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result(s) for
"LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES"
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All Male Panels? Representation and Democratic Legitimacy
by
O'Brien, Diana Z.
,
Piscopo, Jennifer M.
,
Clayton, Amanda
in
Citizens
,
Congressional committees
,
Congressional elections
2019
What does women's presence in political decision-making bodies signal to citizens? Do these signals differ based on the body's policy decisions? And do women and men respond to women's presence similarly? Though scholars have demonstrated the substantive and symbolic benefits of women's representation, little work has examined how women's presence affects citizens' perceptions of democratic legitimacy. We test the relationship between representation and legitimacy beliefs through survey experiments on a nationally representative sample of U.S. citizens. Firsty we find that women's equal presence legitimizes decisions that go against women's interests. We show suggestive evidence that this effect is particularly pronounced among men, who tend to hold less certain views on women's rights. Second, across decision outcomes and issue areas, women's equal presence legitimizes decision-making processes and confers institutional trust and acquiescence. These findings add new theoretical insights into how, when, and for whom inclusive representation increases perceptions of democratic legitimacy.
Journal Article
Parliaments in time : the evolution of legislative democracy in Western Europe, 1866-2015
How can we explain the evolution of legislatures in Western Europe? This book analyses ninety procedural reforms which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. Legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking (where governments control the agenda) or working legislatures (with powerful committees). All else being equal, legislators' demand for mega-seats on legislative committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If, however, legislators fail to centralize agenda control in response to anti-system obstruction, legislative procedures break down. Rather than a decline of legislatures, talking legislatures accordingly indicate the resilience of legislative democracy. In conclusion, the book shows the causal nexus between procedural reforms and (legislative) democracy.
Committee Specialization in U.S. State Legislatures during the 20th Century: Do Legislatures Tap the Talents of Their Members?
by
Hamm, Keith E.
,
Hedlund, Ronald D.
,
Post, Stephanie Shirley
in
20th century
,
Agriculture
,
Appointment
2011
The authors use an informational-theoretical perspective to examine the appointment of legislative committees, using new measures of knowledge and expertise as well as a unique database. While competing theories (distributive and partisan) do not deny that legislative committees are a source of vital knowledge and expertise necessary for legislative policy making, information theory places the wisdom and expertise needs of collective decision making— that is, specialization— on very complex topics by legislative generalists as the raison d'être for a committee system. Thus, the authors investigate one of the fundamental arguments of information theory— that committees are formed to meet the basic knowledge and expertise needs of a legislative body. The findings from U.S. state legislative data indicate that significant member differences regarding prior knowledge and expertise exist by committee jurisdiction, state, and session, reinforcing the applicability of information theory while also suggesting the impact of setting and organizational factors. The authors also explore implications of these findings.
Journal Article
Making British law : committees in action
\"British Governments must pass laws if they are to survive, and Parliament is responsible for scrutinising these laws. We are used to seeing Members of Parliament in the House of Commons chamber, but we very rarely see them in committee, examining and debating the finer details of government bills. This book sheds light on the hidden world of House of Commons bill committees as they scrutinise legislation. Through a close analysis of government bills, it explores the inner workings of committees, revealing the widespread misconceptions of committee work. It also considers whether it is possible for backbenchers to change the law, examines the techniques and strategies they use to do this, and argues that committees are vital to the making of British law\"-- Provided by publisher.
How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees?
2018
Concerns that interest groups use their financial resources to distort the democratic process are long-standing. Surprisingly, though, firms spend little money on political campaigns, and roughly 95% of publicly traded firms in the United States have never contributed to a political campaign. Do interest groups seek political access through their modest contributions, or are these contributions only a minor and forgettable part of the political process? In this article, we present comprehensive evidence that interest groups are extremely sophisticated in the way they make campaign contributions. We collect a new data set on U.S. state legislative committee assignments and legislator procedural powers from 1988 to 2014, merged with campaign finance data, in order to analyze over 440,000 candidate–committee observations across 99 legislatures. Using a series of difference-in-differences designs based on changes in individual legislators' positions in the legislature, we not only show that interest groups seek out committee members, but we also show that they value what we call indirect access. When a legislator gains procedural powers, interest groups reallocate considerable amounts of money to her. The results reveal how interest groups in a wide range of democratic settings seek to influence the policy process not only by seeking direct access to policy makers but by seeking indirect access to legislative procedure as well.
Journal Article
Political Activism and Firm Innovation
by
Reza, Syed Walid
,
Wu, Yanhui
,
Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V.
in
Activism
,
Committees
,
Congressional committees
2020
We hypothesize that political activism is valuable because it helps reduce political uncertainty, which, in turn, fosters firm innovation. We find that firms that support more politicians, winning politicians, politicians on congressional committees with jurisdictional authority over the firms' industries, and politicians who join those committees innovate more. We employ a natural experiment to show a causal effect of political activism on innovation. We also show evidence of intra-industry and geographical political activism spillovers.
Journal Article
Communists and Perverts under the Palms
2012
In 1956, state Senator Charley Johns was appointed the chairman of the newly formed Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, now remembered as the Johns Committee. This group was charged with the task of unearthing communist tendencies, homosexual persuasions, and anything they saw as subversive behavior in academic institutions throughout Florida. With the cooperation of law enforcement, the committee interrogated and spied on countless individuals, including civil rights activists, college students, public school teachers, and university faculty and administrators.
Today, the actions of the Johns Committee are easily dismissed as homophobic and bigoted.Communists and Perverts under the Palms reveals how the creation of the committee was a logical and unsurprising result of historic societal anxieties about race, sexuality, obscenity, and liberalism. Stacy Braukman illustrates how the responses to those societal anxieties, particularly the Johns Committee, laid the foundation for the resurgence of conservatism in the 1960s. Braukman is considered and nuanced in her stance, refusing a blanket condemnation of the extremism of a committee whose influence, even decades after its dissolution, continues to be felt in the culture wars of today.
Valuing Changes in Political Networks: Evidence from Campaign Contributions to Close Congressional Elections
2015
This paper investigates the value of firm political connections using a regression discontinuity design in a sample of close, off-cycle U.S. congressional elections. I compare firms donating to winning candidates and firms donating to losing candidates and find that postelection abnormal equity returns are 3% higher for firms donating to winning candidates. Connections to politicians serving on powerful congressional committees, such as appropriations and taxation, are especially valuable and impact contributing firms sales. Firms' campaign contributions are correlated with other political activities such as lobbying and hiring former government employees, suggesting that firms take coordinated actions to build political networks.
Journal Article
Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork
2016
Journalistic and academic accounts of Congress suggest that important committee positions allow members to procure more federal funds for their constituents, but existing evidence on this topic is limited in scope and has failed to distinguish the effects of committee membership from selection onto committees. We bring together decades of data on federal outlays and congressional committee and subcommittee assignments to provide a comprehensive analysis of committee positions and distributive politics across all policy domains. Using a within-member research design, we find that seats on key committees produce little additional spending. The chairs of the Appropriations subcommittees—the so called \"cardinals\" of Congress—are an exception to the rule. These leadership positions do generate more funding for constituents, but only from programs under the jurisdiction of their subcommittee. Our results paint a new picture of distributive politics and call for a reexamination of its canonical theories.
Journal Article