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International handbook on the economics of corruption. Volume 2
A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs. Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. -- Publisher description.
Book
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians
This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil’s anticorruption program, which randomly audits municipalities for their use of federal funds. We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent. We interpret these reduced-form findings through a political agency model, which we structurally estimate. Our results suggest that the reduction in corruption comes mostly from the audits increasing the perceived nonelectoral costs of engaging in corruption.
Journal Article
Combating corruption : legal approaches to supporting good governance and integrity in Africa
\"This is a truly excellent book: wide-ranging, meticulous scholarship, very well written and easy to read. It should be on the desks of every senior civil servant, government lawyer and politician in every African country. After this book, there is no excuse for not having in place the necessary legal framework and equally important, for not using that legal framework to combat corruption.\"--Patrick McAuslan, Birkbeck University of London, UK. Drawing on numerous recent examples of good and bad practice from around the continent, this insightful volume explores the legal issues involved in developing and enhancing good governance and accountability within African states, as well as addressing the need for other states worldwide to demonstrate the 'transnational political will' to support these efforts. John Hatchard considers the need for good governance, accountability and integrity in both the public and private sector. He studies how these issues are reflected in both the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The book demonstrates that despite the vast majority of African states being party to these conventions, in practice, many of them continue to experience problems of bad governance, corporate bribery and the looting of state assets. It explores how the 'art of persuasion' can help develop the necessary political will through which to address these challenges at both the national and transnational levels. This unique and influential book will be of worldwide interest to those studying law, politics or business, as well as legal practitioners, policymakers, senior public officials, parliamentarians, law reformers, civil society organisations and the corporate sector.
Book
Public Governance and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Recent Anti-corruption Campaign in China
Taking advantage of the China's recent anti-corruption campaign, we attempt to examine the effect of public governance on a firm's incentive to commit fraud. Using enforcement actions data from the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) from 2004 to 2014, we find that, due to enhanced public governance, firms are less likely to commit fraud in the post-campaign period than in the pre-campaign period. We further show that the effect of public governance is more evident in privately held listed firms, in firms with weak legal environment, and in firms in areas with poor local economies. In addition, we find that older CEOs respond less actively to the public governance caused by anti-corruption regulations. This paper offers clear policy implications for business ethics by indicating that public governance provides external monitoring of corporate decisions.
Journal Article
Corruption and Firms
We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in the number of firms concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships and public procurement. Through the estimation of geographic spillovers and additional tests, we show that audits operate via both a direct detection effect as well as through indirect deterrence channels. Politically connected firms suffer after the audits. Our estimates indicate the anticorruption program generates significant local multipliers which are consistent with the presence of a large corruption tax on government-dependent firms.
Journal Article
Fighting Against Corruption: Does Anti-corruption Training Make Any Difference?
Corruption continues to represent a tenacious challenge to internationally active companies. According to prevailing international anti-corruption standards, a company can be held criminally liable if it does not put all necessary and reasonable organizational measures in place to prevent corruption. The regular training of employees is considered one of the most effective ways to prevent corruption. Employee training is considered helpful in efforts to minimize the risk of employees becoming involved in corrupt behavior. With this idea in mind and building on the fraud triangle model and neutralization theory, this paper examines whether business professionals who have undergone anti-corruption training are more likely to reject prevailing justifications of corrupt practices than are those who have not undergone such training. The empirical analysis in this paper is based on regression models using data obtained from a unique dataset that includes 200 business professionals. The findings provide evidence that training is positively linked to the likelihood of rejecting justifications of corruption. However, the research also suggests that methods of training must become more specific in order to tackle challenging questions regarding the gray areas of ethics and compliance.
Journal Article
The Ways of Corruption in Infrastructure
In 2016, the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht was fined 2.6 billion USD by the US Department of Justice. It was the largest corruption case ever prosecuted under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Our examination of judicial documents and media reports on this case provides new insights on the workings of corruption in the infrastructure sector. Odebrecht paid bribes for two reasons: to tailor the terms of the auction in its favor, as well as to obtain favorable terms in contract renegotiations. In projects where Odebrecht paid bribes, costs increased by 70.8 percent on average, compared with 5.6 percent for projects with no bribes. We also find that bribes and profits made from bribing were smaller than documented in most previous studies, in the range of one to two percent of the cost of a project.
Journal Article
Coercive Pressures and Anti-corruption Reporting: The Case of ASEAN Countries
This paper aims to investigate the extent of anti-corruption reporting by ASEAN companies and examine whether coercive factors influence the level of disclosure. The authors adopt indicators from the Global Reporting Initiative version 4.0 to measure the extent of anti-corruption disclosures in 117 companies' reports. Informed by a coercive isomorphism tenet drawn from the institutional theory, the authors propose that several institutional factors influence the extent of their voluntary disclosures. The findings reveal that a large degree of variability difference between the average levels of anti-corruption disclosure in Thailand (434 words) and the Philippines (149 words). The dependence on government tenders and foreign ownership are associated with the level of disclosure. Surprisingly, the United Nation Global Compact membership is not a significant determinant of anti-corruption reporting. This signifies that the membership in the international initiative does not correspond to individual company's commitment to disclose anti-corruption information. In spite of significant efforts undertaken by global organizations to combat corruption, the level of anti-corruption disclosure is significantly different among the four countries under study. The disclosure of sensitive information such as the confirmed incidences of corruption cases requires careful consideration by the top management as it is subjected to legal implications and reputational risks. Thus, impression management can complement the coercive pressure in explaining the level of anti-corruption reporting. This study is among the first studies which explores the association between coercive factors and the level of anti-corruption disclosure in ASEAN region.
Journal Article