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A sizable literature claims that female labor force participation (FLFP) follows a U-shaped trend as countries develop due to structural change, education, and fertility dynamics. We show that empirical support for this secular trend is feeble and depends on the data sources used, especially GDP estimates. The U also vanishes under dynamic panel estimations. Moreover, cross-country differences in levels of FLFP related to historical contingencies are more important than the muted U patterns found in some specifications. Given the large error margins in international GDP estimates and the sensitivity of the U relationship, we propose a more direct approach to explore the effect of structural change on FLFP using sector-specific growth rates. The results suggest that structural change affects FLFP consistent with a U pattern, but the effects are small. We conclude that the feminization U hypothesis as an overarching secular trend driving FLFP in the development process has little empirical support.

Individuals who espouse an egalitarian gender ideology as well as economically independent women benefit from a more egalitarian division of housework. Although these two individual-level characteristics affect the gender division of housework, each suggests a different mechanism; the former is anchored within an economic logic and the latter within a cultural one. Using data of 25 countries from the 2002 and 2012 “Family and Changing Gender Roles” modules of the International Social Survey Program, we examine whether a country’s mean gender ideology and women’s labor force participation (WLFP) rate have a distinct contextual effect beyond these individual-level effects. We predict that the division of housework between married or cohabitating partners will be more egalitarian in countries with higher WLFP rates and in countries with more egalitarian attitudes, even after controlling for the two variables at the individual level. Given the cross-country convergence in WLFP, but not in gender ideology, we expect the effect of WLFP to decline over time and the effect of gender ideology to remain salient. Indeed, our multi-level analysis indicates that the net effect of WLFP, which was evident in 2002, had disappeared by 2012. By contrast, the net contextual effect of gender ideology, which was not significant in 2002, had become an important determinant of housework division by 2012. We conclude that further changes will depend on a country’s prevalent gender ideology because the equalizing effect of WLFP on the division of housework may have reached its limit.

The aim of this study was to examine the microlevel factors affecting women's participation in the Qatar workforce, as the gender gap in employment is still wide, and addressing this issue remains an essential item on the government's policy agenda. Data were collected via a national telephonic survey of a representative sample of Qatari nationals, chosen using simple random sampling. A regression analysis was performed with women's employment, individual-level characteristics (e.g., age, education, and marital status), and household-level factors (e.g., number of children below 18 years of age and household monthly income) as the variables. The analytical model highlighted the microlevel predictors at the individual level as well as the public attitudes toward societal obstacles that have adverse effects on female labor force participation. The results revealed several indicators that affect women's participation in the labor force, including education level, marital status, and age. These constructs were found to have the strongest (direct or indirect) effects in terms of pushing Qatari women into the labor market. The originality of this study lies in its ability to explain how state-directed initiatives can encourage women to participate in the labor market and thus facilitate a rapid increase in the number of employed women in Qatar. A methodological limitation of the cross-sectional survey design used in this study is that it limits the causations between the government interventions and the research outcomes. The findings indicate the need for further improvement in welfare regimes at the intrastate level.

The U.S. labor force participation rate has declined since 2007, primarily because of population aging and ongoing trends that preceded the Great Recession. The labor force participation rate has evolved differently, and for different reasons, across demographic groups. A rise in school enrollment has largely offset declining labor force participation for young workers since the 1990s. Labor force participation has been declining for prime age men for decades, and about half of prime age men who are not in the labor force may have a serious health condition that is a barrier to working. Nearly half of prime age men who are not in the labor force take pain medication on any given day; and in nearly two-thirds of these cases, they take prescription pain medication. Labor force participation has fallen more in U.S. counties where relatively more opioid pain medication is prescribed, causing the problem of depressed labor force participation and the opioid crisis to become intertwined. The labor force participation rate has stopped rising for cohorts of women born after 1960. Prime age men who are out of the labor force report that they experience notably low levels of emotional well-being throughout their days, and that they derive relatively little meaning from their daily activities. Employed women and women not in the labor force, by contrast, report similar levels of subjective well-being; but women not in the labor force who cite a reason other than “home responsibilities” as their main reason report notably low levels of emotional well-being. During the past decade, retirements have increased by about the same amount as aggregate labor force participation has declined, and the retirement rate is expected to continue to rise. A meaningful rise in labor force participation will require a reversal in the secular trends affecting various demographic groups, and perhaps immigration reform.

