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"Legislative bodies Mathematical models."
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Designing Historical Social Scientific Inquiry: How Parameter Heterogeneity Can Bridge the Methodological Divide between Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches
Seeking to advance historical studies of political institutions and behavior, we argue for an expansion of the standard methodological toolkit with a set of innovative approaches that privilege parameter heterogeneity to capture nuances missed by more commonly used approaches. We address critiques by prominent historians and historically oriented political scientists who have underscored the shortcomings of mainstream quantitative approaches for studying the past. They are concerned that the statistical models ordinarily employed by political scientists are inadequate for addressing temporality, periodicity, specificity, and context—issues that are central to good historical analysis. The innovations that we advocate are particularly well suited for incorporating these issues in empirical models, which we demonstrate with replications of extant research that focuses on locating structural breaks relating to realignments and split-party Senate delegations and on the temporal evolution in congressional roll-call behavior connected to labor policy during the New Deal and Fair Deal.
Journal Article
Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation: A Valence-Uncertainty Model
A unidimensional spatial model of multiparty parliamentary elections under proportional representation is presented, in which parties project that the median parliamentary party will implement its policy position. The parties are assumed to be uncertain about the electoral impact of valence issues relating to party elites’ images of competence, integrity and charisma. The assumptions of the model, highlighting the importance of the median party in parliament, are consistent with empirical work by McDonald and Budge. Under them, the existence of a Nash equilibrium under quite general concavity conditions is proved and it is shown that parties will moderate their positions when their valence images deteriorate. Computations of party equilibria are reported. The model and its implications for policy-seeking parties with results on vote-seeking parties can be contrasted with that recently reported by Schofield and Sened.
Journal Article
Candidate positioning and responsiveness to constituent opinion in the U.S. House of Representatives
In this paper, I develop a survey-based measure of district ideology for the House of Representatives. I use this index to document and study ways in which patterns of candidate positioning depart from perfect representation. These findings help distinguish between competing theories of candidate positioning. My findings present evidence against theories that attribute divergence to the preferences of voters and the locations of primary constituencies. My findings are potentially consistent with the policy-motivation and resource theories, which attribute divergence to the polarization of political elites.
Journal Article
Sequential legislative lobbying
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (Am Polit Sci Rev 90:303-315, 1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving first suffers from a second mover advantage and will make an offer to a panel of legislators only if it deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e., if he anticipates to win the battle. This paper departs from the existing literature in assuming that legislators care about the consequence of their votes rather than their votes per se. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that the lobby moving first needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of the key parameters of the game on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory.
Journal Article
Corruption and power in democracies
We study the implications of Acton's dictum that power corrupts when citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. Our model entails various plausible predictions about long-run patterns of government. Acton's dictum results in possible government turnover, and in different predictions about possible government composition: for example, that the grand coalition may form.
Journal Article
Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790
A difficult yet prevalent problem in legislative politics is how to assess explanations when observable actions may not represent true (and unobserved) legislator preferences. We present a method for analyzing the validity of theoretical/historical accounts that unifies theory, history, and measurement. We argue that approaches to testing accounts of legislative behavior which are theoretically and historically agnostic are not always best and present an approach which: (1) forms an explicit explanation of behavior (here a simple dynamic voting game) that yields estimable parameter constraints, and (2) tests these constraints using a customized empirical model that is as consistent as possible with the explanation. We demonstrate the method using legislative voting data from the first Congress (1789-1791). Using the idea of sophisticated equivalents from voting theory we subject the traditional account of the \"Compromise of 1790\" to a statistical test and find that there is reason to doubt the claim that legislators of the time believed the specified log roll was taking place. The results suggest that the capital location and assumption issues were resolved independently.
Journal Article
Electing a parliament
We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single district proportional. We prove that under both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. We compare the outcomes under the two systems.
Journal Article
Stochastic Dependence in Competing Risks
The term \"Competing Risks\" describes duration models in which spells may terminate via multiple outcomes: the term of a cabinet, for example, may end with or without an election; wars persist until the loss or victory of the aggressor. Analysts typically assume stochastic independence among risks, the duration modeling equivalent of independence of irrelevant alternatives. However, many political examples violate this assumption. I review competing risks as a latent variables approach. After discussing methods for modeling dependence that place restrictions on the nature of association, I introduce a parametric generalized dependent risks model in which inter-risk correlation may be estimated and its significance tested. The method employs risk-specific random effects drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. Estimation is conducted using numerical methods and/or Bayesian simulation. Monte Carlo simulation reveals desirable large sample properties of the estimator. Finally, I examine two applications using data on cabinet survival and legislative position taking.
Journal Article
Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty
This paper extends Persson et al.'s (J Polit Econ 108:1121-1161, 2000) simple legislature in the context of public finance with certainty to uncertainty. In our uncertain world, oversized coalitions (OSCs) as well as minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) may arise in equilibrium, and the agenda setter's proposed policy may fail to receive a majority support. This is in marked contrast to the certain world, in which only MWCs can arise in equilibrium and the agenda setter's proposal never fails to pass. When OSCs arise, we show that both public good provision and redistribution are likely to achieve their first-best solution, even if the legislature is simple.
Journal Article