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Abstract This article revisits the 1983 Israel-Lebanon Agreement using new archival material, mainly from the Israel State Archives, with three main goals. First, it demonstrates the centrality of the agreement for Israeli schemes in Lebanon and argues that Israeli demands during the negotiations shed new light on its decision to stay in Lebanon in June 1985, despite the government decision of January 1985 to withdraw to the international border. Second, it reconsiders Syria's ‘veto power’ over the agreement given Israel's objectives to establish a security zone in south Lebanon. Finally, by using new archival evidence, it completes our historical knowledge about the road to the agreement and its aftermath.

Abstract Since 1993, professional and historical record literature has largely focused on the Norwegian involvement in the Oslo peace process. Denmark's extensive mediation efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not received similar scrutiny. This article assesses Denmark's involvement in the period following the Oslo Declaration of Principles in 1993. Denmark's peace engagement included two main diplomatic tracks. The unofficial track was designated as the Louisiana Process and the official track was named the Road Map for Peace. In both tracks, Denmark was able to demonstrate a comprehensive foreign policy that reflected a unique mediation strategy. Denmark's capacity to alter the nature of the conflict was restricted by its meager resources and its inability to impose decisions on the involved parties.

Many modern expositors of the image of the knowing ox in Isa 1:3a do not address the pastoral reality that animates the image. Drawing from the glosses of two medieval rabbinic exegetes and from studies of bovine ethology this study explores the suggestions that have been raised concerning this reality. The study probes the implications of each suggestion for a fuller understanding of the oracle of Isa 1:2-3 and its place at the beginning of the book of Isaiah.

MR. [David Grossman]: Yes, I still belong to the peace camp in Israel. And I do not see any other alternative for Israel rather than achieving peace with its neighbors, including Lebanon and first and foremost, the Palestinians. And maybe even before we go to talk about what happened in Lebanon, I think that of the most dangerous phenomenon nowadays in Israel is - and also in the United States - that there is a kind of a - there is an attitude that treats both the Palestinians and the Hezbollah of Lebanon as if they are made of the same skin. They are not. And our approach, the Israeli approach towards them is totally - should be totally different, because the Hezbollah attacked Israel without any provocation. On the other hand, there are those that say no, Hezbollah was fully aware of the consequences, and it laid out the trap. I would say the truth is somewhere in between. I think that Hezbollah, you know, knew that it changed the rules of the game when it entered Israel to abduct those soldiers. I don't think they really thought it would, you know, just end with a prisoner exchange as it had done in the past. But at the same time, I think that Hezbollah, you know, must have envisaged different scenarios here and one of which was this one. I don't think they (unintelligible), though. But I do think they envisaged it and laid out the necessary contingency plans, which are clearly being demonstrated now in Hezbollah's military strategy, which has proven to be very effective. And the Israeli army themselves are saying well, they appear to have been fully prepared and ready. SAYGI: Yeah. I have a question regarding the responsibility. For six years, Lebanon had the chance to take their own faith by actually dismantling Hezbollah. They knew that the organization want to destroy Israel, actually. That's their goal. That's why Hezbollah, it was not enough for them that Israel withdrew from Lebanon, they had an excuses to keep attacking and crossing the international border. So why Lebanon didn't take their own initiative and took care of that problem, which now become Israel's problem as well?

David Kimche, director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met here today with Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to discuss the faltering relations between...

Officially [David Kimche] was deputy head of the Israeli intelligence and counterterrorism agency, the Mossad, until 1980, then director-general of Israel's foreign ministry for seven years. Yet this only hints at his influence. He was largely responsible for Israel's diplomatic and military overtures to Africa from the late 1950s, nurtured the young Idi Amin and secretly visited Arab leaders in Morocco and Egypt. He prepared the groundwork for the Camp David accords (1978) and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of the following year. Other involvements included Israel's ill-fated plan to install a Christian potentate in Beirut in 1982, and the Iran-Contra scandal of 1985. When Egyptian pressure barred Israel from the conference of non-aligned nations in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, Kimche and his colleagues responded by cultivating ties with non-Arab states bordering the Middle East. He compared Israel's struggle against imperialism with Africa's yearning for freedom. Yet sentiment and idealism were not his only weapons. He brought Kenyan Mau Mau rebels to Israel for military training, established national security agencies across the continent and helped Ghana spy on its ally, Egypt. He also located Mossad listening stations in the Horn of Africa and allegedly backed coups, including the overthrow of the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1964. Numbered among Kimche's presidential allies, and often friends, were Ivory Coast's Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Chad's Ngarta Tombalbaye, Nigeria's Ibrahim Babangida and Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam, enabling thousands of Israeli kibbutz workers to initiate medical, agricultural and environmental projects across Africa. Thousands more Africans studied at Israeli educational institutions. Israel in turn won blocking votes in the UN.

\"In town itself the violence was working itself up to a terrifying pitch. A large crowd had gathered at the borderline of the Jewish and Arab areas near Princess Mary Avenue [today Rehov Shlomzion Hamalka]. From there we could plainly hear the noise of the frenzied Arab mobs as they looted and burnt the old commercial center. In Princess Mary Avenue itself a Kafkaesque scene was unfolding. Human chains of Hagana men armed with cudgels and pistols were formed nearby the Rex Cinema to prevent the Arab and Jewish mobs from getting to grips with each other. Youths with eyes distended with hate or fear pushed against the Hagana men. Rocks and stones flew across from both sides. Shrieks and howls rent the air. Women ululated in the long, plaintive, frightening sound of the East. We were sent to this scene of pandemonium to strengthen the human chains. The first thing I noticed were the British armored cars parked nearby, their crews taking snapshots of the turmoil, but none attempting to intervene,\" [David Kimche] wrote. \"January was a black month for the student group in Moriah Battalion. We consisted of then two platoons - one stationed on the outskirts of Katamon and the other in Beit Hakerem. Several members of our Katamon platoon asked for and received transfer to Beit Hakerem in January, for the constant patrolling and lying in ambush along the border with Katamon was a nerve racking business. We were never to see our friends of Beit Hakerem again.\" he continued.