Explore the vast range of titles available.

The United States patent system has become sand rather than lubricant in the wheels of American progress. Such is the premise behind this provocative and timely book by two of the nation's leading experts on patents and economic innovation.

Almost since the beginning of the republic, America's rigorous separation of powers among Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches has been umpired by the federal judiciary. It may seem surprising, then, that many otherwise ordinary cases are not decided in court even when they include allegations that the President, or Congress, has violated a law or the Constitution itself. Most of these orphan cases are shunned by the judiciary simply because they have foreign policy aspects. In refusing to address the issues involved, judges indicate that judicial review, like politics, should stop at the water's edge--and foreign policy managers find it convenient to agree! Thomas Franck, however, maintains that when courts invoke the \"political question\" doctrine to justify such reticence, they evade a constitutional duty. In his view, whether the government has acted constitutionally in sending men and women to die in foreign battles is just as appropriate an issue for a court to decide as whether property has been taken without due process. In this revisionist work, Franck proposes ways to subject the conduct of foreign policy to the rule of law without compromising either judicial integrity or the national interest. By examining the historical origins of the separation of powers in the American constitutional tradition, with comparative reference to the practices of judiciaries in other federal systems, he broadens and enriches discussions of an important national issue that has particular significance for critical debate about the \"imperial presidency.\"

The Federal Clean Air Act of 1970 is widely seen as a revolutionary legal response to the failures of the earlier common law regime, which had governed air pollution in the United States for more than a century. Noga Morag-Levine challenges this view, highlighting striking continuities between the assumptions governing current air pollution regulation in the United States and the principles that had guided the earlier nuisance regime. Most importantly, this continuity is evident in the centrality of risk-based standards within contemporary American air pollution regulatory policy. Under the European approach, by contrast, the feasibility-based technology standard is the regulatory instrument of choice. Through historical analysis of the evolution of Anglo-American air pollution law and contemporary case studies of localized pollution disputes,Chasing the Windargues for an overhaul in U.S. air pollution policy. This reform, following the European model, would forgo the unrealizable promise of complete, perfectly tailored protection--a hallmark of both nuisance law and the Clean Air Act--in favor of incremental, across-the-board pollution reductions. The author argues that prevailing critiques of technology standards as inefficient and undemocratic instruments of \"command and control\" fit with a longstanding pattern of American suspicion of civil law modeled interventions. This distrust, she concludes, has impeded the development of environmental regulation that would be less adversarial in process and more equitable in outcome.

What constitutes enough evidence to make a decision? While this is an important question across multiple domains, it takes on special importance in the US legal system, where jurors and judges are instructed to apply specific burdens of proof to render life-changing decisions. Civil trials use a preponderance of evidence (PoE) threshold to establish liability, while criminal trials require proof beyond a reasonable doubt (BaRD) to convict. It is still unclear, however, how laypeople interpret and apply these decision thresholds and how these standards compare to people’s intuitive belief (IB) of what constitutes enough evidence. Further, the extent to which their correct interpretation is context-dependent is currently unknown: are they unique to the legal context, or do they generalize to other contexts (e.g. medical, scientific, and perceptual) that also critically rely on decision thresholds? To compare burdens of proof across contexts requires a common parameter space. Here, we applied quantitative, psychometric analyses developed in psychophysics to compare decision thresholds across legal, nonlegal, and perceptual domains. We found a consistent pattern across domains in which BaRD was interpreted more stringently than PoE but, surprisingly, with PoE being more stringent than people’s IB. Decision thresholds were higher for legal contexts even when the costs of decision outcomes were equated. These results highlight how decisions are rendered inherently more stringently in the legal domain and suggest that laypeople’s IB are more lenient than either legal standard. These findings also illustrate the power of applying psychometrics to elucidate complex decision processes.

During its classical period, American contract law had three prominent characteristics: nearly unlimited freedom to choose the contents of a contract, a clear separation from the law of tort (the law of civil wrongs), and the power to make contracts without regard to the other party's ability to understand them. Combining incisive historical analysis with a keen sense of judicial politics, W. David Slawson shows how judges brought the classical period to an end about 1960 with a period of reform that continues to this day. American contract law no longer possesses any of the prominent characteristics of its classical period. For instance, courts now refuse to enforce standard contracts according to their terms; they implement the consumer's reasonable expectations instead. Businesses can no longer count on making the contracts they want: laws for certain industries or for businesses generally set many business obligations regardless of what the contracts say. A person who knowingly breaches a contract and then tries to avoid liability is subject to heavy penalties. As Slawson demonstrates, judges accomplished all these reforms, although with some help from scholars. Legislation contributed very little despite its presence in massive amounts and despite the efforts of modern institutions of law reform such as the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Slawson argues persuasively that this comparison demonstrates the superiority of judge-made law to legislation for reforming private law of any kind.

