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Abstract Hypotheses about the link between cannabis use and psychosis apply to the within-person level but have been tested mostly at the between-person level. We used a within-person design, in which a person serves as his own control, thus removing the need to consider confounding by any fixed (genetic and nongenetic) characteristic to study the prospective association between cannabis use and the incidence of attenuated psychotic experiences, and vice versa, adjusted for time-varying confounders. We combined 2 general population cohorts (at baseline: Early Developmental Stages of Psychopathology Study, n = 1395; Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study-2, n = 6603), which applied a similar methodology to study cannabis use and attenuated psychotic experiences with repeated interviews (T0, T1, T2, and T3) over a period of approximately 10 years. The Hausman test was significant for the adjusted models, indicating the validity of the fixed-effects model. In the adjusted fixed-effects model, prior cannabis use was associated with psychotic experiences (aOR = 7.03, 95% CI: 2.39, 20.69), whereas prior psychotic experiences were not associated with cannabis use (aOR = 0.59, 95% CI: 0.21, 1.71). Longitudinal studies applying random-effects models to study associations between risk factors and mental health outcomes, as well as reverse causality, may not yield precise estimates. Cannabis likely impacts causally on psychosis but not the other way round.

SignificanceSensory processing depends upon the integration of widely distributed neural assemblies. During every day listening, our ears receive different information (due to interaural time and amplitude differences) and it is known that both hemispheres extract different acoustic features. Nonetheless, acoustic features belonging to the same source become integrated. It has been suggested that the brain overcomes this “binding problem” by synchronization of oscillatory activity across the relevant regions. Here we probe interhemispheric oscillatory synchronization as a mechanism for acoustic feature binding using bihemispheric transcranial alternating current stimulation. Concurrent functional MRI reveals that antiphase stimulation of auditory areas changes effective connectivity between these areas, and that this change in connectivity predicts perceptual integration of dichotic stimuli. Brain connectivity plays a major role in the encoding, transfer, and integration of sensory information. Interregional synchronization of neural oscillations in the γ-frequency band has been suggested as a key mechanism underlying perceptual integration. In a recent study, we found evidence for this hypothesis showing that the modulation of interhemispheric oscillatory synchrony by means of bihemispheric high-density transcranial alternating current stimulation (HD-TACS) affects binaural integration of dichotic acoustic features. Here, we aimed to establish a direct link between oscillatory synchrony, effective brain connectivity, and binaural integration. We experimentally manipulated oscillatory synchrony (using bihemispheric γ-TACS with different interhemispheric phase lags) and assessed the effect on effective brain connectivity and binaural integration (as measured with functional MRI and a dichotic listening task, respectively). We found that TACS reduced intrahemispheric connectivity within the auditory cortices and antiphase (interhemispheric phase lag 180°) TACS modulated connectivity between the two auditory cortices. Importantly, the changes in intra- and interhemispheric connectivity induced by TACS were correlated with changes in perceptual integration. Our results indicate that γ-band synchronization between the two auditory cortices plays a functional role in binaural integration, supporting the proposed role of interregional oscillatory synchrony in perceptual integration.

With the broader availability of panel data, fixed effects (FE) regression models are becoming increasingly important in sociology. However, in some studies the potential pitfalls of these models may be ignored, and common critiques of FE models may not always be applicable in comparison to other methods. This article provides an overview of linear FE models and their pitfalls for applied researchers. Throughout the article, we contrast FE and classical pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) models. We argue that in most cases FE models are at least as good as pooled OLS models. Therefore, we encourage scholars to use FE models if possible. Nevertheless, the limitations of FE models should be known and considered.

When object A moves adjacent to a stationary object, B, and in that instant A stops moving and B starts moving, people irresistibly see this as an event in which A causes B to move. Real-world causal collisions are subject to Newtonian constraints on the relative speed of B following the collision, but here we show that perceptual constraints on the relative speed of B (which align imprecisely with Newtonian principles) define two categories of causal events in perception. Using performance-based tasks, we show that triggering events, in which B moves noticeably faster than A, are treated as being categorically different from launching events, in which B does not move noticeably faster than A, and that these categories are unique to causal events (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, we show that 7- to 9-month-old infants are sensitive to this distinction, which suggests that this boundary may be an early-developing component of causal perception (Experiment 3).

