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The regression discontinuity (RD) design is a valuable tool for identifying electoral effects, but this design is only effective when relevant actors do not have precise control over election results. Several recent papers contend that such precise control is possible in large elections, pointing out that the incumbent party is more likely to win very close elections in the United States House of Representatives in recent periods. In this article, we examine whether similar patterns occur in other electoral settings, including the U.S. House in other time periods, statewide, state legislative, and mayoral races in the U.S. and national or local elections in nine other countries. No other case exhibits this pattern. We also cast doubt on suggested explanations for incumbent success in close House races. We conclude that the assumptions behind the RD design are likely to be met in a wide variety of electoral settings and offer a set of best practices for RD researchers going forward.

Does control of patronage jobs significantly increase a political party's chances of winning elections in U.S. states? We employ a differences-in-differences design, exploiting the considerable variation in the dates that different states adopted civil service reforms. Our evidence suggests that political parties in U.S. states were able to use state-level patronage to increase the probability of maintaining control of state legislatures and statewide elective offices. We also find that an “entrenched” party, in power for a longer time, can use patronage more effectively. We consider several alternative hypotheses that might plausibly account for the patterns in the data, but find no evidence to support them.

Events in 2008 suggest that the Koizumi era is over and the Liberal Democratic Party will lose the lower house election that must be called before its current term expires in September 2009. The Democratic Party of Japan became the favorite to win the election and laid out the new domestic and foreign policy directions in which it will take Japan.

This article studies gubernatorial midterm slumps in U.S. state legislative elections. We employ a regression discontinuity design, which allows us to rule out the hypothesis that the midterm slump simply reflects a type of \"reversion to the mean\" generated by simple partisan swings or the withdrawal of gubernatorial coattails or \"anticipatory balancing.\" Our results show that the party of the governor experiences an average seat-share loss of about 3.5 percentage points. We also find evidence suggesting that a large share of the variation in gubernatorial midterm slumps can be accounted for by (1) crude partisan balancing and (2) referendums on state economic performance, with approximately equal weight given to each.

The loss of power by the Liberal Democratic Party after more than half a century of dominance was the most obvious outcome of Japan's 2009 election, but together the 2005 and 2009 elections demonstrate significant shifts in both the foundations of party support and the importance of national swings in support for one party or another. Since 2005, urban-rural differences in the foundations of the leading parties have changed dramatically, and Japan has moved from a system dominated by locally based, individual candidacies toward a two-party system in which both party popularity and personal characteristics influence electoral success or failure.

How do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within parties? While much of the existing literature focuses on portfolio allocation among parties in coalition governments, bargaining over cabinet portfolios also takes place within parties because many parties have internal divisions or factions that influence these decisions. By analyzing data on portfolio allocation in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan from 1960 through 2007, this study demonstrates that, contrary to the proportionality proposition (Gamson's Law), substantial variance exists in allocation outcomes over time because party leaders allocate cabinet portfolios among factions as a means of preventing defections and challenges from their party's members. The resulting portfolio allocation reflects the bargaining dynamics within the party: I find that party leaders surrender more portfolios as they become more vulnerable to challenges posed by internal rivals.

En los últimos tiempos, las tendencias modernizadoras destinadas a implantar un modelo de Estado abierto han llevado consigo la transformación de las instituciones públicas, entre ellas el parlamento. Este nuevo enfoque se asienta en los ejes de transparencia, rendición de cuentas y participación en aras de mejorar la relación/comunicación entre el parlamento y la ciudadanía, y reforzar su legitimidad democrática. El artículo indaga en este tema, ya que evalúa la transparencia y la participación ciudadana en las webs de las cámaras bajas de los parlamentos nacionales en América Latina para determinar si se limitan a cumplir con lo exigido por la normativa o van más allá y, por tanto, se camina hacia una verdadera cultura de parlamento abierto. Para abordar esta cuestión, se ha generado un marco analítico que se compone de cuatro dimensiones (ampliamente reconocidas por la literatura académica) a las que se vinculan una serie de indicadores: información sobre el parlamento (19 indicadores); información sobre la organización, el funcionamiento y la actividad parlamentaria (19 indicadores); información económica y contractual (17 indicadores); y comunicación y relación con la ciudadanía (30 indicadores). En definitiva, los resultados de la investigación ofrecerán un diagnóstico de situación que ayudará a verificar que todavía no se ha instaurado, en su totalidad, un estilo de parlamento abierto en América Latina, y a realizar también una serie de recomendaciones razonables para desarrollar este nuevo modelo de cámara baja

Resumen:En este trabajo se lleva a cabo un estudio jurídico de las Cortes de la Segunda República española —también denominadas Congreso de los Diputados—, a partir del análisis del título IV de la Constitución de 9 de diciembre de 1931 (que engloba los artículos 51 a 66), del Reglamento Provisional de las Cortes Constituyentes de 11 de julio de 1931 y del Reglamento (definitivo) del Congreso de los Diputados de 29 de noviembre de 1934. Junto a estos datos normativos, se han tomado en consideración los debates que se suscitaron en las Cortes Constituyentes, la práctica parlamentaria y las aportaciones doctrinales (de entonces y de ahora) que han abordado el estudio del Parlamento de nuestro último período republicano. Merece subrayarse, desde una perspectiva formal, que se han aplicado los conceptos constitucionales actuales a un texto que se aprobó hace ahora ochenta y cinco años; y, desde una perspectiva material, que se ha reflexionado sobre hasta qué punto la normativa que regulaba las Cortes, o acaso su desleal aplicación u olvido, coadyuvó o aceleró el trágico fin de la Segunda República.Summary:I. Legal sources. II. Unicameral character. III. The composition of Parliament. Specific reference to the electoral system. IV. The legal status of the deputies. V. The organization of Parliament. 1. The Bureau of Parliament. 2. The Parliamentary Groups 3. The Parliamentary Committees. VI. How parliament works: Parliamentary Autonomy and its limits. VII. The functions of parliament. 1. The Legislative Function. 2. The Budgetary Function of Parliament. 3. The Function of Political Control to the Government VIII. The Permanent Deputation. 1. Importance and Precedents. 2. Membership. 3. Competences. 4. On the threshold of a Tragedy: The Performance of the Permanent Deputation during the First Semester of 1936. Bibliography.Abstract:This paper is a legal study about the Spanish Parliament in the 2nd Republic —also called Lower House— based on an analysis of Title IV of the Constitution of 9 December 1931 (which covers articles 51- 66), the provisional Regulations of the Constituent Assembly of 11 July 1931 and the final Regulations of the Parliament of 29 November 1934. Together with these regulations, the discussions that took place at the Constituent Assembly, the parliamentary practice and the doctrinal contributions on the matter (both from that period and current) which analyse the Spanish Parliament in the last Republican Period have also been considered. It is noteworthy that modern constitutional concepts have been applied to a constitutional text that was passed 85 years ago, and to reflect to what extent the Regulations that governed the Assembly or their dishonest application or obliviousness could have contributed to or accelerated the tragic process of disintegration of the 2nd Republic.