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In January 1978, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed that \"There is all across our land a growing sense of peace and a sense of common purpose.\" Yet in the ensuing months, a series of crises disturbed that fragile sense of peace, ultimately setting the stage for Reagan's decisive victory in 1980 and ushering in the final phase of the Cold War..

Why did a handful of Iranian students seize the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979? Why did most members of the US government initially believe that the incident would be over quickly? Why did the Carter administration then decide to launch a rescue mission, and why did it fail so spectacularly? US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis examines these puzzles and others, using an analogical reasoning approach to decision-making, a theoretical perspective which highlights the role played by historical analogies in the genesis of foreign policy decisions. Using interviews with key decision-makers on both sides, Houghton provides an analysis of one of the United States' greatest foreign policy disasters, the events of which continue to poison relations between the two states. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of foreign policy analysis and international relations.

A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real—as opposed to simulated—crises. We look for such evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders see unambiguously committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy substance than about consistency between the leader's words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care about their country's reputation for resolve and national honor independent of whether the leader has issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs as secondary mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were made.

Why did a handful of Iranian students seize the American embassy in Tehran in November 1979? Why did most members of the US government initially believe that the incident would be over quickly? Why did the Carter administration then decide to launch a rescue mission, and why did it fail so spectacularly? US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis examines these puzzles and others, using an analogical reasoning approach to decision-making, a theoretical perspective which highlights the role played by historical analogies in the genesis of foreign policy decisions. Using interviews with key decision-makers on both sides, Houghton provides an analysis of one of the United States' greatest foreign policy disasters, the events of which continue to poison relations between the two states. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of foreign policy analysis and international relations.

Economic sanctions have often been considered an important tool for disciplining adversaries and compelling them to offer important concessions. History, however, suggests otherwise. Economic penalties rarely cause states to abandon important national assets. After decades of struggling under punitive financial measures, Iran has persisted with its objectionable policies ranging from terrorism to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. All this suggests that ideological regimes that put a premium on their political priorities and which are seemingly insensitive to the mounting costs of their belligerence may not be suitable candidates for the type of cost-benefit analysis that sanctions diplomacy invites.

Explore how America's quarter-century of unwavering support for its ally, the Shah of Iran, and the violent Islamic revolution that overthrew him in 1979, set the stage for the Iran hostage crisis.

Through riveting accounts from hostages, journalists and officials, learn how Iranian students held 52 hostages at the American embassy in Tehran from November 1979 to January 1981-a defining crisis of Jimmy Carter's presidency.

International mediation of violent conflicts is commonplace in today's world, and so is academic research on its features and effectiveness. But research that speaks to both the initiation and implementation of mediation remains relatively rare. This article outlines a theoretical and empirical argument that contributes to filling this gap and suggests a counterintuitive selection effect: potential mediators that are likely to resolve a dispute are unlikely to select into mediation. The argument hinges on the claim that mediation by biased third parties is relatively ineffective, and I provide qualitative evidence to suggest that this claim is plausible.

This article examines the relationship between regime type and decision makers' tendency to make suboptimal choices in international crises. To test hypotheses on the optimality of democratic foreign policy, the author uses a novel statistical measure of suboptimality in foreign policy behavior. This estimator builds on Signorino's statistical strategic models to allow for actor-level variation in deviations from optimal behavior in a strategic setting. An analysis of the international disputes from 1919 to 1999 shows that democratic leaders have a greater tendency to choose policies not optimal for their citizens than do nondemocratic leaders.