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A new history of Middle East oil and the deep roots of American violence in Iraq. Iraq has been the site of some of the United States' longest and most sustained military campaigns since the Vietnam War. Yet the origins of US involvement in the country remain deeply obscured—cloaked behind platitudes about advancing democracy or vague notions of American national interests. With this book, Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt exposes the origins and deep history of US intervention in Iraq. The Paranoid Style in American Diplomacy weaves together histories of Arab nationalists, US diplomats, and Western oil execs to tell the parallel stories of the Iraq Petroleum Company and the resilience of Iraqi society. Drawing on new evidence—the private records of the IPC, interviews with key figures in Arab oil politics, and recently declassified US government documents—Wolfe-Hunnicutt covers the arc of the twentieth century, from the pre-WWI origins of the IPC consortium and decline of British Empire, to the beginnings of covert US action in the region, and ultimately the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry and perils of postcolonial politics. American policy makers of the Cold War era inherited the imperial anxieties of their British forebears and inflated concerns about access to and potential scarcity of oil, giving rise to a \"paranoid style\" in US foreign policy. Wolfe-Hunnicutt deconstructs these policy practices to reveal how they fueled decades of American interventions in the region and shines a light on those places that America's covert empire builders might prefer we not look.

The Legacy of Iraq critically reflects on the abject failure of the 2003 intervention to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy, underpinned by free-market capitalism, its citizens free to live in peace and prosperity. It argues that mistakes made by the coalition and the Iraqi political elite set a sequence of events in motion that have had devastating consequences for Iraq, the Middle East and for the rest of the world. Today, as the nation faces perhaps its greatest challenge in the wake of the devastating advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and another US-led coalition undertakes renewed military action in Iraq, understanding the complex and difficult legacies of the 2003 war could not be more urgent. Ignoring the legacies of the Iraq war and denying their connection to contemporary events couldmeans that vital lessonsare ignored and the same mistakes made again.

Building the Nationdraws from foreign-policy reports and interviews with U.S. military officers to investigate recent U.S.-led efforts to \"nation-build\" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Heather Selma Gregg argues that efforts to nation-build in both countries mistakenly focused more on what should be called state-building, or how to establish a government, rule of law, security forces, and a viable economy. Considerably less attention was paid to what mighttrulybe called nation-building-the process of developing a sense of shared identity, purpose, and destiny among a population within a state's borders and popular support for the state and its government.According to Gregg, efforts to stabilize states in the modern world require two key factors largely overlooked in Iraq and Afghanistan: popular involvement in the process of rebuilding the state that gives the population ownership of the process and its results and efforts to foster and strengthen national unity. Gregg offers a hypothetical look at how the United States and its allies could have used a population-centric approach to build viable states in Iraq and Afghanistan, focusing on initiatives that would have given the population buy-in and agency. Moving forward, Gregg proposes a six-step program for state and nation-building in the twenty-first century, stressing that these efforts are as much abouthowstate-building is done as they are about specific goals or programs.

This book offers a concise history of US policy in Iraq since 1990 and how it has evolved over two decades. * Examines US relations with Iraq from both a regional and international perspective * Argues that the only way to clearly understand US policy toward Iraq is to see it in its proper historical context and within a transnational framework * Uses recently declassified documents at the end of each chapter to illustrate US decision-making in the wars for Iraq * Addresses the importance of the changing domestic climate surrounding two decades

When President George W. Bush launched an invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, he did so without the explicit approval of the Security Council. His father's administration, by contrast, carefully funneled statecraft through the United Nations and achieved Council authorization for the U.S.-led Gulf War in 1991. The history of American policy toward Iraq displays considerable variation in the extent to which policies were conducted through the UN and other international organizations. InChannels of Power, Alexander Thompson surveys U.S. policy toward Iraq, starting with the Gulf War, continuing through the interwar years of sanctions and coercive disarmament, and concluding with the 2003 invasion and its long aftermath. He offers a framework for understanding why powerful states often work through international organizations when conducting coercive policies-and why they sometimes choose instead to work alone or with ad hoc coalitions. The conventional wisdom holds that because having legitimacy for their actions is important for normative reasons, states seek multilateral approval. Channels of Poweroffers a rationalist alternative to these standard legitimation arguments, one based on the notion of strategic information transmission: When state actions are endorsed by an independent organization, this sends politically crucial information to the world community, both leaders and their publics, and results in greater international support.

