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This paper explores how corporate taxes affect the financial structure of multinational banks. Guided by a simple theory of optimal capital structure it tests (i) whether corporate taxes induce subsidiary banks to raise their debt-asset ratio in light of the traditional debt bias; and (ii) whether international corporate tax differentials vis-a-vis foreign subsidiary banks affect the intra-bank capital structure through international debt shifting. Using a novel subsidiary-level dataset for 558 commercial bank subsidiaries of the 86 largest multinational banks in the world, we find that taxes matter significantly, through both the traditional debt bias channel and the international debt shifting that is due to the international tax differentials. The latter channel is more robust and tends to be quantitatively more important. Our results imply that taxation causes significant international debt spillovers through multinational banks, which has potentially important implications for tax policy.

Due to a reform of the local equalization scheme in 2003, a set of municipalities in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) increased their local property and business tax rates by one to two percentage points, while the remaining municipalities kept their rates constant. I use this variation across municipalities and over time to study the revenue and base effects of local property and business tax hikes in a generalized difference-in-differences design. The results suggest that the property tax hikes had even in the long-run a revenue elasticity of unity. Accordingly, I find no adverse effects on property tax bases. For the business tax, I find no significant effects on revenues and bases. Furthermore, there are also no effects on broader economic outcomes such as local employment, firms’ wage bill, and property prices. Overall, increasing local tax rates by one to two percentage points does not seem to affect the local economy adversely.

This study examines how land lease revenue, a fiscal resource windfall available to local governments, has shaped local tax policy in China. We follow the literature to argue that the presence of resource revenue incentivizes governments to substitute the more distortive tax policy with the resource revenue. Studying a city-level dataset and a large manufacturing firm-level dataset from 2000 to 2013, we find evidence for this argument by showing that land lease revenue available to city governments is negatively associated with the effective tax rates faced by the firms in the cities. Furthermore, we show that the effect of land lease revenue is likely to be weakened in larger cities, cities with more agglomerated industries, and cities with lower capital mobility. Finally, we show that the effect of land lease revenue on tax rates is more salient for firms that are under the direct control of local governments and for firms that have stronger bargaining power with local governments.

Our research study aims to analyze the effect of government expenditure on goods and services and capital toward regional economic growth in Indonesia. We position local tax effort as a moderating variable between economic growth and government expenditures. Using a panel data set of 24 provinces in Indonesia from 2006 to 2015, a dynamic model of GMM was applied to estimate the effect of public expenditure on growth. The research study provides empirical evidence that the two kinds of public spending positively and significantly affect economic growth. Conversely, local tax efforts negatively affect economic growth. Besides, local tax efforts also reduce the positive impact of capital expenditure on economic growth. In other words, local tax efforts negatively moderate the influence of government expenditure on the output growth of the regional economy.

This handbook aims to help local government practitioners, particularly staff of medium and large cities, improve strategic management of municipal finances. The demands for pragmatic knowledge are fueled in part by decentralization and fiscal pressures, as transfer of responsibilities from central to local governments are not often accompanied with an adequate transfer of resources. Practitioners seek ideas and tools to control expenditures, strengthen revenues, as well as to tap large external funds, achieve creditworthiness, and adopt good borrowing practices. Advocating sound municipal management based on improved governance and enhanced accountability, this handbook provides a comprehensive picture of municipal finances with a broad scope. The eight chapters cover such topics as fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental finances; management of metropolises; instruments of good financial management; management of revenues, expenditures, assets, and external resources; and performance measurement. Focusing on the perspectives of local officers, this handbook combines theory, pragmatic how-to advice, best practices from global experiences, and possible solutions.

A large literature on the 'flypaper effect' examines how federal grants to states at time period t affect state spending (or taxes) at time period t. We explore the fundamentally different question of how federal grants at time period t affect state tax policy in the future. Federal grants often result in states creating new programs and hiring new employees, and when the federal funding is discontinued, these new state programs must either be discontinued or financed through increases in state own source taxes. Government programs tend to be difficult to cut, as goes Milton Friedman's famous quote about nothing being as permanent as a temporary government program, suggesting that it is likely that temporary federal grants create permanent (future) ratchets in state taxes. Far from being purely an academic question, this argument is why South Carolina's Governor Mark Sanford attempted to turn down federal stimulus monies for his state. We examine both the impact of federal grants on future state budgets and how federal and state grants affect future local government budgets. Our findings confirm that grants indeed result in future state and local tax increases of roughly 40 cents for every dollar in grant money received in prior years.

The aim of the article is to reveal regional differences in revenues from local taxation and to compare the development of local government taxation ratios with selected socio-economic indicators within the NUTS III regions in the Slovak Republic. The paper points out the regional differences in local tax revenues in relation to total tax revenues, own current revenues, and total current expenditures with regard to the socio-economic level of the regions. We measure regional disparities through the coefficient of variation and the socio-economic level of regions through the composite index created from selected socioeconomic indicators of the respective regions. Results indicate that the social and economic performance of regions had an impact on revenues from taxation by local governments. We observe a declining trend of the monitored indicators from west to north-east of the country.

This paper studies the effect of relatively costly local taxation on the fiscal response of local governments to intergovernmental transfers. Using a panel dataset of Peruvian municipalities, I find robust evidence that the central government's grants have a greater stimulatory effect in municipalities facing higher local tax collection costs. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that relatively costly local taxation may partially explain the flypaper effect.

This paper examines the distributional and behavioral impacts of ending the deductibility of state and local taxes against the federal individual income tax. I carry out a number of distributional analyses — considering both variation across income and across states — of the subsidy from deductibility as well as the distributional impact of potential partial reforms. I also consider how behavioral responses affect the distributional analysis. Using a large panel of data on state and local governments, I find that deductibility increases reliance on deductible taxes and increases state and local spending out of own-source revenue.

Existing evidence suggests that extra grant revenues lead to little improvements in public services in developing countries—but would governments spend tax revenues differently? This paper considers a program that invests in the tax capacity of Brazilian municipalities. Using variations in the timing of program uptake, I find that it raises local tax revenues and that the increase in taxes is used to improve both the quantity and quality of municipal education infrastructure. In contrast, increases in grants over which municipalities have the same discretion as taxes have no impact on any measure of local public infrastructure. These results suggest that the way governments are financed matters: governments spend increases in tax revenues more toward expenditures that benefit citizens than increases in grant revenues.