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Announces creation of Military Intelligence Program and orders draft of Defense Department Directive.

Reports that U.S. Marine Corps' service-level intelligence organizations and detachments in national and joint intelligence activities will be reorganized, and that new intelligence structure will be established under director of intelligence.

Reviews major components of intelligence budget, speculates on current budget amount, and discusses current authority over National Foreign Intelligence Program; evaluates current legislation proposing to place responsibility of NFIP budget under director of national intelligence.

Reviews congressional concerns about reconnaissance and surveillance programs, including lack of coordination, inadequacy of budget justifications, use of supplemental funding submissions, and need for reorganization.

Reviews 9/11 Commission's recommendations to replace director of central intelligence with director of national intelligence and to separate intelligence appropriations from defense budget; evaluates current legislation aimed at meeting recommendations.

Reviews congressional concerns about reconnaissance and surveillance programs, including lack of coordination, inadequate budget justifications, use of supplemental budget requests, and other topics.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports on its activities during January 4, 1995-October 3, 1996, including legislation enacted and oversight hearings and investigations.

John M. Deutch provides testimony about proliferation of nuclear materials and technology in Russia and former Soviet republics, impediments to countries committed to acquiring nuclear capability, Iraq's nuclear program, and nuclear aspirations of North Korea; and describes threats from terrorists, non-state-actors, and organized crime.

One of the remarkable phenomena in post-Cold War world politics is the persistence of the Anglo-American special relationship (AASR) in spite of recurrent announcement of its death by pessimists. Current scholarship on Anglo-American relations largely draws on interests and sentiments to explain the persistence of the AASR, ignoring other important contributing factors such as institutionalization. This article is the first to give serious consideration to the role of institutionalization in influencing the persistence of the AASR. By using the concept of path dependence, this article argues that the high-level institutionalization in Anglo-American intelligence, nuclear and military relations plays a seminal role in contributing to the persistence of the AASR in the post-Cold War era. The institutionalized intelligence relationship is exemplified by the relationship between the UK's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the US's National Security Agency (NSA), which is underpinned by the UKUSA Agreement. The institutionalized nuclear relationship is exemplified by a variety of Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs), which is underpinned by the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. The institutionalized military relationship is exemplified by routinized military personnel exchange programmes, regular joint training exercises and an extremely close defence trade partnership. The high-level institutionalization embeds habits of cooperation, solidifies interdependence and consolidates mutual trust between the UK and the US in their cooperation on intelligence, nuclear and military issues.