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Heads of State Briefings on the Cuban Missile Crisis (22-23 October 1962) should stress the importance of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) as well as the U.S. desire to accomplish a Cuban Crisis Settlement through Negotiations; Heads of State Briefings on the Cuban Missile Crisis (22-23 October 1962) should begin one hour prior to John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) and include delivery of the text of the Letter from John F. Kennedy to Heads of State (22 October 1962); Embassy chiefs of mission should stress the accuracy of the [Photographic evidence; Intelligence gathering] that revealed Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; Heads of State Briefings on the Cuban Missile Crisis (22-23 October 1962) should highlight Diplomatic initiatives such as requests for U.N. Security Council meetings and the Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (22 October 1962)

Anatoly F. Dobrynin is described as \"ashen\" following his meeting with Dean Rusk where he is informed that John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) will announce the discovery of Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; William P. Bundy reports that Jupiter Missiles are almost obsolete as First strike Nuclear weapons and have little military significance; ExComm Meeting (28 October 1962, 11:00 a.m.) receives Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (28 October 1962) which accepts the terms of Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (27 October 1962); Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (28 October 1962) agrees that the [Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (27 October 1962); Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (28 October 1962)] will be considered the basis for the Cuban Crisis Settlement; Fidel Castro's Five Points Speech (28 October 1962) announces refusal to permit On-site inspection and demands withdrawal from Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) and an end to U.S. [Economic sanctions; Diplomatic sanctions] against Cuba; Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962) discussions included Verification of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba as well as [Soviet Commitment Barring Future Deployment of Offensive Weapons; U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment] and continued U.S. Aerial reconnaissance of Cuba; [John F. Kennedy; Nikita S. Khrushchev] used letters as a private Communications channel following the Cuban Crisis Settlement to supplement the Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962); Soviet Union removed all IL-28 Aircraft but did not agree to any arrangements for Verification of [Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; Soviet Commitment Barring Future Deployment of Offensive Weapons]; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) debates Soviet motivations for sending the contradictory [Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (26 October 1962); Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962)]; Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (27 October 1962) acceptance of the proposal advanced in Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (26 October 1962) despite demands for Cuba-Turkey missile exchange included in Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962) is called the \"Trollope ploy\"; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) discusses Air attacks on Cuba as United States counteractions for Aircraft downings of U.S. Low altitude reconnaissance flights; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 9:00 p.m.) was called to authorize the Mobilization of the U.S. Air Force Reserve and to discuss the addition of Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants to the materials affected by the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (26 October 1962) proposes Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba and an end to Soviet arms shipments in exchange for U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment and lifting the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962); ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) members receive the text of Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962) which demands a Cuba-Turkey missile exchange before Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba can occur; ExComm Meeting (27 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) members receive news of the U-2 Downing over Cuba (27 October 1962) and the death of Rudolf Anderson, Jr. simultaneously with the transmission of the Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy (27 October 1962); Fidel Castro vows Attacks on U.S. Aerial reconnaissance flights violating Cuban Airspace; Letter from U Thant to Fidel Castro (26 October 1962) requests the suspension of Military construction of Soviet missile bases in order to alleviate tension during the Cuban Crisis; Letter from Fidel Castro to U Thant (27 October 1962) agrees to suspend Military construction of Soviet missile bases only if the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) is lifted; Aleksandr S. Fomin proposes the [Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; Soviet Commitment Barring Future Deployment of Offensive Weapons] in exchange for U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment during meeting with John A. Scali; U.S. Department of State response to the Aleksandr S. Fomin Proposal (26 October 1962) agrees that it could provide grounds for a Cuban Crisis Settlement; John A. Scali states during meeting with Aleksandr S. Fomin that On-site inspection of U.S. Military bases in Florida would not be accepted by the United States; ExComm Meeting (26 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.) Intelligence briefing indicates that Soviet missile bases will soon reach Operational readiness; Evacuation of Guantanamo Naval Base (U.S. facility in Cuba) dependents occurred on 26 October 1962; Collangatta (Sweden ship) was allowed to pass through the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) without clearance on 26 October 1962; Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev to U Thant (26 October 1962) accepts the U Thant Proposal (24 October 1962) while the Letter from John F. Kennedy to U Thant (26 October 1962) states that U.S. Naval vessels will attempt to avoid confrontation if Soviet ships avoid the Naval quarantine line; Soviet Union-United States Joint Report to U Thant (7 January 1963) agreed to terminate the Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962) and remove the Cuban Crisis from the agenda of the U.N. Security Council; Adlai E. Stevenson welcomes Soviet decision to avoid Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) as well as assurances to [Bertrand Russell; U Thant] that no \"reckless\" decisions will be taken regarding the Cuban Crisis; Adlai E. Stevenson confronts Valerian A. Zorin with Photographic evidence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba; U.S. Department of Defense announces that Proclamation of Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba of 23 October 1962 covers Fuels used to power Surface-to-surface missiles; Arthur Sylvester announces on 24 October 1962 that there are eight - ten Soviet missile bases in Cuba consisting of four Missile launchers per bases and with 30 Medium-range ballistic missiles and 20 IL-28 Aircraft; U Thant Proposal (24 October 1962) recommending the voluntary suspension of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba as well as the lifting of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) for a two week \"cooling-off\" period is advanced during U.N. Security Council Emergency Meeting (23-25 October 1962); John F. Kennedy rejects U Thant Proposal (24 October 1962) because it does not guarantee Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; ExComm decided to attempt the Marucla (Ship) Boarding (26 October 1962) because it was felt that Interdiction of non-Soviet Ships was desirable; Harold D. MacMillan describes attempts by Soviet Union Diplomats to persuade United Kingdom to intercede in Cuban Crisis as an attempt to weaken U.S. Alliances; ExComm proposes blaming Fidel Castro for Soviet missile deployment in John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) in order to press for [Overthrow of Fidel Castro; Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba] in negotiations to end the crisis; [New York Times; Washington Post] were asked not to publish articles regarding the Cuban Crisis before John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962); News media announcements that Andrei A. Gromyko would make an \"important statement\" before John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) causes \"nervousness in the White House\"; U.S. Department of State summary of activities during 20-22 October 1962; [Carlos Sosa-Rodriguez; Patrick Dean; Frank Aiken] of [Venezuela; United Kingdom; Ireland] support the U.S. actions against Cuba during the U.N. Security Council Emergency Meeting (23-25 October 1962); Mircea Malitza supports the Soviet Union position and calls for annulment of the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) during the U.N. Security Council Emergency Meeting (23-25 October 1962); Nonaligned countries at the U.N. propose that the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) be lifted in exchange for a halt to Soviet arms shipments of Offensive weapons; U.S. Department of Defense institutes a new Information policy making Arthur Sylvester responsible for reviewing all information released to the News media and identifying twelve types of Classified information; ExComm explores Courses of action based on [Diplomatic initiatives; Military actions] including [Air attacks; Blockades of Cuba; Surgical air strikes; U.S. military intervention in Cuba] as responses to Soviet missile deployment in Cuba; Andrei A. Gromyko reiterates statements that Soviet arms shipments to Cuba are defensive, during Meeting of John F. Kennedy and Andrei A. Gromyko (18 October 1962); John F. Kennedy warns Andrei A. Gromyko during Meeting of John F. Kennedy and Andrei A. Gromyko (18 October 1962) that the United States will not tolerate the introduction of offensive Military capability in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff preparations for Blockades of Cuba encompass considerations for Latin America Internal security; United States Intelligence Board Intelligence Report asserts Diplomatic initiatives would not halt the development of Soviet missile bases in Cuba; United States Intelligence Board Intelligence Report asserts that [Blockades of Cuba; U.S. military intervention in Cuba] will increase the risk of Soviet counteractions against Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany) but are unlikely to escalate into general Warfare; Exercise Phibriglex-62 provides an ideal \"cover\" for Mobilization of U.S. Armed Forces as called for in Contingency plans for milita

