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Electricity and water are often subsidized in developing countries to increase their affordability for low-income households. Ideally, such subsidies would create sufficient demand in poor neighborhoods to encourage private investment in their infrastructure. Instead, many regions receiving large subsidies have precarious distribution networks supplying users who never pay. Using a structural model of household electricity demand in Colombia, I predict the change in consumption and profits from upgrading low-quality electricity connections. I show that the existing subsidies, which provide greater transfers to areas with unreliable supply, deter investment to modernize infrastructure. Finally, I analyze alternative programs with stronger investment incentives.

The intertemporal elasticity of investment for long-lived capital goods is nearly infinite. Consequently, investment prices should fully reflect temporary tax subsidies, regardless of the investment supply elasticity. Since prices move one-for-one with the subsidy, elasticities can be inferred from quantities alone. This paper uses a recent tax policy—bonus depreciation—to estimate the investment supply elasticity. Investment in qualified capital increased sharply. The estimated elasticity is high—between 6 and 14. There is no evidence that market prices reacted to the subsidy, suggesting that adjustment costs are internal, or that measurement error masks the price changes.

A corrective tax or subsidy is “well-targeted” if it primarily affects choices that are more distorted by market failures. Energy efficiency subsidies are designed to correct multiple distortions: externalities, credit constraints, “landlord-tenant” information asymmetries, imperfect information, and inattention. We show that three important energy efficiency subsidies are primarily taken up by consumers who are wealthier, own their own homes, and are more informed about and attentive to energy costs. This suggests that these subsidies are poorly targeted at the market failures they were designed to address. However, we show that “tagging” can lead to large efficiency gains.

The strategic use of first-party content by two-sided platforms is driven by two key factors: the nature of buyer and seller expectations (favorable versus unfavorable) and the nature of the relationship between first-party content and third-party content (complements or substitutes). Platforms facing unfavorable expectations face an additional constraint: their prices and first-party content investment need to be such that low (zero) participation equilibria are eliminated. This additional constraint typically leads them to invest more (less) in first-party content relative to platforms facing favorable expectations when first- and third-party content are substitutes (complements). These results hold with both simultaneous and sequential entry of the two sides. With two competing platforms-incumbent facing favorable expectations and entrant facing unfavorable expectations-and multi-homing on one side of the market, the incumbent always invests (weakly) more in first-party content relative to the case in which it is a monopolist. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

This paper evaluates a unique R&D subsidy program implemented in northern Italy. Firms were invited to submit proposals for new projects and only those which scored above a certain threshold received the subsidy. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to compare the investment spending of subsidized firms with that of unsubsidized firms. For the sample as a whole we find no significant increase in investment. This overall effect, however, masks substantial heterogeneity in the program's impact. We estimate that small enterprises increased their investments—by approximately the amount of the subsidy they received—whereas larger firms did not.

We study whether firms' actual use of R&D subsidies and tax incentives is correlated with financing constraints -internal and external- and appropriability difficulties and investigate whether both tools are substitutes. We compare the use of both policies by SMEs and by large firms and find significant differences both across instruments and across firm size. For SMEs, financing constraints are negatively correlated with the use of tax of credits, while they are positively associated with the likelihood of receiving a subsidy. The use of legal methods to protect intellectual property is positively correlated with the probability of using tax incentives, but not with the use of subsidies. For large firms external financing constraints are correlated with instrument use, but results regarding appropriability are ambiguous. Our findings suggest that (1) direct funding and tax credits are not perfect substitutes in terms of their ability to reach firms experiencing barriers associated to market failures; (2) one size may not fit all in innovation policy when the type or intensity of market failure differs across firm size, and (3) subsidies may be better suited than tax credits to encourage firms, especially young knowledge-based firms, to start doing R&D.

We study the expected welfare effects of targeted R&D subsidies using project-level data from Finland. We model the application and R&D investment decisions of firms and the subsidy-granting decision of the public agency in charge of the program. Our model and institutional environment allow us to identify different benefits and costs of the R&D subsidy program. We find that expected effects of subsidies are very heterogeneous and estimated application costs low on average. The social rate of return on targeted subsidies is 30% to 50%, but spillover effects of subsidies are smaller than effects on firm profits.

We investigate the response of multinational corporations (MNCs) to major disasters at the subsidiary level. We examine the type and severity of the disaster and whether and how country governance moderates the relationship between exogenous disaster risk and subsidiary investment. We test our hypotheses with a panel dataset of 71 large European MNCs and their subsidiaries (2001–2006) with 31,285 total observations. Findings suggest that the number of a firm's foreign subsidiaries is likely to decrease in response to terrorist attacks or technological disasters but not natural disasters, regardless of the severity of the event. For terrorist activities, MNC subsidiary-level disinvestment is less likely when the quality of host country governance is higher.

Despite the prevalence of R&D support programs, evaluation studies based on explicit differences in support allocation are rare. In this paper, the identification of the causal effect of R&D support on company performance is based on geographic variation in government funding arising from a population-density rule. I find positive impacts on R&D investment, employment, and sales among the participants who were granted an R&D subsidy as a result of additional aggregate R&D support funding in their region. Although there are no instantaneous impacts on productivity, the study provides evidence of long-term productivity gains.

Agents face a coordination problem akin to the adoption of a network technology. A principal announces investment subsidies that, at minimal cost, attain a given likelihood of successful coordination. Optimal subsidies target agents who impose high externalities on others and on whom others impose low externalities. Based on the analysis of the role of strategic uncertainty in coordination processes, we provide a methodology that can be used to find the optimal targets for a variety of interventions in a large class of coordination problems with heterogeneous agents.