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In research and policy discourse, conceptualizations of fertility decision-making often assume that people only consider circumstances within national borders. In an integrated Europe, citizens may know about and compare conditions across countries. Such comparisons may influence the way people think about and respond to childrearing costs. To explore this possibility and its implications, we present evidence from 44 in-depth interviews with Polish parents in the United Kingdom and Poland. Explanations of childbearing decisions involved comparisons of policy packages and living standards across countries. Individuals in Poland used richer European countries as an important reference point, rather than recent conditions in Poland. In contrast, migrants often positively assessed their relatively disadvantaged circumstances by using the Polish setting as a reference. The findings could help explain why, despite substantial policy efforts, fertility has remained at very low levels in poorer European countries, while migrants from those countries often have higher fertility abroad.

Over the past few decades, demographic research on unrealized fertility - the experience of having fewer children than desired - has expanded rapidly, particularly in low-fertility settings. More recently, scholars have shown that unrealized fertility is also widespread in higher-fertility contexts, affecting individuals across diverse sociodemographic conditions. Yet the literature remains fragmented, spanning definitions and measurement approaches, and with limited synthesis across settings. This article reflects on the current state of demographic research on unrealized fertility. Drawing on studies from both the Global North and Global South, we provide a narrative review of how unrealized fertility has been measured, its primary causes, and the persistent gaps in the field. We identify five dominant approaches to measuring unrealized fertility and review their strengths and limitations, as well as the data constraints that hinder cross-contextual comparisons. We then consider the principal causes of unrealized fertility and introduce a preliminary conceptual model for understanding its multilevel drivers. Finally, we highlight key gaps in the literature and propose substantive and methodological directions for future research.

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950-2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990-2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births inaeased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.

This paper provides a review of fertility research in advanced societies, societies in which birth control is the default option. The central aim is to provide a comprehensive review that summarizes how contemporary research has explained ongoing and expected fertility changes across time and space (i.e., cross- and within-country heterogeneity). A secondary aim is to provide an analytical synthesis of the core determinants of fertility, grouping them within the analytical level in which they operate. Determinants are positioned at the individual and/or couple level (micro-level), social relationships and social networks (meso-level); and, by cultural and institutional settings (macro-level). The focus is both on the quantum and on the tempo of fertility, with a particular focus on the postponement of childbearing. The review incorporates both theoretical and empirical contributions, with attention placed on empirically tested research and whether results support or falsify existing theoretical expectations. Attention is also devoted to causality and endogeneity issues. The paper concludes with an outline of the current challenges and opportunities for future research. //ABSTRACT IN FRENCH: Cet article présente un aperçu des recherches dans le domaine de la fécondité réalisées dans les sociétés dites avancées, c'est-à-dire les sociétés dans lesquelles le contrôle des naissances est l'option par défaut. L'objectif principal est de fournir une vue d'ensemble complète résumant comment la recherche contemporaine explique les changements de fécondité actuelle et prévue dans le temps et dans l'espace (c'est-à-dire l'hétérogénéité à l'intérieur d'un pays ou entre pays). Un second objectif vise à fournir une synthèse des principaux déterminants de la fécondité en les regroupant par niveau d'analyse dans lequel ils se situent. Les déterminants sont ainsi situés au niveau individuel ou au niveau du couple (niveau micro), au niveau des relations sociales et des réseaux sociaux (niveaux méso) et au niveau des cadres institutionnels et culturels (niveau macro). L'accent est mis tant sur l'intensité que le calendrier de la fécondité avec un intérêt particulier sur le report de la procréation. Cette synthèse de la littérature concerne les recherches tant théoriques qu'empiriques, une attention particulière étant portée à celles qui sont testées empiriquement et dont les résultats confirment ou infirment les théories explicatives existantes. De même nous nous sommes particulièrement intéressés aux problèmes de causalité et d'endogénéité. En conclusion, un tableau des défis actuels et des perspectives futures en matière de recherche est esquissé. Reprinted by permission of Springer

South Korea and other developed regions in East Asia have become forerunners of prolonged lowest-low fertility. South Korea's total fertility rate has been below 1.3 for two decades, the longest duration among OECD countries. Using vital statistics and census data, I study recent trends in the country's cohort fertility covering women born before the 1960s to those born in the 1980s. Analyzing outcomes at both the intensive margin of fertility (i.e., timing and number of children) and the extensive margin of family formation (i.e., marriage and childlessness), I document three novel patterns. First, the driver of low fertility has evolved across birth cohorts, from married women having later and fewer childbirths, to fewer women getting married, and finally to fewer women having children even if married. Second, a decomposition analysis of marriage and fertility changes indicates that the marriage and fertility decline was driven by changes within educational groups rather than by changes in women's educational composition. Third, the relationship between women's educational attainment and marriage or fertility was negative for the 1960s cohort, but an inverted U-shaped education gradient emerged beginning with the 1970s cohort.

