Explore the vast range of titles available.

Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring-and so elusive-to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when \"grand strategy\" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is. Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to \"do\" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking-but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come. Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring-and so elusive-to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when \"grand strategy\" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is.Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to \"do\" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking-but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come.

Chosen by William Safire in the New York Times to be the publishing sleeper-seller of the year for 2007. In this rapid-paced book, a former CIA chief of Soviet bloc counterintelligence breaks open the mysterious case of KGB officer Yuri Nosenko's 1964 defection to the United States. Still a highly controversial chapter in the history of Cold War espionage, the Nosenko affair has inspired debate for more than forty years: was Nosenko a bona fide defector with the real information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in Soviet Russia, or was he a KGB loyalist, engaged in a complex game of deception? As supervisor of CIA operations against the KGB at the time, Tennent H. Bagley directly handled Nosenko's case. This insider knowledge, combined with information gleaned from dozens of interviews with former KGB adversaries, places Bagley in a uniquely authoritative position. He guides the reader step by step through the complicated operations surrounding the Nosenko affair and shatters the comfortable version of events the CIA has presented to the public. Bagley unveils not only the KGB's history of merciless and bloody betrayals but also the existence of undiscovered traitors in the American camp. Shining new light on the CIA-KGB spy wars, he invites deeper thinking about the history of espionage and its implications for the intelligence community today.

In this volume, Richard Ned Lebow introduces his own constructivist theory of political order and international relations based on theories of motives and identity formation drawn from the ancient Greeks. His theory stresses the human need for self-esteem, and shows how it influences political behavior at every level of social aggregation. Lebow develops ideal-type worlds associated with four motives: appetite, spirit, reason and fear, and demonstrates how each generates a different logic concerning cooperation, conflict and risk-taking. Expanding and documenting the utility of his theory in a series of historical case studies, ranging from classical Greece to the war in Iraq, he presents a novel explanation for the rise of the state and the causes of war, and offers a reformulation of prospect theory. This is a novel theory of politics by one of the world's leading scholars of international relations.

Das Buch , das im Mittelpunkt des vorliegenden Beitrags steht, wurde 1978 unter der Leitung von Christel Hoffmann und im Namen des Nationalen Zentrums DDR der ASSITEJ (Internationale Vereinigung für Kinder- und Jugendtheater) im Henschelverlag in Ostberlin veröffentlicht. Zunächst wird die Entstehungsgeschichte dieses Buches rekonstruiert, das die wichtige Rolle des Kinder- und Jugendtheaters in der DDR belegt. Anschließend wird auf die Anwesenheit von Materialien in Paris eingegangen, die sich auf das Buch beziehen, vom Nationalen Zentrum DDR der ASSITEJ zugeschickt wurden und sich jetzt im Bestand der Société d’Histoire du Théâtre befinden: Durch die Untersuchung dieser Archive kann der Austausch zwischen Ost- und Westblock im Bereich des Kinder- und Jugendtheaters zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges beleuchtet werden. Le livre , qui est au centre de notre contribution, a été publié aux éditions Henschel à Berlin-Est en 1978 sous la direction de Christel Hoffmann et au nom du Centre national RDA de l’ASSITEJ (Association internationale du théâtre pour l’enfance et la jeunesse). Nous nous attachons tout d’abord à retracer la genèse de cet ouvrage, lequel témoigne du rôle important incombant en RDA au théâtre pour l’enfance et la jeunesse. Puis, nous revenons sur la présence à Paris, dans le fonds de la Société d’Histoire du Théâtre, de documents relatifs au livre et envoyés par le Centre national RDA de l’ASSITEJ : à travers l’examen de ces archives, nous mettons en lumière les échanges existants entre blocs de l’Est et de l’Ouest, au moment de la guerre froide, en matière de théâtre jeunes publics. The book (Children’s and Youth Theatre of the World), which is the focus of my contribution, was published by Henschelverlag in East Berlin in 1978 under the direction of Christel Hoffmann and on behalf of the GDR National Centre of the ASSITEJ (International Association for Children’s and Youth Theatre). I begin by reconstructing the genesis of this book, which bears witness to the important role played by children’s and youth theatre in the GDR. Then I look back at the presence in Paris, in the holdings of the Société d’Histoire du Théâtre, of documents relating to the book and sent by the GDR National Centre of the ASSITEJ : By examining these archives, I aim to shed light on the exchanges that existed between the East and West blocs, at the time of the Cold War, in terms of children’s and youth theatre.

