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The recent political history of Lebanon has been defined by the legacy of war. While much has been written about the tragedy of the civil war, this title is the first book focused on the evolution of the postwar political scene.

This article revisits the 1983 Israel-Lebanon Agreement using new archival material, mainly from the Israel State Archives, with three main goals. First, it demonstrates the centrality of the agreement for Israeli schemes in Lebanon and argues that Israeli demands during the negotiations shed new light on its decision to stay in Lebanon in June 1985, despite the government decision of January 1985 to withdraw to the international border. Second, it reconsiders Syria's ‘veto power’ over the agreement given Israel's objectives to establish a security zone in south Lebanon. Finally, by using new archival evidence, it completes our historical knowledge about the road to the agreement and its aftermath.

Menachem Begin was the sixth prime minister of Israel and the first from the right wing. He was in his post six years (1977–1983). The main claim of the article is that two main features led to his behavior during his term as prime minister. The first was dominant in his first term (1977–1981) and its central achievement was the Peace Agreement with Egypt. He was pragmatic, moderate, and his wish was to become accepted by the international community. The second feature was dominant in his second term (1981–1983), whose central event was the war with Lebanon (The First War with Lebanon). Begin was extreme, unbalanced, and his behavior during was the main reason for his resignation and his collapse.

Kaye argues that neither military-strategic considerations nor domestic pressure can adequately explain the Israeli decision to withdraw unilaterally from southern Lebanon. The key trigger for withdrawal was the reframing of the issue by the Israeli political leadership, particularly by Ehud Barak.

Examines how Lebanon became involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria's negotiation strategy in light of its military and political disadvantage with respect to Israel, and Lebanon-Syrian relations.

In the Middle East today, Iran is trying to upgrade its status to a dominant power by demonstrating an ability to penetrate and influence various regional theatres. Meanwhile, despite being the sole global power with considerable military presence in the region, America's strategic initiatives in the Middle East are frustrated by Iran's behaviour. This interaction is destabilizing the Middle East regional order. In this article I demonstrate that instability is mainly driven by the incompatibility ofthe two states' preferences, not their incongruence of capabilities. The regime in Tehran counters American encirclement by manipulating several foreign policy tools. Although its military capabilities are dwarfed by those of the United States, these tools still provide Iran with considerable ability to maneuver relatively freely despite international and regional constraints, enabling it to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. The first tool is Iran's ambition to develop nuclear energy technology, largely within the confines of the international atomic safeguards for civilian technology, but enshrined in confrontational rhetoric. The second tool is Iran's hardened alliance with an increasingly isolated Syria. The third tool is Iran's support of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The fourth is Iran's leverage in Iraq through ties to Shiite groups. Two potential tools that the Iranian regime can mobilize more effectively than it currently does are ties to groups in Afghanistan (such as the Hazara), and to Hamas in the occupied territories. Added to its considerable conventional military capability, Iran's advantages stem from the fact that the costs incurred for the manipulation of these tools have so far proven tolerable. In the interim it is willing to use them to destabilize a regional order that it sees as confining. These tools provide access to a wide theatre of operations, and their timed manipulation has proven Tehran's ability to exert formidable influence on other regional states as well as the US. In sum, Iran has been able to match or even overturn Washington's strategic initiatives and military interventions in the Middle East. Tehran would not have developed such resolve in isolation of the regional actors noted above. These state and substate actors are not passive recipients of Iranian influence efforts but have themselves been served through ties to Iran. Their interests coincide or overlap with Iran's own. To fully appreciate the effect of Iran's efforts to assume a higher regional status, we have to better understand the preferences of these regional actors. It is only after unpacking these two sets of preferences that we can better grasp the current sources of instability in the regional order. Embedding analysis in the logic of liberal international relations theory serves such an investigation. In studying Iran's behaviour and regional instability, emphasis shifts from focusing on the distribution of capabilities to unpacking the sources of preferences. Moreover, instead of asking only what policies should decision-makers (American or otherwise) pursue regarding Iran, we may be able to develop policies averting a regional confrontation between the US and Iran, as well as defuse a variety of potentially destabilizing regional issues. Two important factors are necessary for a full understanding of Iran's behaviour. The first is the nature of the Iranian regime itself. Unpacking Iran's domestic politics can help explain the timing and the reasons behind particular choices in foreign policy. The second factor is American policy in the Middle East. Along with the historic American presence in the Arabian Gulf states, placing US troops in Iraq meant replacing Iraq as a balancer to Iran; the costs of encirclement to Iran became too high to be ignored. What we are witnessing is Washington's regional standing being compromised by its under- appreciation of the role diplomacy can play in bringing Iran around.