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This paper examines the collapse of Barings Bank, utilizing an extended analytical framework based on Callon's sociology of translation. It shows how Leeson linked himself inextricably with Barings’ executives need for profit, mobilizing them (and others) into defending him when his activities were subject to scrutiny. It goes on to explain the process through which Leeson effectively lost control of his socio-technical network, and concludes by examining the difficulty of Leeson's presentation of himself to the world as a ‘rogue trader’.

ODD THOUGH it is to hear [Nick Leeson] rant on about debt and irresponsibility, he has a point. The man who single-handedly broke the Queen's bank, causing the biggest financial scandal of the last century, still owes Pounds 100million to the liquidators. Yet every week, without fail, he receives one of those enticing 'plastic fantastic' offers in the post. A decade on, it still seems incredible. In 1995, Leeson, then a 28-yearold plasterer's son from Watford, went on the run after making losses of Pounds 860 million at Barings, the oldest merchant bank in the City of London. 'I know it's not dealing with money on the scale that I was at Barings, and it is a very different field, but it gets all the old juices going. I have targets to meet.' What is interesting about Leeson's book is that it attempts to explain why he acted as he did.

Dressed in a grey suit with open-collar shirt, Leeson shrugged off comparisons to Jerome Kerviel, the Paris trader who lost an astounding $7.2 billion US through unauthorized trades for French banking giant Societe Generale early this year.

Arrested whilst on the run at Frankfurt airport a week later, Nick Leeson proceeded to recount what was to become the biggest financial fraud of the 20th century. Born the son of a plasterer in Watford (London), Leeson rose to become the Chief Trader in Singapore of the United Kingdom's oldest investment bank, Barings. By the early 1990s, Leeson had become Barings' star trader; by 1993 he was responsible for 10% of the bank's profits. As Chief Trader, from 1992 Leeson began to make unauthorized speculative trades on the Nikkei 225, initially making large profits, but soon generating large losses. On 17th January 1995, a large earthquake hit Kobe in Japan, sending the Nikkei, and Leeson's position, into a nose‐dive. Requesting extra funds to continue trading, Leeson took a series of risky long, un‐hedged positions; this time betting that the Nikkei would stabilize at 19,000 points.

Nick Leeson, the rogue trader who brought down Barings Bank with losses of £1.3bn, is set to host an event next month on the importance of getting recruitment decisions right.

As long as China's financial reforms lag, Beijing shouldn't be given new channels to affect world markets. If China's stock markets are included on global indices, it would allow China's economic troubles to spill over to other countries. It would also provide an opportunity for financial fraudsters in China to expand their operations. Chinese regulators are starting to grasp the problem. On May 12, one day after [Nick Leeson]'s warning, Securities and Futures Commission chairman Carlson Tong |Ka-shing pledged to clamp down on \"any unusual share movement\". But capital flows have accelerated so much - with millions of mainlanders having signed up for multiple trading accounts - that it's not clear if regulators will know where to start. (President Xi Jinping's crackdown on international media hasn't helped matters. Shielded from the scrutiny of journalists, corporate China has become more opaque in its financial dealings.)

As long as China's financial reforms lag, Beijing shouldn't be given new channels to affect world markets. If China's stock markets are included on global indices, it would allow China's economic troubles to spill over to other countries. It would also provide an opportunity for financial fraudsters in China to expand their operations. Chinese regulators are starting to grasp the problem. On May 12, one day after [Nick Leeson]'s warning, Securities and Futures Commission chairman Carlson Tong |Ka-shing pledged to clamp down on \"any unusual share movement\". But capital flows have accelerated so much - with millions of mainlanders having signed up for multiple trading accounts - that it's not clear if regulators will know where to start. (President Xi Jinping's crackdown on international media hasn't helped matters. Shielded from the scrutiny of journalists, corporate China has become more opaque in its financial dealings.)

  As long as China's financial reforms lag, Beijing shouldn't be given new channels to affect world markets. If China's stock markets are included on global indices, it would allow China's economic troubles to spill over to other countries. It would also provide an opportunity for financial fraudsters in China to expand their operations. Chinese regulators are starting to grasp the problem. On May 12, one day after [Nick Leeson]'s warning, Securities and Futures Commission chairman Carlson Tong |Ka-shing pledged to clamp down on \"any unusual share movement\". But capital flows have accelerated so much - with millions of mainlanders having signed up for multiple trading accounts - that it's not clear if regulators will know where to start. (President Xi Jinping's crackdown on international media hasn't helped matters. Shielded from the scrutiny of journalists, corporate China has become more opaque in its financial dealings.)

  As long as China's financial reforms lag, Beijing shouldn't be given new channels to affect world markets. If China's stock markets are included on global indices, it would allow China's economic troubles to spill over to other countries. It would also provide an opportunity for financial fraudsters in China to expand their operations. Chinese regulators are starting to grasp the problem. On May 12, one day after [Nick Leeson]'s warning, Securities and Futures Commission chairman Carlson Tong |Ka-shing pledged to clamp down on \"any unusual share movement\". But capital flows have accelerated so much - with millions of mainlanders having signed up for multiple trading accounts - that it's not clear if regulators will know where to start. (President Xi Jinping's crackdown on international media hasn't helped matters. Shielded from the scrutiny of journalists, corporate China has become more opaque in its financial dealings.)

His son \"just took it in his stride\", [Nick Leeson] says. How? \"You know, 'Can I get back on your phone and play Fifa?' or whatever.\" Today marks exactly two decades since Leeson and his then wife, Lisa, fled Singapore after he finally admitted to her that he had \"lost a lot If you're an expert in busts, the past few years haven't been bad for business. \"Strangely so,\" he admits. \"The world of banking is always good to me, because it throws out a bone from time to time by shooting itself in the foot.\" Even among rogue traders, he points out, \"I'm way down there now.\" Kweku Adoboli lost Swiss bank UBS pounds 1.5bn in 2011; three years earlier, Jerome Kerviel holed Societe Generale with losses of pounds 3.7bn. \"pounds 166bn! I lost pounds 862m. So the fines are far outweighing the losses, and still nothing's changing.\" What's the common thread between his fraud and subsequent scandals? Hubris? Greed? \"Everybody keeps away from the word greed, but that's what the industry is about. I don't think you could find a bank that sets themselves a target and, once they get there, is happy with it. They always want to exceed that and go further. It's also extremely competitive, and in my opinion it just is improperly policed.\"