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We examine cross-national variation in the global growth of commercial microfinance from 1998 to 2009 as a natural experiment to analyze the role of national institutions in shaping the ability of commercial enterprises to reach the global poor. Our results demonstrate that a country's level of state fragility represents an important institutional context of poverty that explains significant cross-national variation in the commercial microfinance industry's ability to grow its client base, control costs, and attract commercial capital. Moreover, we find that commercial microfinance lenders have experienced greater difficulty than nonprofit lenders in growing their client base in more fragile state settings. Our results support the proposition that the state shapes both institutional hazards and opportunities for business-led efforts to combat global poverty.

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.

Ianalyze the impact of a firm's environmental profile on its cost of equity and debt capital. Using implied cost of capital derived from analysts' earnings estimates, I find that investors demand significantly higher expected returns on stocks excluded by environmental screens (such as hazardous chemical, substantial emissions, and climate change concerns) compared to firms without such environmental concerns. Lenders also charge a significantly higher interest rate on the bank loans issued to firms with these environmental concerns. I provide evidence that the environmental profile of a firm is not simply proxying for an omitted component of its default risk. Further, firms with these environmental concerns have lower institutional ownership and fewer banks participate in their loan syndicate than firms without such environmental concerns. These results suggest that exclusionary socially responsible investing and environmentally sensitive lending can have a material impact on the cost of equity and debt capital of affected firms. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance .

This study applies an institutional perspective to a current debate in social entrepreneurship about the relative effectiveness of commercial vs non-profit methods of building inclusive markets for the poor. While some observers argue that for-profit ventures are needed to serve the poor on a large scale, others express concern that commercialization causes mission drift, a phenomenon where ventures migrate to wealthier clients over time. A multilevel analysis of 2679 for-profit and non-profit microfinance lenders in 123 countries over 15 years supported the hypotheses that commercialization contributes to mission drift away from market inclusivity, but that national levels of \"state fragility\" moderate this effect. In countries with a low level of state fragility, it was less costly to serve the poor, which decreased pressure on commercial actors to shift to wealthier clients to achieve profitability. An important implication of this finding is that institutions influence not only the number of entrepreneurs found in a particular location but also the social impact of entrepreneurial strategies and actions.

This paper investigates how friendship relationships act as pipes, prisms, and herding signals in a large online, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending site. By analyzing decisions of lenders, we find that friends of the borrower, especially close offline friends, act as financial pipes by lending money to the borrower. On the other hand, the prism effect of friends’ endorsements via bidding on a loan negatively affects subsequent bids by third parties. However, when offline friends of a potential lender, especially close friends, place a bid, a relational herding effect occurs as potential lenders are likely to follow their offline friends with a bid.

We use survey data to measure households' propensity to default on mortgages even if they can afford to pay them (strategic default) when the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. The willingness to default increases in both the absolute and the relative size of the home-equity shortfall. Our evidence suggests that this willingness is affected by both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, such as views about fairness and morality. We also find that exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued.

Using exogenous liquidity windfalls from oil and natural gas shale discoveries, we demonstrate that bank branch networks help integrate U.S. lending markets. Banks exposed to shale booms enjoy liquidity inflows, which increase their capacity to originate and hold new loans. Exposed banks increase mortgage lending in nonboom counties, but only where they have branches and only for hard-to-securitize mortgages. Our findings suggest that contracting frictions limit the ability of arm's length finance to integrate credit markets fully. Branch networks continue to play an important role in financial integration, despite the development of securitization markets.

We study the online market for peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, in which individuals bid on unsecured microloans sought by other individual borrowers. Using a large sample of consummated and failed listings from the largest online P2P lending marketplace, Prosper.com, we find that the online friendships of borrowers act as signals of credit quality. Friendships increase the probability of successful funding, lower interest rates on funded loans, and are associated with lower ex post default rates. The economic effects of friendships show a striking gradation based on the roles and identities of the friends. We discuss the implications of our findings for the disintermediation of financial markets and the design of decentralized electronic markets. This paper was accepted by Sandra Slaughter, information systems.

Using information on advertising and mortgages originated by subprime lenders, we study whether advertising helped consumers find cheaper mortgages. Lenders that advertise more within a region sell more expensive mortgages, measured as the excess rate of a mortgage after accounting for borrower, contract, and regional characteristics. These effects are stronger for mortgages sold to less sophisticated consumers. We exploit regional variation in mortgage advertising induced by the entry of Craigslist and other tests to demonstrate that these findings are not spurious. Analyzing advertising content reveals that initial/introductory rates are frequently advertised in a salient fashion, where reset rates are not.

We present evidence that cultural proximity (shared codes, beliefs, ethnicity) between lenders and borrowers increases the quantity of credit and reduces default. We identify in-group lending using dyadic data on religion and caste for officers and borrowers from an Indian bank, and a rotation policy that induces exogenous matching between them. Having an in-group officer increases credit access and loan size dispersion, reduces collateral requirements, and induces better repayment even after the in-group officer leaves. We consider a range of explanations and suggest that the findings are most easily explained by cultural proximity serving to mitigate information frictions in lending.