Explore the vast range of titles available.

We develop a framework to estimate the aggregate capital-labor elasticity of substitution by aggregating the actions of individual plants. The aggregate elasticity reflects substitution within plants and reallocation across plants; the extent of heterogeneity in capital intensities determines their relative importance. We use micro data on the cross-section of plants to build up to the aggregate elasticity at a point in time. Interpreting our econometric estimates through the lens of several different models, we find that the aggregate elasticity for the U. S. manufacturing sector is in the range of 0.5–0.7, and has declined slightly since 1970. We use our estimates to measure the bias of technical change and assess the decline in labor’s share of income in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Mechanisms that rely on changes in the relative supply of factors, such as an acceleration of capital accumulation, cannot account for the decline.

The authors are the first to study the factors determining labor's share of income on the level of the individual firm, employing an unusually informative panel data set. The empirical examination is concerned with Switzerland, which stands out as one of the very few developed countries with a stable labor share. Broadly confirming results from previous cross-country and industry-level studies, the authors find that the main factor decreasing the labor share between 2001 and 2010 was the increase in the firm's share of workers using information and communication technology. The main reasons why Switzerland's labor share remained almost constant are the counteracting effects of a relatively slow rate of technological progress in 1980 to 1995 and sectoral reallocation toward industries with above-average labor shares.

Many technological innovations replace workers with machines. But this capital–labor substitution need not reduce aggregate labor demand, because it simultaneously induces four countervailing responses: own-industry output effects; cross-industry input–output effects; between-industry shifts; and final demand effects. We quantify these channels using four decades of harmonized cross-country and industry data, whereby we measure automation as industry-level movements in total factor productivity that are common across countries. We find that automation displaces employment and reduces labor’s share of value added in the industries where it originates (a direct effect). In the case of employment, these own-industry losses are reversed by indirect gains in customer industries and induced increases in aggregate demand. By contrast, own-industry labor share losses are not recouped elsewhere. Our framework can account for a substantial fraction of the reallocation of employment across industries and the aggregate fall in the labor share over the last three decades. It does not, however, explain why the labor share fell more rapidly during the 2000s.

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013.

The recent fall of labor's share of GDP in numerous countries is well-documented, but its causes are poorly understood. We sketch a “superstar firm” model where industries are increasingly characterized by “winner take most” competition, leading a small number of highly profitable (and low labor share) firms to command growing market share. Building on Autor et al. (2017), we evaluate and confirm two core claims of the superstar firm hypothesis: the concentration of sales among firms within industries has risen across much of the private sector; and industries with larger increases in concentration exhibit a larger decline in labor's share.

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm’s decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot–Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities—rendering the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns to scale are non-increasing, then an increase in “effective” market concentration (which accounts for common ownership) leads to declines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Yet when there are multiple sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common ownership could stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We characterize for which ownership structures the monopolistically competitive limit or an oligopolistic one is attained as the number of sectors in the economy increases. When firms have heterogeneous constant returns to scale technologies, we find that an increase in common ownership leads to markets that are more concentrated.

This paper examines to what extent globalization has contributed to the decline in the labor share of US national income. It argues that globalization can influence the national labor share (NLS), even though its impacts first occur to the tradable sector. It then empirically estimates the effect of globalization on the labor share in the manufacturing sector, and uses the resulting estimates to infer the effect of globalization on the NLS. Our estimations indicate that not all globalization indicators are negative on the labor share. However, between 1999 and 2009, the included indicators of globalization cut the manufacturing labor share by about 3–6 percentage points, directly contributing to about 20–36 percent of the decline in the NLS in that period. Moreover, that tally is very likely to underestimate the total effect of globalization on the US labor share because the paper's estimates do not capture the indirect effect of globalization on the labor share of the non-tradable sector.

We study the behavior of the U.S. labor share over the past 90 years. We find that the observed decline of the labor share is entirely explained by the capitalization of intellectual property products in the national income and product accounts.

Over the past quarter century, labor's share of income in the United States has trended downward, reaching its lowest level in the postwar period after the Great Recession. A detailed examination of the magnitude, determinants, and implications of this decline delivers five conclusions. First, about a third of the decline in the published labor share appears to be an artifact of statistical procedures used to impute the labor income of the self-employed that underlies the headline measure. Second, movements in labor's share are not solely a feature of recent U.S. history: The relative stability of the aggregate labor share prior to the 1980s in fact veiled substantial, though offsetting, movements in labor shares within industries. By contrast, the recent decline has been dominated by the trade and manufacturing sectors. Third, U.S. data provide limited support for neoclassical explanations based on the substitution of capital for (unskilled) labor to exploit technical change embodied in new capital goods. Fourth, prima facie evidence for institutional explanations based on the decline in unionization is inconclusive. Finally, our analysis identifies offshoring of the labor-intensive component of the U.S. supply chain as a leading potential explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor share over the past 25 years.

The benefits of new technologies accrue not only to high-skilled labor but also to owners of capital in the form of higher capital incomes. This increases inequality. To make this argument, we develop a tractable theory that links technology to the distribution of income and wealth—and not just that of wages—and use it to study the distributional effects of automation. We isolate a new theoretical mechanism: automation increases inequality by raising returns to wealth. The flip side of such return movements is that automation can lead to stagnant wages and, therefore, stagnant incomes at the bottom of the distribution. We use a multiasset model extension to confront differing empirical trends in returns to productive and safe assets and show that the relevant return measures have increased over time. Automation can account for part of the observed trends in income and wealth inequality.