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The article is devoted to the analysis of Pitirim Sorokin’s book “The Sociology of Revolution” in the context of scientific achievements in the field of the theory of revolution. The author analyzes: first, those ideas and thoughts that formed the basis of Sorokin's concept in comparison with those approaches and ideas that existed in his time; Secondly, those ideas and approaches that had been developing in the 20th century under the influence of Sorokin’s book. The author considers, that Sorokin’s “The Sociology of Revolution” needs to be considered in the scientific context of researches on the causes of social protest from Aristotle to Enlightenment, researches on the English and Great French Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries and the development of the theory of revolution in the 19th century. The author concludes that Sorokin's “The Sociology of Revolution” had absorbed into its concept existing approaches and ideas, and became a bright conceptual work, which gave a way to several generations of researchers of the theory of revolution in the 20th century. And its great influence is still valid.

Many historical processes exhibit recurrent patterns of change. Century-long periods of population expansion come before long periods of stagnation and decline; the dynamics of prices mirror population oscillations; and states go through strong expansionist phases followed by periods of state failure, endemic sociopolitical instability, and territorial loss. Peter Turchin and Sergey Nefedov explore the dynamics and causal connections between such demographic, economic, and political variables in agrarian societies and offer detailed explanations for these long-term oscillations--what the authors call secular cycles.

In the current paper, we investigate the predictive ability of Goldstone’s demographic structural model. In particular we seek to apply Turchin’s version of it to modeling the social pressures for political instability in the UK. It is then demonstrated that Turchin’s analysis of ‘demographic structural’ pressures in the US presents similar conditions that developed under neoliberalism during the same time periods in both countries. It is also demonstrated that the modeling of social pressures toward political instability in the UK and the USA performed by Peter Turchin and us can throw some light on the factors and patterns of the global sociopolitical destabilization wave of the 2010s. Thus, Goldstone’s demographic structural model might have some predictive potential not only at the national level, but also global scale.

In the last thirty years, there have been fierce debates over how civilizations develop and why the West became so powerful.The Measure of Civilizationpresents a brand-new way of investigating these questions and provides new tools for assessing the long-term growth of societies. Using a groundbreaking numerical index of social development that compares societies in different times and places, award-winning author Ian Morris sets forth a sweeping examination of Eastern and Western development across 15,000 years since the end of the last ice age. He offers surprising conclusions about when and why the West came to dominate the world and fresh perspectives for thinking about the twenty-first century. Adapting the United Nations' approach for measuring human development, Morris's index breaks social development into four traits--energy capture per capita, organization, information technology, and war-making capacity--and he uses archaeological, historical, and current government data to quantify patterns. Morris reveals that for 90 percent of the time since the last ice age, the world's most advanced region has been at the western end of Eurasia, but contrary to what many historians once believed, there were roughly 1,200 years--from about 550 to 1750 CE--when an East Asian region was more advanced. Only in the late eighteenth century CE, when northwest Europeans tapped into the energy trapped in fossil fuels, did the West leap ahead. Resolving some of the biggest debates in global history,The Measure of Civilizationputs forth innovative tools for determining past, present, and future economic and social trends.

Though not its main focus, Goldstone's Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (1991) threw considerable new light on 19 th century Europe's revolutions and near-revolutions. While Goldstone stresses the role of an expanding and industrializing economy in absorbing 19 th century England's demographic shocks, we accept this analysis but argue alongside it for similar attention to the vector of emigration, settler-colonialism, and imperial state expansion into which at least some of the exhaust fumes of the population explosion were vented. Furthermore, it is important to note the crucial role of a highly interventionist state and 'big' government in the background to these dynamics—a far cry from the light-touch, laissez-faire qualities with which the 19 th century British state is often associated.To make our case, this article takes advantage of secondary literature and raw data not available prior to the publication of Goldstone's book. Of crucial importance here is our unique dataset of fatality-inducing political violence events in Britain and Ireland from 1785 to 1900. This is the first research paper to utilise this dataset. We draw upon this in the following section, which seeks to establish what the real level of political instability was in 19 th century Britain—thus cross-referencing Goldstone's account with more recent data—before moving on in the following section to a more detailed overview of the socio-economic conditions underlying events at the political level. This is followed by our account of the emigration-settler-colonialism-imperial state expansion vector and the interventionist state policy behind it, which we argue was crucial to making 19 th century Britain relatively 'revolution-proof'—alongside the expanding economic opportunities rightly highlighted by Goldstone. Lastly come our brief concluding remarks, which lay out the implications, as we see them, of this article's findings for research on revolutions, political violence and instability, demographic-structural theory, state-building, migration, and imperialism-colonialism.

Deirdre McCloskey has now completed the third volume of her trilogy on how the West (from 1800 to 1950) and most of the rest of the world (from 1900 to 2015) grew rich. The message of all three volumes is spelled out in the subtitle: \"How ideas, not capital or institutions, enriched the world\". The latest volume has much that is right, and a few things that are wrong; all are important. The book is also a tribute to the view that history's finest accomplishments are made late in careers, when one has not only absorbed but mastered a wide variety of materials. In this volume people are treated to McCloskey's finest displays of erudition to date. Her arguments range from in-depth analysis of English literature (notably tracing the marked differences in attitudes toward the bourgeoisie from Shakespeare to Jane Austen but also including Swift, Addison, Steele, Defoe, Fielding, Trollope, Pepys, Johnson) to philosophy (Adam Smith, David Hume, J.L. Austin, Wittgenstein) to hundreds of modern historians, economists, sociologists, and political scientists.

A review essay on books by (1) Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, & Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: U Cambridge Press, 2001); & (2) Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney Tarrow, & Charles Tilly Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge: U Cambridge Press, 2001). 6 References.

[Jack Goldstone] added: \"It's not often we get expensive records and apparently this one is quite rare.\" Oxfam staff and volunteers Joanne Maylott, Leigh Ellison and Jack Goldstone in the charity's shop on Manchester's Oldham Street .

Dunning applies Jack A. Goldstone's theory of early modern state crises, elucidated in \"Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World,\" to Russia's Time of Troubles, 1598-1613. The model fits well.