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Ianalyze the impact of a firm's environmental profile on its cost of equity and debt capital. Using implied cost of capital derived from analysts' earnings estimates, I find that investors demand significantly higher expected returns on stocks excluded by environmental screens (such as hazardous chemical, substantial emissions, and climate change concerns) compared to firms without such environmental concerns. Lenders also charge a significantly higher interest rate on the bank loans issued to firms with these environmental concerns. I provide evidence that the environmental profile of a firm is not simply proxying for an omitted component of its default risk. Further, firms with these environmental concerns have lower institutional ownership and fewer banks participate in their loan syndicate than firms without such environmental concerns. These results suggest that exclusionary socially responsible investing and environmentally sensitive lending can have a material impact on the cost of equity and debt capital of affected firms. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance .

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.

The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy 105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy 113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.

Foreign currency debt is considered a source of financial instability in emerging markets. We propose a theory in which liability dollarization arises from an insurance motive of domestic savers. Since financial crises are associated to depreciations, savers ask for a risk premium when saving in local currency. This force makes domestic currency debt expensive, and incentivizes borrowers to issue foreign currency debt. Providing ex post support to borrowers can alleviate the effect of the crisis on savers’ income, lowering their demand for insurance, and, surprisingly, it can reduce ex ante incentives to borrow in foreign currency.

We examine cross-national variation in the global growth of commercial microfinance from 1998 to 2009 as a natural experiment to analyze the role of national institutions in shaping the ability of commercial enterprises to reach the global poor. Our results demonstrate that a country's level of state fragility represents an important institutional context of poverty that explains significant cross-national variation in the commercial microfinance industry's ability to grow its client base, control costs, and attract commercial capital. Moreover, we find that commercial microfinance lenders have experienced greater difficulty than nonprofit lenders in growing their client base in more fragile state settings. Our results support the proposition that the state shapes both institutional hazards and opportunities for business-led efforts to combat global poverty.

Liquidity restrictions on investors, like the redemption gates and liquidity fees introduced in the 2016 money market fund (MMF) reform, are meant to improve financial stability. However, we find evidence that such liquidity restrictions exacerbated the run on prime MMFs during the COVID-19 crisis. Our results indicate that gates and fees could generate strategic complementarities among investors in crisis times. Severe outflows from prime MMFs led the Federal Reserve to intervene with the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF). Using MMLF microdata, we show how the provision of “liquidity of last resort” stabilized prime funds.

Existing research establishes that minority borrowers, particularly Black small business owners, faced significant challenges in accessing funds from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), especially in its early stages. We find that institutional and racial disparities persist during the PPP loan forgiveness stage. Controlling for various loan- and borrower-level characteristics, we demonstrate that relationship lenders—community banks, credit unions, and farm credit institutions—are associated with higher rates of PPP loan forgiveness. In contrast, automated lenders—fintechs and fintech banks—exhibit the lowest forgiveness rates. Black borrowers experience the poorest outcomes, except for loans issued by non-depository fintech and lenders categorized as “other,” where they outperform White borrowers. Loan forgiveness rates improve, and racial disparities diminish, with increased lender concentration in specific economic sectors. Thus, specialized relationship lenders may have the highest odds of achieving the best and most equitable lending outcomes. Plain English summary Specialized relationship lenders may achieve the best and most equitable lending outcomes. This study is the first comprehensive examination of loan forgiveness in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which was designed to help US small businesses survive the COVID-19 pandemic. Relationship lenders do not necessarily eliminate racial gaps in forgiveness rates. The smallest gaps are found among non-depository fintech lenders, which, along with fintech banks, have the poorest forgiveness outcomes for borrowers of all races. For future government-backed lending program designs, policymakers may consider aligning private lenders’ incentives with the programs’ desired final outcomes.

Injecting over two trillion dollars into the international economy, the Federal Reserve effectively operated as an international lender of last resort during the 2008 financial crisis. Over half a trillion dollars went to foreign central banks through bilateral arrangements known as Central Bank Liquidity Swaps. While studies show that a key determinant of a country's chances of receiving Fed liquidity was the exposure of US banks to the foreign economy, the literature overlooks the ambiguous and politicized nature of the Fed's decision-making that explains the selection of emerging market swap recipients. Through a consideration of all economies that officially requested a swap line, including those rejected, this article analyses the bilateral politics of Fed swaps. By evaluating transcripts of the Fed's deliberations, it identifies strategic motivations underlying the Fed's decision-making and argues the Fed was more likely to grant a swap to economies that shared its policy preferences for greater capital account openness. Further, the article argues that the influence of shared policy preferences was mediated by political and diplomatic considerations. The article concludes that the Fed strategically chose its emerging economy partners to reinforce economic alliances, particularly with those who experienced increased influence in economic governance post-2008.

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the European interbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks. Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higher hoarding of liquidity.

This study applies an institutional perspective to a current debate in social entrepreneurship about the relative effectiveness of commercial vs non-profit methods of building inclusive markets for the poor. While some observers argue that for-profit ventures are needed to serve the poor on a large scale, others express concern that commercialization causes mission drift, a phenomenon where ventures migrate to wealthier clients over time. A multilevel analysis of 2679 for-profit and non-profit microfinance lenders in 123 countries over 15 years supported the hypotheses that commercialization contributes to mission drift away from market inclusivity, but that national levels of \"state fragility\" moderate this effect. In countries with a low level of state fragility, it was less costly to serve the poor, which decreased pressure on commercial actors to shift to wealthier clients to achieve profitability. An important implication of this finding is that institutions influence not only the number of entrepreneurs found in a particular location but also the social impact of entrepreneurial strategies and actions.