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"Investment value"
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The Collateral Channel: How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment
What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In the presence of financing frictions, firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects. Through this collateral channel, shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment. To compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral value, we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate. Over the 1993-2007 period, the representative US corporation invests $0.06 out of each $1 of collateral.
Journal Article
Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment
We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting generates a history-dependent wedge between marginal and average q, and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time-invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck.
Journal Article
Financial Constraints, Investment, and the Value of Cash Holdings
Previous studies report that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. We examine (i) why this is so and (ii) why some constrained firms appear to hold too little cash. Our results indicate that greater cash holdings are associated with higher levels of investment for constrained firms with high hedging needs and that the association between investment and value is stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. These findings imply that higher cash holdings allow constrained firms to undertake value-increasing projects that might otherwise be bypassed. We further find that some constrained firms exhibit low cash holdings because of persistently low cash flows. Overall, our findings support the view that greater cash holdings of constrained firms are a value-increasing response to costly external financing.
Journal Article
A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang
Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; longer term debt can impose less if asset volatility is higher in bad times. For future investments, reduced correlation between assets-in-place and investment opportunities increases the shorter term debt overhang.
Journal Article
The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Sovereign wealth funds have emerged as major investors in corporate and real resources worldwide. After an overview of their magnitude, we consider the institutional arrangements under which many of the sovereign wealth funds operate. We focus on a specific set of agency problems that is of first-order importance for these funds: that is, the direct involvement of political leaders in the management process. We show that sovereign wealth funds with greater involvement of political leaders in fund management are associated with investment strategies that seem to favor short-term economic policy goals in their respective countries at the expense of longer-term maximization of returns. Sovereign wealth funds face several other issues, like how best to cope with demands for transparency, which can allow others to copy their investment strategies, and how to address the problems that arise with sheer size, like the difficulties of scaling up investment strategies that only work with a smaller value of assets under investment. In the conclusion, we discuss how various approaches cultivated by effective institutional investors worldwide—from investing in the best people to pioneering new asset classes to compartmentalizing investment activities—may provide clues as to how sovereign wealth funds might address these issues.
Journal Article
IT Value: The Great Divide Between Qualitative and Quantitative and Individual and Organizational Measures
A comprehensive review was conducted of IT value articles in the Communications of the ACM, Information Systems Research, Journal of Management Information Systems, and MIS Quarterly from 1993 to 1998. IT-value measures published during this period were documented, classified, analyzed, and reported. The review of these journal articles revealed a schism between the use of organization-level measures and other measures. Communications of the ACM and Information Systems Research also provided strong evidence of a schism between the use of quantitative and qualitative measures in IT-value research. The Journal of Management information Systems and MIS Quarterly data provided more limited evidence of this schism as well. These schisms have become more pronounced over time. This may be due partly to an increasing reliance on secondary data set analyses that use only quantitative measures and organization-level analyses. The current research confirmed what many researchers suspect-schisms exist, and may be deepening, in IT-value research.
Journal Article
Strategic capacity investment under uncertainty
This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. Each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level The simultaneous analysis of timing and capacity decisions extends work on entry deterrence/accommodation to consider a timing/delay element. We find that, when applying an entry deterrence policy, the first investor, or incumbent, overinvests in capacity for two reasons. First, it delays the investment of the second investor, or entrant. Second, the entrant will invest in less capacity. We also find that greater uncertainty makes entry deterrence more likely.
Journal Article