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China has adopted a transfer-based fiscal decentralisation scheme since the mid-1990s. In the 1994 tax sharing reform, the central government significantly raised its share of government revenue vis-à-vis local governments by taking most of the newly created value-added tax on manufacturing. One aim for the adoption of the transfer-based fiscal scheme was to channel more funds to less developed regions and rural areas, and to alleviate growing interregional inequality and urban–rural income disparity. In 2002 and 2003 the Chinese central government further grabbed 50% and 60%, respectively, of the income taxes previously assigned only to local governments while providing more fiscal transfers to the country’s poor regions and the countryside. Utilising the 2002–2003 change in China’s central–local tax sharing regime as an exogenous policy shock, we employ a Simulated Instrumental Variable approach to causally evaluate the effects of the policy shock on growth, interregional inequality and urban–rural disparity. We find the lower local tax share dis-incentivised local governments and led to lower growth. Although higher central transfers helped to reduce interregional inequalities in per capita GDP and per capita income, the equalising effects were only present for urban incomes. We argue that transfer-based decentralisation without bottom-up accountability was detrimental to economic growth and had limited impact on income redistribution. 自20世纪90年代中期以来，中国一直采用基于转移支付的财政分权方案。在1994年的分税制改革中，中央政府通过对制造业征收大部分新创造的增值税，大幅提高了相对于地方政府的政府收入份额。采用基于转移的财政方案的一个目的是将更多资金引入欠发达地区和农村地区，并缓解日益加剧的地区间不平等和城乡收入差距。2002年和2003年，中国中央政府进一步分别拿走了以前完全分配给地方政府的所得税的50%和60%，同时向贫困地区和农村提供了更多的财政转移支付。利用2002-2003年中国中央与地方税收分享制度的变化作为外生政策冲击，我们采用模拟工具变量方法，针对政策冲击对增长、地区间不平等和城乡不平等的影响进行因果评估。我们发现较低的地方税收份额削弱了地方政府的积极性，导致了较低的增长。虽然较高的中央转移有助于减少人均国内生产总值和人均收入的区域间不平等，但均衡效应只存在于城市收入。我们认为，没有自下而上问责制的基于转移的财政分权不利于经济增长，对收入再分配的影响有限。

The Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer (IGFT) is a crucial tool for local governments (LGs) to bridge fiscal disparities by providing the necessary funds to fulfil their functional responsibilities. In the context of federal Nepal, IGFT has been classified into four types: fiscal equalisation, conditional, special and matching grants. This research is an attempt to examine the effectiveness of these transfer types in enhancing the local governments’ accountability in Nepal. Through a combination of quantitative and qualitative data types, this study collected primary and secondary data from seven purposively selected municipalities. Our analysis finds that IGFT serves as a powerful tool for advancing accountability among local governments in Nepal. However, the current trend of centralisation within federal government agencies, limited bureaucratic capabilities at both federal and local levels and inadequate political commitment to IGFT have hindered accountability at the local level.

This study aims to examine several main issues, namely the effect of the competence of local government apparatus on the implementation of good governance and the effect of the implementation of good governance on local government performance accountability. what factors affect performance accountability in the Merangin district government, further researchers are interested in analyzing differences in performance accountability of each agency in Merangin Regency based on performance reports that have been reported using the PLS Multi Group Analysis (MGA) method. Quantitative methods were used in this study using questionnaires as primary data and the Merangin Regency Regional Apparatus Organization (OPD) Accountability Performance Evaluation Report as secondary data. The sample obtained in this study was 56 Regional Apparatus Work Units. The following research results provide findings that the competence of government officials has a direct positive effect on Good Corporate Governance, the professionalism of the government internal control apparatus has a direct positive effect on Good Corporate Governance, Good Corporate Governance has a direct positive effect on performance accountability.