This book represents the first comprehensive overview of the US-Iraqi relationship since 1979 and the first attempt to place the 2003 American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in that wider historical context.Using a modified version of World Systems Theory, the book places American policy toward Iraq at the centre of a number of dynamics, including America's dominant role in managing the world capitalist system, the fundamental importance of Persian Gulf oil to that system, and long-term change in the American political system.It argues that American policy towards Iraq since 1979 has been shaped above all by the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the world economy and the consequent need to restore America's position as regional hegemon and guarantor of the global oil supply, which had been destabilized by the Iranian revolution.It also emphasizes the role of American domestic politics and above all the 'conservative ascendancy' which brought George W. Bush to the presidency, as a critical factor in explaining the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Key Features*Provides a comprehensive analysis of US-Iraqi relations from 1979*Demonstrates that the second Iraq War is a result of a longer historical process and not just the product of 9/11 and the War on Terror*Deepens understanding of the underlying factors of US policy towards the Persian Gulf, and its oil*Uses World Systems Theory to analyse US foreign policy

Covering both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom as two campaigns within a single, if discontinuous, conflict, this book analyzes the strategic interaction between Iraq and the United States from 1990 to 2010 and the key operational decisions that determined the course of the war. The author's assessment of the long war against Iraq includes misunderstandings between government leaders in Iraq and the United States that led initially to war, ineffective UN sanctions, inefficient efforts by the Clinton administration, and uncoordinated actions by the Bush administration that then led to a preemptive strategy, continuation of conventional combat, and the evolution of an Iraqi insurgency. Ballard's thorough examination of these multiple operations within the context of a single conflict provides readers with rare and insightful perspectives on the complexity of modern war and the challenges of operational command. He first identifies the influence of the Vietnam era on the use of U.S. military power and the decision for war in 1990 and then outlines the important factors of Iraqi history and culture that dominated relations between the two nations during the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequent chapters examine the conduct of Desert Storm from the American and Iraqi perspectives and the military, economic, and diplomatic actions of the period between the two conventional campaigns. Final chapters analyze the 2003 offensive on Baghdad, the postwar stabilization operations that began with the failure to transition under the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the eventual implementation of a warfighting strategy that combined new doctrine and a surge of forces to protect the population in a renewed counterinsurgency campaign. A concluding chapter reviews key lessons for the future, including the importance of effective strategic decision making and the operational mindset required to prosecute modern war successfully.

This edited volume provides an overview on US involvement in Iraq from the 1958 Iraqi coup to the present-day, offering a deeper context to the current conflict. Using a range of innovative methods to interrogate US foreign policy, ideology and culture, the book provides a broad set of reflections on past, present and future implications of US-Iraqi relations, and especially the strategic implications for US policy-making. In doing so, it examines several key aspects of relationship such as: the 1958 Iraqi Revolution; the impact of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; the impact of the Nixon Doctrine on the regional balance of power; US attempts at rapprochement during the 1980s; the 1990-91 Gulf War; and, finally, sanctions and inspections. Analysis of the contemporary Iraq crisis sets US plans against the 'reality' they faced in the country, and explores both attempts to bring security to Iraq, and the implications of failure.

An analysis of attempts to coerce Iraq since Desert Storm reveals that military strikes and other forms of pressure that threatened Saddam Husayn's relationship with his power base proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime. Although Iraq remains hostile to the United States, Baghdad has repeatedly compromised, and at times caved, in response to U.S. pressure and threats. An analysis of attempts to coerce Iraq since Desert Storm reveals that military strikes and other forms of pressure that threatened Saddam Husayn's relationship with his power base proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime. When coercing Saddam or other foes, U.S. policymakers should design a strategy around the adversary's center of gravity while seeking to neutralize adversary efforts to counter-coerce the United States and appreciating the policy constraints imposed by domestic politics and international alliances.

As the crisis with Iraq continues, Americans have questions. Is war really necessary? What can it accomplish? What broad vision of U.S. foreign policy underlies the determination to remove Saddam Hussein? What were the failures of the last couple of decades that brought us to a showdown with a dictator developing weapons of mass destruction? What is the relationship between war with Iraq and the events of 9/11? The answers to these questions are found in this timely book by two of America's leading foreign policy thinkers. Kristol and Kaplan lay out a detailed rationale for action against Iraq. But to understand why we must fight Saddam, the authors assert, it is necessary to go beyond the details of his weapons of mass destruction, his past genocidal actions against Iran and his own people, and the U.N. resolutions he has ignored. The explanation begins with how the dominant policy ideas of the last decade—Clintonian liberalism and Republican realpolitik—led American policymakers to turn a blind eye to the threat Iraq has posed for well over a decade. As Kristol and Kaplan make clear, the war over Iraq is in large part a war of competing ideas about America's role in the world. The authors provide the first comprehensive explanation of the strategy of “preemption\" guiding the Bush Administration in dealing with this crisis. They show that American foreign policy for the 21st century is being forged in the crucible of our response to Saddam. The war over Iraq will presumably be the end of Saddam Hussein. But it will be the beginning of a new era in American foreign policy. William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan are indispensable guides to the era that lies ahead.