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"Lehman Brothers."
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LIBERTY AFTER LEHMAN BROTHERS
The financial Crunch of 2008 was easily explained by both the left and right–too easily. Each insisted that events thoroughly confirmed its own long-held views and utterly refuted those of the opposed camp. This essay argues that there are indeed new lessons to be drawn from the Crunch, lessons that involve balancing the bounty of the Invisible Hand against perils of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Liberal moral imperatives are traced to variables of Personal Choice and External Cost that are typically in tension with each other and thus generate needs for institutional reconstructions that change according to time and circumstance. Personal bankruptcy protection, limited liability corporations, and intellectual property are cited as examples. It is argued that the Crunch occurred because of failure adequately to balance these variables. Three paradoxes came to a head in 2008: Paradox of Efficient Markets; Paradox of Reduced Risk; Paradox of Hard-won Knowledge. The essay concludes with suggestions concerning specific lessons to be drawn from the Crunch and a corresponding list of lessons not to be drawn.
Journal Article
The role of equity underwriters in shaping corporate disclosure
We find that the exogenous shock of the collapse of Lehman Brothers leads to significant increases in the disclosure of management earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K items by equity underwriting clients of Lehman relative to clients of other underwriters of similar status. The increases in disclosure are more pronounced among Lehman clients with stronger underwriting relationships with Lehman or those that experienced more negative stock returns at the time of the collapse. Additional analyses reveal that, while Lehman clients experienced reductions in liquidity compared to non-Lehman clients after the collapse, this reduction is significantly attenuated among Lehman clients that increased the volume of their voluntary disclosures. Finally, we expand the sample to a larger set of underwriters and document that equity underwriter reputation changes are negatively associated with subsequent client disclosures, consistent with a substitution effect between client firms’ voluntary disclosures and the information roles played by high-quality underwriters. Overall, our results underscore the importance of the informational role of firms’ equity underwriters beyond the initial public offering (IPO) period.
Journal Article
El fantasma de Lehman Brothers. Inestabilidad en el Sector Inmobiliario Chino
En el presente trabajo se presentan algunas reflexiones sobre las similitudes y distancias entre el momento Lehman Brothers del 2008 y la inestabilidad que se observa en la actualidad en el sector inmobiliario chino. Para ello, se hace un recuento de los factores determinantes de la Gran Crisis del 2008, como fueron la falta de regulación estatal, las fallas estructurales del sistema y la irresponsabilidad de los agentes financieros. Enseguida, se expone el panorama del sector inmobiliario en China y el papel del Estado en el manejo de la inestabilidad en ese país.
Journal Article
Investor behavior in crisis: a comparative study of fear-driven downtrends and confidence-led recoveries
PurposeThe purpose of this research is to investigate the differences between financial crises of fear and confidence and the differential behavior between downtrends and recovery.Design/methodology/approachFive national stock markets have been analyzed – the USA (SP500), China (Hang Seng), Spain (IBEX 35), Japan (Nikkei) and Germany (DAX) – through the evolution of three world economic crises: the mortgage bubble crisis of 2007 in the first place, with special attention to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which will be treated as an independent crisis process, and the crisis caused by COVID-19. The behavioral finance theory, with the support of the complexity theory in the field of risk management, will establish the different behavioral biases that explain the differences between the two types of crises, fear and confidence, when confronted with risk.FindingsEconomic crises resulting from a shocking event, addressed as crises of fear in this research, such as Lehman Brothers or COVID-19, are fast-moving; all the economies analyzed show a common pattern of evolution. The difference is found in the recovery periods in which the previous parallelism does not continue. Crisis events that arise from a social context, addressed as crises of trust in this research, follow similar patterns in their evolution; nonetheless, the start date presents higher variations than those originated by a shock. These crises also lack parallelism between fall and recovery.Practical implicationsUnderstanding crisis process patterns may help to prevent them and alleviate their effects when they occur.Originality/valueUnderstanding crisis process patterns may help to prevent them and alleviate their effects when they occur. This constitutes an original field of research.
Journal Article
Uncontrolled risk : the lessons of Lehman Brothers and how systemic risk can still bring down the world financial system
A risk advisor for top financial institutions explains how limitless risky behaviors toppled a 158-year-old institution, using the story to illuminate the interconnection of the global financial system, as well as broader policy implications.
Book
The Bankers' New Clothes
Why our banking system is broken—and what we must do to fix it
As memories of the Global Financial Crisis have faded, it has been tempting to believe that the banking system is now safe and that we will never again have to choose between havoc and massive bailouts. But The Bankers' New Clothes shows that reforms have changed little—and that the banks still present serious dangers to the world economy. Writing in clear language anyone can understand, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig explain how we can have a healthier banking system without sacrificing any benefits. They also debunk the false and misleading narratives of bankers, regulators, politicians, academics, and others who oppose real reform.
eBook