in which cognitive-processing manipulations were applied to economic cooperation games (total N = 17,647; no indication of publication bias using Egger's test, Begg's test, or p-curve). My meta-analysis was guided by the social heuristics hypothesis, which proposes that intuition favors behavior that typically maximizes payoffs, whereas deliberation favors behavior that maximizes one's payoff in the current situation. Therefore, this theory predicts that deliberation will undermine pure cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where there are few future consequences for one's actions, such that cooperating is not in one's self-interest) but not strategic cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where cooperating can maximize one's payoff). As predicted, the meta-analysis revealed 17.3% more pure cooperation when intuition was promoted over deliberation, but no significant difference in strategic cooperation between more intuitive and more deliberative conditions.

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena – from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic – precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Theories proposing that how one thinks and feels is influenced by feedback from the body remain controversial. A central but untested prediction of many of these proposals is that how well individuals can perceive subtle bodily changes (interoception) determines the strength of the relationship between bodily reactions and cognitive-affective processing. In Study I, we demonstrated that the more accurately participants could track their heartbeat, the stronger the observed link between their heart rate reactions and their subjective arousal (but not valence) ratings of emotional images. In Study 2, we found that increasing interoception ability either helped or hindered adaptive intuitive decision making, depending on whether the anticipatory bodily signals generated favored advantageous or disadvantageous choices. These findings identify both the generation and the perception of bodily responses as pivotal sources of variability in emotion experience and intuition, and offer strong supporting evidence for bodily feedback theories, suggesting that cognitive-affective processing does in significant part relate to \"following the heart.\"

Many psychology studies are statistically underpowered. In part, this may be because many researchers rely on intuition, rules of thumb, and prior practice (along with practical considerations) to determine the number of subjects to test. In Study 1, we surveyed 291 published research psychologists and found large discrepancies between their reports of their preferred amount of power and the actual power of their studies (calculated from their reported typical cell size, typical effect size, and acceptable alpha). Furthermore, in Study 2, 89% of the 214 respondents overestimated the power of specific research designs with a small expected effect size, and 95% underestimated the sample size needed to obtain .80 power for detecting a small effect. Neither researchers' experience nor their knowledge predicted the bias in their self-reported power intuitions. Because many respondents reported that they based their sample sizes on rules of thumb or common practice in the field, we recommend that researchers conduct and report formal power analyses for their studies.

Logical reasoning is often presumed to require effortful cognition. However, there is evidence that reasoners may have some form of “logical intuition” that generates rapid, intuitive logical responses to arguments. Previous studies have shown that intuitive logical judgments for some forms of inference can be generated by matching strategies or by activation of semantic information, leaving the existence of any form of purely logical intuition an open question. In this paper, we examined the possibility that once these effects are controlled for, at least some people are able to make rapid, intuitive logical inferences that reflect only logical structure. In two studies, participants were given 5 s to make a series of inferences, which included semi-abstract syllogisms of the form “All A are B, X is B, X is A,” where the B term was abstract (meaningless), and for which both matching and semantic activation were controlled. Results show that about 15% of participants were able to consistently respond logically to these inferences. These indicate that there is a clear, although limited, form of abstract logical intuition.

Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.

Humans have a unique ability to engage in different modes of thinking. Intuitive thinking (coined System 1, see Kahneman, 2011) is fast, automatic, and effortless whereas analytical thinking (coined System 2) is slow, contemplative, and effortful. We extend seminal pupillometry research examining these modes of thinking by using electroencephalography (EEG) to decipher their respective underlying neural mechanisms. We demonstrate that System 1 thinking is characterized by an increase in parietal alpha EEG power reflecting autonomic access to long-term memory and a release of attentional resources whereas System 2 thinking is characterized by an increase in frontal theta EEG power indicative of the engagement of cognitive control and working memory processes. Consider our results in terms of an example - a child may need cognitive control and working memory when contemplating a mathematics problem yet an adult can drive a car with little to no attention by drawing on easily accessed memories. Importantly, the unravelling of intuitive and analytical thinking mechanisms and their neural signatures will provide insight as to how different modes of thinking drive our everyday lives. •Replicated pupil dilation as an indicator of System 1 and System 2 thinking.•System 1 thinking elicits increased parietal alpha activity.•System 2 thinking produces increased frontal theta activity.•System 1 thinking results in the autonomic access of long-term memory.•System 2 thinking is reflective of cognitive control, working memory, and attention.

According to moral foundations theory, there are five distinct sources of moral intuition on which political liberals and conservatives differ. The present research program seeks to contextualize this taxonomy within the broader research literature on political ideology as motivated social cognition, including the observation that conservative judgments often serve system-justifying functions. In two studies, a combination of regression and path modeling techniques were used to explore the motivational underpinnings of ideological differences in moral intuitions. Consistent with our integrative model, the “binding” foundations (in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity) were associated with epistemic and existential needs to reduce uncertainty and threat and system justification tendencies, whereas the so-called “individualizing” foundations (fairness and avoidance of harm) were generally unrelated to epistemic and existential motives and were instead linked to empathic motivation. Taken as a whole, these results are consistent with the position taken by Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith that moral “foundations” are themselves the product of motivated social cognition.

To engage with the world—to understand the scene in front of us, plan actions, and predict what will happen next—we must have an intuitive grasp of the world’s physical structure and dynamics. How do the objects in front of us rest on and support each other, how much force would be required to move them, and how will they behave when they fall, roll, or collide? Despite the centrality of physical inferences in daily life, little is known about the brain mechanisms recruited to interpret the physical structure of a scene and predict how physical events will unfold. Here, in a series of fMRI experiments, we identified a set of cortical regions that are selectively engaged when people watch and predict the unfolding of physical events—a “physics engine” in the brain. These brain regions are selective to physical inferences relative to nonphysical but otherwise highly similar scenes and tasks. However, these regions are not exclusively engaged in physical inferences per se or, indeed, even in scene understanding; they overlap with the domain-general “multiple demand” system, especially the parts of that system involved in action planning and tool use, pointing to a close relationship between the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in parsing the physical content of a scene and preparing an appropriate action.

Theories of moral judgment have long emphasized reasoning and conscious thought while downplaying the role of intuitive and contextual influences. However, recent research has demonstrated that incidental feelings of disgust can influence moral judgments and make them more severe. This study involved two experiments demonstrating that the reverse effect can occur when the notion of physical purity is made salient, thus making moral judgments less severe. After having the cognitive concept of cleanliness activated (Experiment 1) or after physically cleansing themselves after experiencing disgust (Experiment 2), participants found certain moral actions to be less wrong than did participants who had not been exposed to a cleanliness manipulation. The findings support the idea that moral judgment can be driven by intuitive processes, rather than deliberate reasoning. One of those intuitions appears to be physical purity, because it has a strong connection to moral purity.