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In the spring of 2004, army reservist and public affairs officer Steven J. Alvarez waited to be called up as the U.S. military stormed Baghdad and deposed Saddam Hussein. But soon after President Bush's famous PR stunt in which an aircraft carrier displayed the banner \"Mission Accomplished,\" the dynamics of the war shifted.Selling Warrecounts how the U.S. military lost the information war in Iraq by engaging the wrong audiences-that is, the Western media-by ignoring Iraqi citizens and the wider Arab population, and by paying mere lip service to the directive to \"Put an Iraqi face on everything.\" In the absence of effective communication from the U.S. military, the information void was swiftly filled by Al Qaeda and, eventually, ISIS. As a result, efforts to create and maintain a successful, stable country were complicated and eventually frustrated.Alvarez couples his experiences as a public affairs officer in Iraq with extensive research on communication and government relations to expose why communications failed and led to the breakdown on the ground. A revealing glimpse into the inner workings of the military's PR machine, where personnel become stewards of presidential legacies and keepers of flawed policies,Selling Warprovides a critical review of the outdated communication strategies executed in Iraq. Alvarez's candid account demonstrates how a fundamental lack of understanding about how to wage an information war has led to the conditions we face now: the rise of ISIS and the return of U.S. forces to Iraq.

This book is a work of investigative journalism and historical recreation ranging from 2003 to 2012, giving a comprehensive, inside account of arguably the most widely reported yet least understood war in American history, from the occupation of Iraq to the withdrawal of American troops. Provides a blow-by-blow chronicle of the fighting, but also deftly pieces together the puzzle of the prosecution of American, Iraqi, and Iranian objectives, and the diplomatic intrigue and political struggle within Iraq since the American invasion.

Despite all that has been written on it, the Iraq war - its causes, agency and execution - has been shrouded in an ideological mist. Now, Muhammad Idrees Ahmad dispels the myths surrounding the war, taking a sociological approach to establish the war's causes, identify its agents and describe how it was sold. Ahmad presents a social history of the war's leading agents - the neoconservatives - and shows how this ideologically coherent group of determined political agents used the contingency of 9/11 to overwhelm a sceptical foreign policy establishment, military brass and intelligence apparatus, propelling the US into a war that a significant portion of the public opposed. The book includes an historical exploration of American militarism and of the increased post-WWII US role in the Middle East, as well as a reconsideration of the debates that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt sparked after the publication of The Israel lobby and US Foreign Policy.

The riveting, exclusive true story of an Iraq whistleblower who continues to be betrayed by his country, as told by an international bestselling author. Gregory Ford, an intelligence agent and medic, was in Iraq for only a short time - from the invasion in March 2003 until early June of the same year, when he was strapped to a stretcher, drugged, and \"renditioned\" out of Iraq in a clandestine and criminal operation at the behest of his command, who were frantically trying to silence him. But why? \"Midnight in Samarra\" is the shocking true story of one soldier's attempt to speak up and report the abuse and torture he saw being inflicted on the local population, as well as secret, incriminating, enormous Iraqi arms stores of American-made Weapons of Mass Destruction with bills of lading implicating, among others, famous political families. His warnings about simmering anti-American fury of the local populace were ignored and suppressed by his command; hundreds of millions of dollars in cash seized in the home of Saddam Hussein's main banker as a result of Ford's intelligence work vanished without a trace. Ford's information about Hussein's location, which could have led to the dictator's apprehension six months before his actual capture, was also ignored and suppressed. As Ford was filing charges against his superior officers, they seized his weapons (illegal in a war zone), tried to declare him insane and abducted him by force, restrained him, adminstered a dangerous mind-altering drug during a Medavac flight, and tried to interrogate him while he was under. Years later Gregory Ford is still trying to get justice. His command - and high-ups in both the military and government - lied, dissembled, obfuscated, danced, and dodged while Ford endured libel, slander, and innuendo, feared for his life, and nearly a decade after the drugging on the plane, learned that the chemical injected into him had done permanent damage to his heart and nervous system. \"Midnight in Sammara\" is the story of one man's courage and conviction, and the horrifying truths of one of our most trusted and honored institutions.--Inside cover.

The Iraq War of March 19, 2003 was an implausible war at the outset. We now understand that it could have been averted and never should have been waged. How and why did it begin? Who was responsible? This book offers a new perspective on the Iraq War and explains the dynamic relationships between the George W. Bush administration, the United States Congress, and the national news media. It is based on the “multiple streams model of political change” by John Kingdon, which says that if a unique combination of political, policy, and problem streams collide, under the right circumstances, they can create a window of opportunity for a shift in policy. It was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which set the stage for the emergence of three dynamic streams in the country. Fear, power, and a contentious political climate converged to produce not only a dramatic new foreign policy, but also a war with Iraq, a country which had not provoked or threatened the United States. Fear, power, and a tense political climate also influenced institutional behavior and exposed the failures of 1) The executive branch in the administration of George W. Bush, 2) The United States Congress and, 3) the national news media. All are designed and are differently responsible to protect the interests of the American people. Errors in judgment have happened throughout history with other administrations, with other Congresses, and with the news media. However, with regard to the Iraq War, it was a matter of degree and extent, especially for the President of the United States. Both the Congress and the news media were also experiencing colossal institutional changes, which influenced and hindered their performances. However, all were culpable in helping to create the Iraq war, which today stands as one of the longest military conflicts in United States history.

This edited volume presents the foremost scholarly thinking on why the US invaded Iraq in 2003, a pivotal event in both modern US foreign policy and international politics. In the years since the US invasion of Iraq it has become clear that the threat of weapons of mass destruction was not as urgent as the Bush administration presented it and that Saddam Hussein was not involved with either Al Qaeda or 9/11. Many consider the war a mistake and question why Iraq was invaded. A majority of Americans now believe that the public were deliberately misled by the Bush administration in order to bolster support for the war. Public doubt has been strengthened by the growing number of critical scholarly analyses and in-depth journalistic investigations about the invasion that suggest the administration was not candid about its reasons for wanting to take action against Iraq. This volume begins with a survey of private scholarly views about the war's origins, then assesses the current state of debate by organising the best recent thinking by foreign policy and international relations experts on why the US invaded Iraq. The book covers a broad range of approaches to explaining Iraq - the role of the uncertainty of intelligence, cognitive biases, ideas, Israel, and oil, highlighting areas of both agreement and disagreement. This book will be of much interest to students of the Iraq War, US foreign and security policy, strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics and IR/Security Studies in general.

\"Party in the Street explores the interaction between political parties and social movements in the United States. Examining the collapse of the post-9/11 antiwar movement against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this book focuses on activism and protest in the United States. It argues that the electoral success of the Democratic Party and President Barack Obama, as well as antipathy toward President George W. Bush, played a greater role in this collapse than did changes in foreign policy. It shows that how people identify with social movements and political parties matters a great deal, and it considers the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street as comparison cases\"-- Provided by publisher.

In Deceit on the Road to War , John M. Schuessler examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic process, in Schuessler's view, because elected leaders have powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit. These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is greatest. When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated risk that the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the public to adopt a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The three cases featured in the book-Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the Iraq War-test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies are not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as contrary to the national interest. In Deceit on the Road to War , John M. Schuessler examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic process, in Schuessler's view, because elected leaders have powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit. These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is greatest.When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated risk that the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the public to adopt a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The three cases featured in the book-Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the Iraq War-test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies are not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as contrary to the national interest.