In this article we argue that the emergence of a new form of organization - community enterprise - provides an alternative mechanism for corporations to behave in socially responsible ways. Community enterprises are distinguished from other third sector organisations by their generation of income through trading, rather than philanthropy and/or government subsidy, to finance their social goals. They also include democratic governance structures which allow members of the community or constituency they serve to participate in the management of the organisation. Partnerships between corporations and community enterprises therefore raise the possibility of corporations moving beyond philanthropic donations toward a more sustainable form of intervention involving long-term commitments to communities. At the same time they change substantively the nature of any collaboration by allowing relationships to proceed on the basis of mutual advantage, thereby broadening their appeal and scope. In doing so, partnerships build capacity and enfranchise communities in a way that avoids the paternalism that has traditionally characterised relationships between corporations and voluntary sector organisations. Power relations are transformed because partners are seen as sources of valuable assets, knowledge and expertise, rather than recipients of patronage or charity.

This book provides a new institutional economics perspective on alternative models of local governance, offering a comprehensive view of local government organization and finance in the developing world. The experiences of ten developing/transition economies are reviewed to draw lessons of general interest in strengthening responsive, responsible, and accountable local governance. The book is written in simple user friendly language to facilitate a wider readership by policy makers and practitioners in addition to students and scholars of public finance, economics and politics.

This study examines the effects of local and national newspapers on local political accountability. Local newspapers are expected to monitor local governments’ behavior. However, national newspapers could also contribute to local governments’ accountability by attracting nationwide attention to a local policy issue. Using the method developed by Snyder and Strömberg (J Polit Econ 118:355–408, 2010), I construct a variable that measures the weighted market share of locally circulated newspapers in an administrative district in Japan. I find that an increase in the market share of local newspapers is associated with a reduction in local public works spending (seen as rents for local interest groups), which indicates an improvement in political accountability. In addition, the accountability effect of local newspapers becomes greater one year after national newspapers focus readers’ attentions on the issue of unnecessary public works. This result suggests that national newspapers serve as an agenda setter and complement local newspapers for strengthening local political accountability.

The aim of this exploratory study is to delineate the role of local government in climate change response through an accountability lens. Local governments have an important role in climate change response due to its proximity to the impact the environment will have on its citizens and businesses. Understanding the roles and responsibilities of local government response to climate change, therefore, needs a critical exploration of the ways in which local governments are answerable on its obligations. Local government climate change response was investigated by posing questions aimed to unpack accountability: who, to whom, for what, and how? Findings from the investigation show that climate change response within local councils is a highly contextual phenomenon; where the level of accountability observed is influenced externally by community demands and political cycles, and internally through a hierarchical chain of command, collaboration amongst council workers and the political interests of its leaders. The current study contributes to the literature by deepening understanding of how individuals make sense of organisational initiatives that respond to climate change, as well as highlighting the accountability challenges faced within local governments.

A key assumption behind decentralisation in developing countries is that it enhances the accountability of local government and results in policies that reflect the preferences of the local community. However, previous research shows that local politicians and administrators in many developing countries to a large extent behave as if they were primarily accountable to central government, not local communities. The literature suggests various explanatory factors but does not provide insight into their relative weight and into how different factors interact. This paper combines comparative case-study research with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with local government politicians and officials involved in the delivery of agricultural extension services in Tanzania. It shows that limited administrative and political decentralisation and centralistic human resources management restrict downward accountability to the community. Downward accountability is also constrained by the social rules that local politicians and administrators observe. For downward accountability to materialise, formal systems of public administration need to introduce incentives to that effect.

This study analyses, firstly, the achievement of local governments’ reform based on their Performance Accountability System (SAKIP) as part of the national administrative reform program in Indonesia. Secondly, this paper examines factors that have been affecting reform output. The study uses a mixed method perspective by analyzing the whole population of local governments from SAKIP data (2016–2019; quantitative) and applies the qualitative method of in-depth interviews with key informants. The study finds that, although there were improvements in the performance accountability system, the improvement processes have been slow and dominated by formalism at provincial and regency/city levels. Several determining factors affected the implementation of the local government performance accountability system, that is, the regulations’ arrangements, the norms, the cognitive culture, and management problems. Thus, this study confirms the theory of institutional change that considers cultural factors, political commitment, and organizational aspects that influence the dynamic of bureaucratic reform implementation.