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We revisit the issue of the high cyclicality of wages of new hires.We show that after controlling for composition effects likely involving procyclical upgrading of job match quality, the wages of new hires are no more cyclical than those of existing workers. The key implication is that the sluggish behaviour of wages for existing workers is a better guide to the cyclicality of the marginal cost of labour than is the high measured cyclicality of new hires wages unadjusted for composition effects. Key to our identification is distinguishing between new hires from unemployment versus those who are job changers. We argue that to a reasonable approximation, the wages of the former provide a composition-free estimate of the wage flexibility, while the same is not true for the latter. We then develop a quantitative general equilibrium model with sticky wages via staggered contracting, on-the-job search, and heterogeneous match quality, and show that it can account for both the panel data evidence and aggregate evidence on labour market volatility.

Understanding whether labor market discrimination explains inferior labor market outcomes for many groups has drawn the attention of labor economists for decades—at least since the publication of Gary Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination in 1957. The decades of research on discrimination in labor markets began with a regression-based “decomposition” approach, asking whether raw wage or earnings differences between groups—which might constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination—were in fact attributable to other productivity-related factors. Subsequent research—responding in large part to limitations of the regression-based approach—moved on to other approaches, such as using firm-level data to estimate both marginal productivity and wage differentials. In recent years, however, there has been substantial growth in experimental research on labor market discrimination—although the earliest experiments were done decades ago. Some experimental research on labor market discrimination takes place in the lab. But far more of it is done in the field, which makes this particular area of experimental research unique relative to the explosion of experimental economic research more generally. This paper surveys the full range of experimental literature on labor market discrimination, places it in the context of the broader research literature on labor market discrimination, discusses the experimental literature from many different perspectives (empirical, theoretical, and policy), and reviews both what this literature has taught us thus far, and what remains to be done.

We propose a framework to identify and estimate earnings distributions and worker composition on matched panel data, allowing for two-sided worker-firm unobserved heterogeneity and complementarities in earnings. We introduce two models: a static model that allows for nonlinear interactions between workers and firms, and a dynamic model that allows, in addition, for Markovian earnings dynamics and endogenous mobility. We show that this framework nests a number of structural models of wages and worker mobility. We establish identification in short panels, and develop tractable two-step estimators where firms are classified in a first step. Applying our method to Swedish administrative data, we find that log-earnings are approximately additive in worker and firm heterogeneity. Our estimates imply the presence of strong sorting patterns between workers and firms, and a small contribution of firms—net of worker composition—to earnings dispersion. In addition, we document that wages have a direct effect on mobility, and that, beyond their dependence on the current firm, earnings after a job move also depend on the previous employer.

The increasing availability of data derived from linked consumer financial accounts has the potential to dramatically expand the potential for research. Examining the most comprehensive existing set of linked-account data, consisting of transaction and balance sheet data for millions of Americans, I demonstrate the power and versatility of such sources. I discuss advantages and concerns arising from this type of data andmatch a range of distributionalmoments to external sources. As one application, I test consumption elasticities across households with varying levels, and types, of debt. I find that heterogeneity in consumption elasticity can be explained entirely by credit and liquidity.

The growth of the “gig” economy generates worker flexibility that, some have speculated, will favour women. We explore this by examining labour supply choices and earnings among more than a million rideshare drivers on Uber in the U.S. We document a roughly 7% gender earnings gap amongst drivers. We show that this gap can be entirely attributed to three factors: experience on the platform (learning-by-doing), preferences and constraints over where to work (driven largely by where drivers live and, to a lesser extent, safety), and preferences for driving speed. We do not find that men and women are differentially affected by a taste for specific hours, a return to within-week work intensity, or customer discrimination. Our results suggest that, in a “gig” economy setting with no gender discrimination and highly flexible labour markets, women’s relatively high opportunity cost of non-paid-work time and gender-based differences in preferences and constraints can sustain a gender pay gap.

On the leading job board CareerBuilder.com, high-wage job postings unexpectedly attract fewer applicants, and this is the case even within a detailed occupation. Viewed through the lens of our directed search model, this negative relationship is indicative of substantial applicant heterogeneity within an occupation. Empirically, we find that job title heterogeneity is key: within a job title, jobs with 10% higher wages do attract 7.7% more applicants. Furthermore, our findings are consistent with a higher return to worker quality for hires in “manager” and “senior” job titles. Overall, our findings demonstrate the power of words in the matching process.

Using administrative payroll data from the largest US payroll processing company, we measure the extent of nominal wage rigidity in the United States. The data allow us to define a worker’s per-period base contract wage separately from other forms of compensation such as overtime premiums and bonuses. We provide evidence that firms use base wages to cyclically adjust the marginal cost of their workers. Nominal base wage declines are much rarer than previously thought with only 2 percent of job-stayers receiving a nominal base wage cut during a given year. Approximately 35 percent of workers receive no base wage change year over year. We document strong evidence of both time and state dependence in nominal base wage adjustments. In addition, we provide evidence that the flexibility of new hire base wages is similar to that of existing workers. Collectively, our results can be used to discipline models of nominal wage rigidity.

We construct a structural model of on-the-job search in which workers differ in skills along several dimensions and sort themselves into jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements along those same dimensions. Skills are accumulated when used, and depreciate when not used. We estimate the model combining data from O*NET with the NLSY79. We use the model to shed light on the origins and costs of mismatch along heterogeneous skill dimensions. We highlight the deficiencies of relying on a unidimensional model of skill when decomposing the sources of variation in the value of lifetime output between initial conditions and career shocks.

Online labor markets allow rapid recruitment of large numbers of workers for very low pay. Although online workers are often used as research participants, there is little evidence that they are motivated to make costly choices to forgo wealth or leisure that are often central to addressing accounting research questions. Thus, we investigate the validity of using online workers as a proxy for non-experts when accounting research designs use more demanding tasks than these workers typically complete. Three experiments examine the costly choices of online workers relative to student research participants. We find that online workers are at least as willing as students to make costly choices, even at significantly lower wages. We also find that online workers are sensitive to performance-based wages, which are just as effective in inducing high effort as high fixed wages. We discuss implications of our results for conducting accounting research with online workers.

This article identifies an equilibrium theory of wage formation and endogenous quit turnover in a labour market with on-the-job search, where risk averse workers accumulate human capital through learning-by-doing and lose skills while unemployed. Optimal contracting implies the wage paid increases with experience and tenure. Indirect inference using German data determines the deep parameters of the model. The estimated model not only reproduces the large and persistent fall in wages and earnings following job loss, a new structural decomposition finds foregone human capital accumulation (while unemployed) is the worker’s major cost of job loss.