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This is a history-though, intentionally, a brief history-of the rise of law and economics as a field of thought in the U.S. college and law school academy, though the field has expanded to Europe and South America and will expand further as other legal systems develop. This book explains the origins of the field and the sources of its growth during its formative period. It describes the intellectual roots of the field, and the field's relationship to the understanding of the role of the legal system in directing the functioning of the economy. It describes the effect of the Great Depression and the expansion of governmental power on advancing the functional approach. The book then addresses the work of Aaron Director, during the late 1950s, on focusing economic analysis as a means of understanding the effects of the legal and regulatory system on the allocation of resources in the society. Then it turns to the subsequent intellectual founders of the field-Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, and Richard Posner-and attempts to explain the significance of their work. It also discusses the efforts of Robert Bork and Henry Manne toward the influence of law and economics on public policy. The book ends with the founding of the American Law and Economics Association in 1991. This is an essential companion to law and economics texts for undergraduate law and economic students and, especially, a general supplement to first-year casebooks for law school students.

Law and economics was formally introduced to South Korea in the mid-1980s. It was adopted relatively quickly compared to other Asian countries, and both research and education have been actively pursued. As a result, the Korean Law and Economics Association was founded in 2002, promoting research within the country, and many Korean scholars played a significant role in the establishment and development of the Asian Law and Economics Association, founded in 2005. The growth of the law and economics community in Korea can be attributed to the efforts of many pioneering scholars, as well as the smooth interaction between economics and law within academia and practice. To ensure the continued development of this field, it is essential to enhance understanding between economics and law and to sustain efforts to attract new scholars.

Why do policies and business practices that ignore the moral and generous side of human nature often fail? Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends

We live in a time of interrelated crises. Economic inequality and precarity, and crises of democracy, climate change, and more raise significant challenges for legal scholarship and thought. \"Neoliberal\" premises undergird many fields of law and have helped authorize policies and practices that reaffirm the inequities of the current era. In particular, market efficiency, neutrality, and formal equality have rendered key kinds of power invisible, and generated a skepticism of democratic politics. The result of these presumptions is what we call the \"Twentieth-Century Synthesis\": a pervasive view of law that encases \"the market\" from claims of justice and conceals it from analyses of power. This Feature offers a framework for identifying and critiquing the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. This is also a framework for a new \"law-and-political-economy approach\" to legal scholarship. We hope to help amplify and catalyze scholarship and pedagogy that place themes of power, equality, and democracy at the center of legal scholarship.

Behavioral Law and Economics has created a dilemma for policymakers. On the one hand, research from the field suggests a wide range of unconventional policy instruments (\"nudges\") may be used to shape people's voluntary choices in order to lead them to the option they most prefer. On the other hand, the very nature of these new instruments precludes researchers from measuring people's preferences in the traditional way, i.e., by evaluating which option people choose from the set of available choices. As a result, policymakers often lack the information they need to design nudges that will make people better off. To tackle this dilemma, I propose a new framework that focuses on the distinction between those decision makers who respond to nudges and those who do not. The framework highlights that existing methods for designing nudges come up short—none accounts for what I argue is the crucial piece of information: the preferences of the nudge-sensitive decisionmakers. After exploring this dilemma, the Essay describes two new approaches for uncovering the preferences of this group and argues that they hold promise for informing the design of nudges in a wide range of policy settings.

Do we need behavioral economics to explain law? I analyze Judge Guido Calabresi’s claim that we do. I find that, actually, we don’t; traditional economic theory can explain law just fine.

America has become a nation of homebodies. Rates of interstate mobility, by most estimates, have been falling for decades. Interstate mobility rates are particularly low and stagnant among disadvantaged groups—despite a growing connection between mobility and economic opportunity. Perhaps most importantly, mobility is declining in regions where it is needed most. Americans are not leaving places hit by economic crises, resulting in unemployment rates and low wages that linger in these areas for decades. And people are not moving to rich regions where the highest wages are available. This Article advances two central claims. First, declining interstate mobility rates create problems for federal macroeconomic policymaking. Low rates of interstate mobility make it harder for the Federal Reserve to meet both sides of its \"dual mandate\": ensuring both stable prices and maximum employment. Low interstate mobility rates also impair the efficacy and affordability of federal safety net programs that rely on state and local participation, and reduce wealth and growth by inhibiting agglomeration economies. While determining an optimal rate of interstate mobility is difficult, policies that unnaturally inhibit interstate moves worsen national economic problems. Second, the Article argues that governments, mostly at the state and local levels, have created a huge number of legal barriers to interstate mobility. Land-use laws and occupational licensing regimes limit entry into local and state labor markets. Different eligibility standards for public benefits, public employee pension policies, homeownership subsidies, state and local tax regimes, and even basic property law rules inhibit exit from low-opportunity states and cities. Furthermore, building codes, mobile home bans, federal location-based subsidies, legal constraints on knocking down houses, and the problematic structure of Chapter 9 municipal bank-ruptcy all limit the capacity of failing cities to \"shrink\" gracefully, directly reducing exit among some populations and increasing the economic and social costs of entry limits elsewhere. Combining these two insights, the Article shows that big questions of macroeconomic policy and performance turn on the content of state and local policies usually analyzed using microeconomic tools. Many of the legal barriers to interstate mobility emerged or became stricter during the period in which interstate mobility declined. While causation is difficult to determine, public policies developed by state and local governments more interested in guaranteeing local population stability than ensuring successful macroeconomic conditions either generated or failed to stymie falling mobility rates. The Article concludes by suggesting how the federal government could address stagnation in interstate mobility.