Dean Rusk calls Soviet missile deployment in Cuba a \"gross error\" in meeting with Anatoly F. Dobrynin prior to John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962); Dean Rusk transfers Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (22 October 1962) and text of John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) to Anatoly F. Dobrynin

United States Embassies are instructed to read John F. Kennedy Draft Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) during Heads of State Briefings on the Cuban Missile Crisis (22-23 October 1962) and submit an official copy of the John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) to the Heads of state on the following day

United States Embassy. Soviet Union receives Diplomatic instructions to change the text of Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (22 October 1962) to indicate that Nikita S. Khrushchev will not immediately receive the text of John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962)

Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (22 October 1962) asserts U.S. determination to protect its [National security; Regional security] by obtaining Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba of [Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range ballistic missiles] and the removal of Offensive weapons from Cuba; Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (22 October 1962) warns that misunderstanding United States policy could result in Nuclear warfare; Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (22 October 1962) states that the United States will not tolerate escalations of the [Berlin Crisis; Military build-up in Cuba] which upset the Balance of power; Letter from John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev (22 October 1962) is to be delivered to Nikita S. Khrushchev one hour before John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962)

John F. Kennedy requests the development of Contingency plans in the event of U.S. Aerial reconnaissance Aircraft downings or the continuation of the Military build-up in Cuba; [Dwight D. Eisenhower; Harry S. Truman; Herbert C. Hoover] express support for Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) to John F. Kennedy; OAS support for Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) will depends on presentation of more Evidence of Soviet [Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range ballistic missiles] Deployment in Cuba; Harold D. MacMillan response to the imposition of Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) \"made the best argument for taking no action,\" says John F. Kennedy; Andrei A. Gromyko leaves New York without making any comments on Cuba; NSC 507th Meeting (22 October 1962, 3:00 p.m.) participants agree to show unanimous support for Courses of action contained in John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) in order to gain support of American Public opinion

U.S. Department of State activities between 20-22 October 1962 included dispatching [Letter from John F. Kennedy to Heads of State (22 October 1962); John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962)] to 60 United States Embassies and briefings of Government officials

United States Embassy. Turkey could not inform Turkey of the John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) as planned because it did not receive Letter from John F. Kennedy to Heads of State (22 October 1962)

United States Embassy. Japan receives assurances from Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda that Japan understands the U.S. position outlined in the John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962) and will reply to the Letter from John F. Kennedy to Heads of State (22 October 1962)