In this riveting memoir, Daniloff describes the reality of journalism behind the Iron Curtain: how Western reporters banded together to thwart Soviet propagandists, how their \"official sources\" were almost always controlled by the KGB-and how those sources would sometimes try to turn newsmen into collaborators. When Daniloff was arrested and thrown into prison as a spy, the incident threatened to undo the Reykjavik summit until a solution was worked out. Daniloff also tells how the news media played a crucial role in resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis, recalls the emotional impact of the JFK assassination on Soviet leadership, and describes the behind-the-scenes struggles that catapulted Mikhail Gorbachev to power.

This article takes a strategic narrative approach to explaining the current and likely future contestation between Russia and the West. We argue that Russia projects a strategic narrative that seeks to reinforce Russia’s global prestige and authority, whilst promoting multilateral legal and institutional constraints on the other more powerful actors, as a means to ensure Russia stays among the top ranking great powers. To illustrate this we analyze Russia’s identity narratives, international system narratives and issue narratives present in policy documents and speeches by key players since 2000. This enables the identification of remarkably consistency in Russia’s narratives and potential points of convergence with Western powers around commitment to international law and systemic shifts to an increasingly multipolar order. However, we explain why the different meanings attributed to these phenomena generate contestation rather than alignment about past, present and future global power relations. We argue that Russia’s historical-facing narratives and weakened material circumstances have the potential to hamper its adaptation to rapid systemic change, and to make attempts to forge closer cooperation with third parties challenging.

Blick ins BuchSiegesgewiss plante General Douglas MacArthur, Oberkommandierenderder UN-Streitkrafte in Korea, eine groangelegte Offensive, die einen kraftvollen Vorsto aller Truppen nach Norden vorsah. Am chinesischen Grenzfluss Yalu sollte der nordkoreanische Gegner endgultig zerschlagen und der Koreakrieg noch vor Ablauf des Jahres 1950 beendet werden. Wahrend die UN-Truppen in der bergigen Landschaft beiderseits des Flusses Cheongcheon vorruckten, formierte sich unerkannt ein gewaltiger chinesischer Gegenangriff, der die ambitionierte Offensive in eine schwere Niederlage verwandelte. Wir stehen einem vollig neuen Krieg gegenuber lautete das Urteil MacArthurs, der erkannte, dass die chinesische Intervention fortan die Strategie in Korea nachhaltig verandern wurde. Die Schlacht am Cheongcheon ist damit nicht nur ein Wendepunkt des Koreakrieges, sondern auch ein Schlusselereignis des Kalten Krieges. Oliver Heyn analysiert die taktischen Entscheidungen der Generale ebenso wie die Erfahrungen und Emotionen der Soldaten, die in extremer Kalte um jedes Stuck Boden rangen. Am Ende steht die Einsicht, dass trotz uberlegener Technik und Material der Faktor Mensch die entscheidende Komponente auf dem Schlachtfeld bleibt.

Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.

A major theoretical statement by a distinguished political scholar explains why a policy of liberal hegemony is doomed to failIn this major statement, the renowned international-relations scholar John Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony, the foreign policy pursued by the United States since the Cold War ended, is doomed to fail. It makes far more sense, he maintains, for Washington to adopt a more restrained foreign policy based on a sound understanding of how nationalism and realism constrain great powers abroad.It is widely believed in the West that the United States should spread liberal democracy across the world, foster an open international economy, and build institutions. This policy of remaking the world in America's image is supposed to protect human rights, promote peace, and make the world safe for democracy. But this is not what has happened. Instead, the United States has ended up as a highly militarized state fighting wars that undermine peace, harm human rights, and threaten liberal values at home. Mearsheimer tells us why this has happened.