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173,674 result(s) for "Leverage"
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Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions
I exploit the adoption of state-level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.
Leverage Dynamics without Commitment
We characterize equilibrium leverage dynamics in a trade-off model in which the firm can continuously adjust leverage and cannot commit to a policy ex ante. While the leverage ratchet effect leads shareholders to issue debt gradually over time, asset growth and debt maturity cause leverage to mean-revert slowly toward a target. Investors anticipate future debt issuance and raise credit spreads, fully offsetting the tax benefits of new debt. Shareholders are therefore indifferent toward the debt maturity structure, even though their choice significantly affects credit spreads, leverage levels, the speed of adjustment, future investment, and growth.
Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity
We investigate global factors associated with bank capital flows. We formulate a model of the international banking system where global banks interact with local banks. The solution highlights the bank leverage cycle as the determinant of the transmission of financial conditions across borders through banking sector capital flows. A distinctive prediction of the model is that local currency appreciation is associated with higher leverage of the banking sector, thereby providing a conceptual bridge between exchange rates and financial stability. In a panel study of 46 countries, we find support for the key predictions of our model.
LEVERAGE AND DEFAULT IN BINOMIAL ECONOMIES: A COMPLETE CHARACTERIZATION
Our paper provides a complete characterization of leverage and default in binomial economies with financial assets serving as collateral. Our Binomial No-Default Theorem states that any equilibrium is equivalent (in real allocations and prices) to another equilibrium in which there is no default. Thus actual default is irrelevant, though the potential for default drives the equilibrium and limits borrowing. This result is valid with arbitrary preferences and endowments, contingent or noncontingent promises, many assets and consumption goods, production, and multiple periods. We also show that only no-default equilibria would be selected if there were the slightest cost of using collateral or handling default. Our Binomial Leverage Theorem shows that equilibrium Loan to Value (LTV) for noncontingent debt contracts is the ratio of the worst-case return of the asset to the riskless gross rate of interest. In binomial economies, leverage is determined by down risk and not by volatility.
Operating Leverage, Profitability, and Capital Structure
Operating leverage increases profitability and reduces optimal financial leverage. Thus, operating leverage generates a negative relation between profitability and financial leverage that is thought to be inconsistent with the trade-off theory but is commonly observed in the data. We demonstrate the effect of operating leverage on firms' profitability and financial leverage, as well as on the empirical relation between profitability and financial leverage, by using China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and its effect on the capital–labor ratio of U.S. firms.
The microstructural foundations of leverage effect and rough volatility
We show that typical behaviors of market participants at the high frequency scale generate leverage effect and rough volatility. To do so, we build a simple microscopic model for the price of an asset based on Hawkes processes. We encode in this model some of the main features of market microstructure in the context of high frequency trading: high degree of endogeneity of market, no-arbitrage property, buying/selling asymmetry and presence of metaorders. We prove that when the first three of these stylized facts are considered within the framework of our microscopic model, it behaves in the long run as a Heston stochastic volatility model, where a leverage effect is generated. Adding the last property enables us to obtain a rough Heston model in the limit, exhibiting both leverage effect and rough volatility. Hence we show that at least part of the foundations of leverage effect and rough volatility can be found in the microstructure of the asset.
Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?
We show that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. In large part, firms' financing decisions are responses to the financing decisions and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of peer firms. These peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. Furthermore, smaller, less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, but not vice versa. We also quantify the externalities generated by peer effects, which can amplify the impact of changes in exogenous determinants on leverage by over 70%.
Discrete-Time Volatility Forecasting With Persistent Leverage Effect and the Link With Continuous-Time Volatility Modeling
We first propose a reduced-form model in discrete time for S&P 500 volatility showing that the forecasting performance can be significantly improved by introducing a persistent leverage effect with a long-range dependence similar to that of volatility itself. We also find a strongly significant positive impact of lagged jumps on volatility, which however is absorbed more quickly. We then estimate continuous-time stochastic volatility models that are able to reproduce the statistical features captured by the discrete-time model. We show that a single-factor model driven by a fractional Brownian motion is unable to reproduce the volatility dynamics observed in the data, while a multifactor Markovian model fully replicates the persistence of both volatility and leverage effect. The impact of jumps can be associated with a common jump component in price and volatility. This article has online supplementary materials.
A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector
This article studies the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with financial frictions. Due to highly nonlinear amplification effects, the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile crisis episodes. Endogenous risk, driven by asset illiquidity, persists in crisis even for very low levels of exogenous risk. This phenomenon, which we call the volatility paradox, resolves the Kocherlakota (2000) critique. Endogenous leverage determines the distance to crisis. Securitization and derivatives contracts that improve risk sharing may lead to higher leverage and more frequent crises.