The adversary professions--law, business, and government, among others--typically claim a moral permission to violate persons in ways that, if not for the professional role, would be morally wrong. Lawyers advance bad ends and deceive, business managers exploit and despoil, public officials enforce unjust laws, and doctors keep confidences that, if disclosed, would prevent harm. Ethics for Adversaries is a philosophical inquiry into arguments that are offered to defend seemingly wrongful actions performed by those who occupy what Montaigne called \"necessary offices.\"

Independent domestic courts play important roles in enforcing international human rights agreements, thereby providing a mechanism by which international institutions can affect government policy. Yet this enforcement power is constrained not only by independence but also by the courts' ability to overcome information problems. Domestic courts' enforcement power depends on information in two ways: the costs of producing legally admissible evidence of abuses and the applicable legal standards of proof. When countries ratify international agreements, judicial enforcement can improve government practices when evidence-production costs and standards of proof are low, but not otherwise. With respect to personal integrity rights violations, evidence is especially difficult to obtain, and standards of proof are high, meaning that the courts will not be able to constrain government practices. By contrast, evidence-production costs and standards of proof are lower for other civil rights violations, so courts will be able to prosecute offenders and bring governments into line with their international commitments. Consistent with this theory, I find that commitments to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) have significantly improved governments' respect for the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion. With respect to personal integrity rights, however, I find that commitments to the ICCPR have not improved government practices.

Standards of proof for attributing real world events/damage to global warming should be the same as in clinical or environmental lawsuits, argue Lloyd et al. The central question that we raise is effective communication. How can climate scientists best and effectively communicate their findings to crucial non-expert audiences, including public policy makers and civil society? To address this question, we look at the mismatch between what courts require and what climate scientists are setting as a bar of proof. Our first point is that scientists typically demand too much of themselves in terms of evidence, in comparison with the level of evidence required in a legal, regulatory, or public policy context. Our second point is to recommend that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recommend more prominently the use of the category “more likely than not” as a level of proof in their reports, as this corresponds to the standard of proof most frequently required in civil court rooms. This has also implications for public policy and the public communication of climate evidence.

Dental age assessment based on evaluating dental mineralization status is one of the most common methods used in forensic practice. The aim of this study is to enhance the accuracy of age diagnostics and provide reference data from the Syrian population for forensic application. After several selection steps, a total of 280 orthopantomograms (OPGs) from 140 males and 140 females from the Syrian population divided into 14 age groups between 12 and 25 years were analysed. Based on Demirjian’s classification system, the mineralization stages of third molars (18, 28, 38 and 48) as well as lower second molars (37 and 47) were evaluated. Statistical investigations and evaluations were carried out to estimate the marginal probabilities of the subjects having attained ages 14 and 18 by generalized estimating equation models. Our results show that no significant differences can be revealed in the mineralization status with respect to jaw side and sex. In the Syrian population, third molars showing mineralization stage G provide evidence of reaching the age of 14 years with the highest standard of proof (“beyond reasonable doubt”). A completed mineralization in lower second molars (stage H) provides very high marginal probabilities (more than 90%) of the subjects having attained age 14 years. Nevertheless, this cannot exclude an age under 14 years. For the age threshold of 18 years, third molars showing incomplete root development (G dental stage or lower) are associated with a low probability (less than 40%) of the subject having reached 18 years of age. A person’s probability of having attained 18 years of age is very high (82– 95%) when the roots of third molars are fully developed (stage H). Nevertheless, third molars at stage H do not conclusively exclude an age under 18 years.

The burden of proof, a central feature of adjudication and other decision-making contexts, constitutes an important but largely unappreciated policy instrument. The optimal strength of the burden of proof, as well as optimal enforcement effort and sanctions, involves trading off deterrence and the chilling of desirable behavior, the latter being absent in previous work. The character of the optimum differs markedly from prior results and from conventional understandings of proof burdens. There are important divergences across models in which enforcement involves monitoring, investigation, and auditing. A number of extensions are analyzed, in one instance nullifying key results in prior work.