Rapid fertility decline, a strong expansion of female education, and favorable economic conditions should have promoted female labor force participation in developing countries. Yet trends in female labor force participation rates (FLFP) have been quite heterogeneous, rising strongly in Latin America and stagnating in many other regions, while improvements were modest in the Middle East and female participation even fell in South Asia. These trends are inconsistent with secular theories such as the feminization U hypothesis but point to an interplay of initial conditions, economic structure, structural change, and persistent gender norms and values. We find that differences in levels are heavily affected by historical differences in economic structure that circumscribe women’s economic opportunities still today. Shocks can bring about drastic changes, with the experience of socialism being the most important shock to women’s labor force participation. Trends are heavily affected by how much women’s labor force participation depends on their household’s economic conditions, how jobs deemed appropriate for more educated women are growing relative to the supply of more educated women, whether growth strategies are promoting female employment, and to what extent women are able to break down occupational barriers within the sectors where women predominantly work.

The author investigates how high-speed home Internet use has affected labor supply. Using an instrumental variables strategy that exploits cross-state variation in supply-side constraints to residential broadband Internet access, she finds that exogenously determined high-speed Internet use leads to a 4.1 percentage point increase in labor force participation for married women. No corresponding effect is found for single women or men. Among married women, the largest increases in participation are found among college-educated women with children. Supplemental analyses suggest that Internet use for telework and saving time in home production explains the increase in participation. The results suggest that home Internet facilitates work-family balance.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the link between two different family policy dimensions – one supporting the combination of work and parenthood and one supporting stay-at-home mothers – and fertility rates between 1995 and 2011 in 33 industrialized countries.Design/methodology/approachTotal fertility rates were regressed on the two policy dimensions, earner–carer support and traditional–family support, using pooled time-series analysis with country fixed effects and stepwise control for female labor force participation, unemployment rates and GDP.FindingsThe analyses show that earner–carer support is linked to higher fertility, while traditional–family support is not. Also, higher female labor force participation is linked to higher fertility before GDP is included. Conversely, higher unemployment is correlated with lower fertility levels. Sensitivity analyses with and without day care enrollment on a smaller set of countries show no influence of day care on the results for family policy.Originality/valueThe results give weight to the argument that family policies supporting the combination of work and parenthood could increase fertility in low-fertility countries, probably mediated in part by female labor force participation. Earnings-related earner–carer support incentivizes women to enter the labor force before parenthood and to return to work after time off with their newborn child, thus supporting a combination of work and parenthood.

Economic theories predict that women are more likely to exit the labor force if their partners' earnings are higher and if their own wage rate is lower. In this article, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (N = 2,254) and discrete-time event-history analysis to show that wives' relative wages are more predictive of their exit than are their own or their husbands' absolute wages. In addition, I show that women married to men who work more than 45 hours per week are more likely to exit the labor force than are wives whose husbands' work approximately 40 hours per week. My findings highlight the need to examine how women's partners affect women's labor-force participation.

Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this result.

In contrast with global trends, India has witnessed a secular decline in women’s employment rates over the past few decades. We investigate this decline in rural areas, where the majority of Indian women reside. Using parametric and semiparametric decomposition techniques, we show that changes in individual and household attributes fully account for the fall in women’s labor force participation in 1987–1999 and account for more than half of the decline in 1999–2011. Our findings underscore increasing education levels among rural married women and the men in their households as the most prominent attributes contributing to this decline. We provide suggestive evidence that changes in more educated women’s relative returns to home production compared with market production may have adversely affected female labor force participation in rural India.