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Our paper shows how Charles P. Kindleberger examined the function of the international lender of last resort and anticipated the rules governing the dollar swap line program (with unlimited amounts and at a fixed price) implemented by the Federal Reserve in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. We systematically explore Kindleberger's works on the central bank swap agreement in order to discern the theoretical foundations of the international lender of last resort rules he proposed. In this respect, two of his arguments that appear concomitantly must be distinguished. The first concerns the burden that the leadership partly or mostly should shoulder because of the problem of free riding—this is the traditional argument of benevolent leadership. The second argument concerns the efficiency with which the leadership operates as the stabilizer given the international monetary and financial context—this argument of the efficient stabilizer has been far less studied in the literature. We find that the Federal Reserve was not a benevolent monetary institution, but the global financial stabilizer instead—meaning that Kindleberger's second argument finally prevailed. We conclude by emphasizing how central bankers rediscovered Kindleberger's contribution to the international lender of last resort function.

Este escrito sostiene que el premio “Nobel” de economía de este año celebra uno de los aspectos más débiles del pensamiento macroeconómico moderno: su limitada capacidad para entender la inestabilidad macrofinanciera del capitalismo moderno. En vez de desafiar la obstinada negativa de tomar en serio a los pensadores que afrontan la importancia esencial de las finanzas y sus peligros para el mundo moderno, como Hyman Minsky o Hyun Song Shin, hace alarde de la tendencia a ignorarlos. Y argumenta que si el Comité del premio hubiese querido galardonar a quienes procuran entender la dinámica del sistema financiero global moderno y sus interconexiones con la economía real, debería habérselo entregado al equipo del BIS, que se remonta a la época de William White, y a economistas académicos asociados al BIS como Hyun Song Shin.

The paper is a contribution to a series of recollections and reflections on the professional experiences of distinguished economists which the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review started in 1979. In it Charles P. Kindleberger reflects on his life and career, from his formative years to his experiences in academia.   JEL: B31, A20

In light of increasing salaries and transfer fees, the present study investigates the existence of a speculative bubble in European football. By applying the Kindleberger–Minsky model to football, we show that developments in recent years do not meet the criteria of a classic bubble. Although transfer fee spending in recent years does meet the typical pattern seen in historical bubbles, the case of football rather resembles an atypical bubble. This is because the rise in transfer fees for most clubs is largely backed by cash inflows, prompting an elevator effect for transfer fees. Typical bubbles, on the other hand, contain heavy debt-financing in the absence of respective and sustainable cash inflows. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a speculative bubble on the aggregated league level, some individual clubs seem to “live in a bubble”. Furthermore, the French and especially Italian leagues should be cautious about overspending. We further discuss the main risk factors that can lead to a turning point in European football’s constant revenue growth, including potential implications of a financial downturn.

As part of the roundtable “International Institutions and Peaceful Change,” this essay focuses on the “Kindleberger trap,” a term coined by Joseph Nye Jr. referring to the situation in which no country takes the lead to maintain international institutions in the international system. President Trump's destructive policies toward many international institutions seem to push the current international order to the brink of the Kindleberger trap. Ironically, China has pledged, at least rhetorically, to support and even save these existing international institutions. Based on an institutional-balancing perspective, we suggest that the worry about the Kindleberger trap is unwarranted because the international institutional order will not easily collapse after the decline of U.S. hegemony. Institutional competition among great powers and institutional changes within the institutional order have become two remedies to maintain international institutions and to avoid the Kindleberger trap during the international order transition. What states, including the United States and China, should do is to reembrace and reinvigorate the role of multilateralism in world politics so that the dynamics of institutional balancing and consequential institutional changes in the context of U.S.-China competition do not deprive international society of the public goods and normative values of international institutions. The future international order should not be led by a single country, but by dynamic and balanced international institutions.

In this article, we provide a 'road map' for teaching the global economic crisis (the Crisis hereafter) sociologically, using Kindleberger's schema of financial crises. The causes of the Crisis are often associated with financial and economic technicalities, and we provide readers who are unfamiliar with the jargon of Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Default Swaps with a summary of the role played by these and other financial products. We seek to situate technical finance within the sociological frame of reference, where rationality and reality are areas of contention, rather than mathematical certainty. The article seeks, throughout, to foreground the social processes behind the credit bubble which burst in 2007. We argue for an understanding of the Crisis which takes into account the social totality, taking in culture, ideology and discourse, as well as political economy.

\"Samuelson's Concern\" and \"Kindleberger Trap\" are cited as justifications for trade protectionism under the Trump administration. After reviewing Samuelson's and Kindleberger's trade theories, this paper finds that both Samuelson and Kindleberger are actually proponents of free trade, and that their common concern is falling US competitiveness due to its economic model, domestic institutional rules, and unilateralism. Both the \"Samuelson's Concern\" and \"Kindleberger Trap\" are distortions of Samuelson's and Kindleberger's original theories and the arguments' defense of protectionism cannot overcome the challenges confronting the U.S. and will destabilize international economic order.

En este trabajo se analiza la evolución de la relación entre la masa monetaria y el crédito bancario, con objeto de observar si existe una relación entre masa monetaria y crédito bancario. Esta relación ha sido establecida por la interpretación institucionalista mediante la hipótesis “echando leña al fuego” (fueling the flames) propuesta en el modelo Kindleberger-Minsky, en la teoría de la endogeneidad monetaria. Con el objeto de identificar las relaciones causales predominantes se estima la prueba de no-Causalidad de Granger  en una aproximación a Estados Unidos, Alemania y España entre 1960-2008. 

Capital inflows to emerging economies have a significant exogenous component, they are very large when scaled to the size of the domestic financial sectors of recipients and they have large real macroeconomic effects. They also sow the seeds for the ensuing sudden stops, or capital flow reversals, observed in financial crises in emerging markets. This paper tests the implications of applying the Kindleberger–Minsky model of financial crises to capital account reversals in emerging economies, or sudden stops as they have been called in the recent literature. It uses a panel-probit framework with heterogeneous unobserved country effects. The most important variables that account for sudden stops are preceding capital surges, the share of flows other than foreign direct investment, the size of the current account deficit, contagion from sudden stops in other emerging markets and the ratio of external debt to exports. The main policy conclusion is that emerging economies need specific policies to deal with capital surges. In addition, macroeconomic policies geared toward preserving sustainable macroeconomic balance may be necessary to avoid sudden stops but they are clearly insufficient.