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Introducing the Negev–Bedouin land issue from the international indigenous land rights perspective, this comparative study suggests options for the recognition of their land. The book demonstrates that the Bedouin land dispossession, like many indigenous peoples’, progressed through several phases that included eviction and displacement, legislation, and judicial decisions that support acts of dispossession and deny the Bedouin’s traditional land rights. Examining the Mawat legal doctrine on which the State and the Court rely on to deny Bedouin land rights, this volume introduces the relevant international law protecting indigenous land rights and shows how the limitations of this law prevent any meaningful protection of Bedouin land rights. In the second part of the work, the Aborigines’ land in Australia is introduced as an example of indigenous peoples’ successful struggle for their traditional land rights. The final chapter analyzes the basic elements of judicial recognition of the land and shows that the basic elements needed for Bedouin land recognition exist in the Israeli legal system. Proposing practical recommendations for the recognition of Bedouin land, this volume is a key resource to scholars and students interested in land rights, international law, comparative studies, and the Middle East.

Immunity from tort liability for losses that are inflicted during warfare is often justified by a supposedly intuitive concern: without immunity, states and combatants will be over-deterred from engaging in combat. In this article, I test this common perception using three frameworks. First, I theoretically analyze the impact of tort liability on relevant state actors’ incentives to engage in warfare. This analysis suggests that tort law is likely to under-deter state actors in relation to their decisions on whether and how to conduct hostilities. Second, I test this conclusion through an original mixed-methods exploratory research, using Israel as a test case. My findings reveal that while tort liability under-deters state actors from engaging in warfare, it can prompt them to implement regulatory measures to minimize the state’s liability. Third, I offer a legal history analysis, exploring why Israel established an immunity from tort liability for losses it inflicts during combat in 1951, and why and how this immunity has expanded since. I show that as the Israel-Palestine conflict prolonged and intensified, state actors began viewing Palestinians’ tort claims as a civilian means of warfare and immunity from liability as the weapon needed for defending Israel’s interests.

Israel's military court system, a centerpiece of Israel's apparatus of control in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, has prosecuted hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. This authoritative book provides a rare look at an institution that lies both figuratively and literally at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Lisa Hajjar has conducted in-depth interviews with dozens of Israelis and Palestinians—including judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, defendants, and translators—about their experiences and practices to explain how this system functions, and how its functioning has affected the conflict. Her lucid, richly detailed, and theoretically sophisticated study highlights the array of problems and debates that characterize Israel's military courts as it asks how the law is deployed to protect and further the interests of the Israeli state and how it has been used to articulate and defend the rights of Palestinians living under occupation.

This study examines how social media users emotionally respond to Israeli politicians’ messages during crises based on political alignment and crisis type. With Israel’s frequent civic and military crises, the case study in this article aims to offer unique insights to scholars, practitioners, and the public invested in the intersection of online media, emotions, and crisis. To this end, we built a dataset of Facebook posts (N = 25,000) published by all active right, left, and center members of the Israeli parliament and government over a period of one year (November 2022–November 2023). We ensured that the dataset includes both routine and crisis periods, particularly the judicial reform unrest (civic crisis) and the Hamas–Israel war following the October 7 attack (military crisis). Our statistical analysis indicated two major trends in the dataset: (a) during the military crisis, emotional markers that were previously considered to correlate and cluster (sad and angry) are not merely different, as they stand in opposition to one another; (b) crisis periods, especially military, invite use of “edge” reactions, and see a significant increase in negative emotions, whereas routine times prompt more neutral or positive reactions. Reading the findings through the combination of affordances theory, mediatization theory, and the “template for emotions” concept, we suggest that social media may amplify negative reactions beyond politicians’ influence, as the limited emotional spectrum offered on platforms might steer users to certain emotive responses, affecting risk management in crises. These insights call for decision-makers to consider the implications of emotional appeals and incentives on social media, especially during crises, to foster safer democratic public discourse.

The recent events in Palestine, starting on Oct. 7, have surprised many people, but attentive observers knew that the status quo was unsustainable. Palestinian fighters parachuted into southern Israel, capturing hundreds of Israelis, including soldiers and civilians. The reason for the surprise is that Israel tends to focus on its internal political discourses and intelligence analyses, neglecting Palestinian discourses. To understand these events, we must look back at the preceding year. In 2022, the UN Middle East envoy declared it the most violent year since 2005, with many Palestinian casualties. Palestinian leadership, however, continued to pacify resistance calls while maintaining security coordination with Israel. In response to the oppressive Israeli government, Palestinians developed defensive strategies, such as the multifactional resistance group, The Lions Den. Israel attempted to crush this rebellion through incursions into Palestinian towns and refugee camps. However, instead of quelling resistance, these incursions ignited a wider rebellion and further strained the relationship between Palestinians and their leadership. Israeli intelligence reports indicated a plan by Hamas to ignite an armed intifada, leading to the assassination of Saleh Arouri. Israel believed that Hamas in Gaza was disinterested in confrontation, but they miscalculated. On Oct. 7, Hamas executed well-coordinated attacks in southern Israel. The response from the US and the West was solidarity with Israel, calls for revenge, and plans to displace Palestinians. The Israeli war on Gaza resulted in unprecedented Palestinian casualties, leading to accusations of genocide. The UN's inability to prevent this genocide disabled the international legal and political systems. Despite the violence and starvation, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank resisted, with Gaza becoming the epicenter of the Israeli genocide. Palestinians are determined to win their freedom, and their determination is greater than Israel's ability to break their resistance.