In two experiments, one hundred and sixty-two 6- to 8-year-olds were asked to reason counterfactually about events with different causal structures. All events involved overdetermined outcomes in which two different causal events led to the same outcome. In Experiment 1, children heard stories with either an ambiguous causal relation between events or causally unrelated events. Children in the causally unrelated version performed better than chance and better than those in the ambiguous condition. In Experiment 2, children heard stories in which antecedent events were causally connected or causally disconnected. Eight-year-olds performed above chance in both conditions, whereas 6-year-olds performed above chance only in the connected condition. This work provides the first evidence that children can reason counterfactually in causally overdetermined contexts by age 8.

Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.

Causal Bayes nets capture many aspects of causal thinking that set them apart from purely associative reasoning. However, some central properties of this normative theory routinely violated. In tasks requiring an understanding of explaining away and screening off, subjects often deviate from these principles and manifest the operation of an associative bias that we refer to as the rich-get-richer principle. This research focuses on these two failures comparing tasks in which causal scenarios are merely described (via verbal statements of the causal relations) versus experienced (via samples of data that manifest the intervariable correlations implied by the causal relations). Our key finding is that we obtained stronger deviations from normative predictions in the described conditions that highlight the instructed causal model compared to those that presented data. This counterintuitive finding indicate that a theory of causal reasoning and learning needs to integrate normative principles with biases people hold about causal relations.

There is an ongoing debate whether biological illness explanations improve tolerance towards persons with mental illness or not. Several theoretical models have been proposed to predict the relationship between causal beliefs and social acceptance. This study uses path models to compare different theoretical predictions regarding attitudes towards persons with schizophrenia, depression and alcohol dependence. In a representative population survey in Germany (n = 3642), we elicited agreement with belief in biogenetic causes, current stress and childhood adversities as causes of either disorder as described in an unlabelled case vignette. We further elicited potentially mediating attitudes related to different theories about the consequences of biogenetic causal beliefs (attribution theory: onset responsibility, offset responsibility; genetic essentialism: differentness, dangerousness; genetic optimism: treatability) and social acceptance. For each vignette condition, we calculated a multiple mediator path model containing all variables. Biogenetic beliefs were associated with lower social acceptance in schizophrenia and depression, and with higher acceptance in alcohol dependence. In schizophrenia and depression, perceived differentness and dangerousness mediated the largest indirect effects, the consequences of biogenetic causal explanations thus being in accordance with the predictions of genetic essentialism. Psychosocial causal beliefs had differential effects: belief in current stress as a cause was associated with higher acceptance in schizophrenia, while belief in childhood adversities resulted in lower acceptance of a person with depression. Biological causal explanations seem beneficial in alcohol dependence, but harmful in schizophrenia and depression. The negative correlates of believing in childhood adversities as a cause of depression merit further exploration.

One of the main functions of vision is to represent object shape. Most theories of shape perception focus exclusively on geometrical computations (e.g., curvatures, symmetries, axis structure). Here, however, we find that shape representations are also profoundly influenced by an object’s causal origins: the processes in its past that formed it. Observers placed dots on objects to report their perceived symmetry axes. When objects appeared ‘complete’—created entirely by a single generative process—responses closely approximated the object’s geometrical axes. However, when objects appeared ‘bitten’—as if parts had been removed by a distinct causal process—the responses deviated significantly from the geometrical axes, as if the bitten regions were suppressed from the computation of symmetry. This suppression of bitten regions was also found when observers were not asked about symmetry axes but about the perceived front and back of objects. The findings suggest that visual shape representations are more sophisticated than previously appreciated. Objects are not only parsed according to what features they have, but also to how or why they have those features.

This article shows that across multiple generations, the persistence of occupational and educational attainment in Germany is larger than estimates from two generations suggest. We consider two recent interpretations. First, we assess Gregory Clark's hypotheses that the true rate of intergenerational persistence is higher than the observed rate, as high as 0.75, and time-invariant. Our evidence supports the first but not the other two hypotheses. Second, we test for independent effects of grandparents. We show that the coefficient on grandparent status is positive in a wide class of Markovian models and present evidence against its causal interpretation. (Orig.).