As is the case in Western countries, more Japanese are marrying later or remaining unmarried and are postponing childbearing or staying childless. Previous studies revealed that those individuals who were unable to secure regular employment due to the serious recession between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, labelled a \"lost generation,\" had a very low marriage rate. But what about subsequent cohorts? Using a discrete-time logit model to analyse Japanese Life Course Panel Survey data, this study investigates the effects of employment on first marriages between 2007 and 2015, including cohorts after the lost generation. The results indicate that: (a) among men who are classed as non-regular employees, unemployed, or low-income regular employees, the likelihood of first marriage is low due to their weak economic position; and (b) women have a low likelihood of first marriage if they are non-regular employees or unemployed, not because of their employment status but because they have less chance of meeting a romantic partner and also because of their values regarding work and marriage. These explicit gender differences in the findings contradict observations made in contemporary Europe and North America, where a trend towards gender convergence in the effects of employment and earnings on marriage has been identified. The ambivalence towards gender equality in family and the workplace will be discussed to understand why many young Japanese remain single.

The rise in the age at first birth has been universal in low-fertility countries in the last decades. Mothers who have their first child later tend to have fewer children, and in the absence of fertility catch-up at older ages, delayed fertility contributes to cohort fertility decline. We aim to study how changes in completed cohort fertility (quantum) relate to delayed age at first birth (tempo) across birth cohorts. We use birth histories collected in surveys or censuses in ten high-income countries. We rely on a decomposition analysis that quantifies how much the changes in age at first birth, mothers' completed fertility conditional on age at first birth, and childlessness contribute to the total change in cohort fertility over the 1940-1969 birth cohorts. In many countries and cohorts, the fertility intensity of mothers increased more at later ages than at earlier ages, reflecting the catching up of those who had delayed childbearing. However, in most countries studied, the increased fertility intensity of mothers at older ages was not sufficient to offset the depressing effect of delayed first births on cohort fertility rates. Increased childlessness and delayed childbearing are important components of the fertility decline. The chances of a full fertility recovery in the future are minimal, given the inertia of mothers' completed fertility conditional on age at first birth across successive birth cohorts.

Indigenous peoples in Canada are among the youngest and fastest-growing populations in the country and have had higher fertility rates than non-Indigenous populations. This paper examines how Indigenous fertility in Canada changed over two decades (2001-2021). It also examines how Indigenous fertility varies across different Indigenous populations and how the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous fertility has changed. The paper uses the own-children method to reconstruct the total fertility rate (TFR) of Indigenous populations in Canada. Data are from confidential long-form Canadian census micro-files from 2000, 2006, 2016, and 2021 and from the National Household Survey of 2011. First, we find that Indigenous fertility was close to replacement level in 2001, 2006, and 2011 and that it declined below replacement fertility in 2016 to 1.82 and then to 1.54 in 2021. Second, we disaggregate Indigenous fertility and find that the Inuit have the highest TFR among all Indigenous populations. Status Indians had above-replacement fertility in 2001, 2006, and 2011 but as of 2021 have had below-replacement fertility. In contrast, non-status Indians and Metis had below-replacement fertility between 2001 and 2021. Third, although Indigenous peoples have had much higher fertility than non-Indigenous groups in Canada, the gap has narrowed. Indigenous fertility has declined to below-replacement levels, moving toward convergence with non-Indigenous populations.

In recent years, fertility rates have declined substantially in most Latin American countries. Uruguay has been at the forefront of this regional process, as the country's total fertility rate plummeted from 2 children per woman in 2015 to 1.37 in 2021 (and continued to drop to 1.28 in 2022, according to preliminary data). We decompose fertility decline by age and birth order in Uruguay, and identify the probable mechanisms (e.g., postponement, stopping) behind this decline. Combining census data and vital statistics, we estimate period fertility rates by age and conditional period fertility rates by birth order and age. We also decompose the relative contribution of decline in each age and birth order to total decline in TFR. Our findings suggest that the postponement of births, especially among adolescent and very young women, was the main driver of the big fertility decline. Additionally, the fall in higher-order births, mostly among middle-aged women, played a significant role in the overall decline. The findings also reveal an increase of nearly two years in age at first birth between 2016 and 2021. This unprecedented decline in fertility appears to be leveling off. Moreover, we expect that some of the births by adolescents and young women that were avoided during the big fertility decline will take place at some point in the future, probably generating a slight rebound in the total fertility rate.

Spain has one of the most enduring low levels of fertility in the world, but desired fertility there is still close to two children. We document recent fertility trends and examine the reasons that women and men provide for not achieving their desired fertility. We use data from the 2018 Spanish Fertility Survey (14,556 women and 2,619 men). We provide a cohort and age perspective and compare women and men. We use retrospective information and classify the reasons people report for not having (more) children. Estimates on observed fertility, employment, and partnerships show that having a stable partner between the ages of 25 and 35 seems key in the transition to childbearing. Work--family conflicts and insufficient economic resources are the main reasons women and men give for not having their desired number of children. These are followed by partnership reasons (not having a stable partner) and health (infertility). Our findings, although descriptive, shed light on the multiple and age-varying obstacles that prevent women and men from achieving desired levels of fertility.