The religion-and-state debate in Israel is Jewish-centered, systematically disregarding the status of the Palestinian-Arab minority This is rather puzzling, not least because, in many other countries, this debate does pick up conflicts pertaining to minority religions, and the Palestinian-Arab minority has generated a rich and diverse series of questions that might easily have qualified as highly relevant to it. The article decodes this anomaly by pointing out the existence of a legal matrix in the Israeli religion-and-state conflict. This matrix identifies a value system in the Israeli legal system by which the recognition accorded to Jewish religious institutions and norms is regarded as \"public and coercive\" and the recognition accorded to the Palestinian-Arabs is regarded as \"private and liberal.\" The second part of the article comments on some legal implications of this matrix and critically evaluates the question whether what seems to be \"private and liberal\" is so in fact.

This article offers a typology of comparative law research and assesses the state of this body of research in one Asian country – the State of Israel. To identify the work that should be considered ‘comparative’, I classify studies into three groups. Following a short overview of Israel's political and legal system, I assess the ways comparative public law is addressed in the country. Relying on a first-of-its-kind quantitative study of Israeli legal scholarship in English in the field of public law that compares at least two systems, the article shows that the compared systems in Israeli comparative legal research are predominantly western, and that materials from the United States by far outweigh all other sources. The article then considers several possible reasons for the limited gaze eastwards and beyond the United States, granting special attention to the cultural ‘Americanization’ of Israel. Directions for future research are considered in the conclusion, including the expansion of the findings from public law to other fields of law; the comparison of these findings with those of similar systems in Asia and beyond; and the possible ways legal education may promote the development of eastern-bound comparative exercises.

While Israeli and Palestinian veterans were able to lay the foundation for mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1993 Oslo Accords, they haven't been able to complete the job by ending the occupation and achieving peace based upon mutual recognition between two states: Israel and Palestine living side by side along the June 4,1967 borders. Twenty-eight years later, the occupation continues, the settlement enterprise is expanding, the 1967 borders known as the Green Line are fading, and the dual legal system and the deprivation of Palestinians of their rights has created an increasingly apartheid-like reality in the occupied West Bank.In the recent unprecedented fourth round of, and once again inconclusive, Israeli elections, the occupation and Israeli-Palestinian relations were simply not on the agenda. The focus was on \"Bibi yes or no\" and how to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic repercussions. While Palestinians are looking forward to the prospect of their first elections since 2005-06, they are mainly concerned with ending the division between Fateh and Hamas, restoring the legitimacy of their national institutions, arranging their internal affairs by electing a new leadership and adopting a comprehensive national plan to lead their struggle for freedom and independence against Israeli maneuvers to liquidate the Palestinian cause and undermine any possibility of establishing a Palestinian state.

This article explores the practices, discourses and dilemmas of the Israeli human rights NGOs that are working to protect and promote the human rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This case can shed light on the complex process of \"triangular translation\" of human rights, which is distinct from other forms of human rights localization studied thus far. In this process, human rights NGOs translate international human rights norms on the one hand, and the suffering of the victims on the other, into the conceptions and legal language commonly employed by the state that violates these rights. We analyze the dialectics of change and reproduction embedded in the efforts of Israeli activists to defend Palestinian human rights while at the same time depoliticizing their work and adopting discriminatory premises and conceptions hegemonic in Israeli society. The recent and alarming legislative proposals in Israel aimed at curtailing the work of human rights NGOs reinforce the need to reconsider the role of human rights NGOs in society, including their depoliticized strategies, their use of legal language and their relations with the diminishing peace movement.

This timely and critically important work does what hostilities in the Middle East have made nearly impossible: it offers a measured, internal perspective on Palestinian politics, viewing emerging political patterns from the Palestinian point of view rather than through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Based on groundbreaking fieldwork, interviews with Palestinian leaders, and an extensive survey of Arabic-language writings and documents,Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accordspresents the meaning of state building and self-reliance as Palestinians themselves have understood them in the years between 1993 and 2002. Nathan J. Brown focuses his work on five areas: legal development, constitution drafting, the Palestinian Legislative Council, civil society, and the effort to write a new curriculum. His book shows how Palestinians have understood efforts at building institutions as acts of resumption rather than creation-with activists and leaders seeing themselves as recovering from an interrupted past, Palestinians seeking to rejoin the Arab world by building their new institutions on Arab models, and many Palestinian reformers taking the Oslo Accords as an occasion to resume normal political life. Providing a clear and urgently needed vantage point on most of the issues of Palestinian reform and governance that have emerged in recent policy debates-issues such as corruption, constitutionalism, democracy, and rule of law-Brown's book helps to put Palestinian aspirations and accomplishments in their proper context within a long and complex history and within the larger Arab world.