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The Great Recession, institutional dysfunction, a growing divide between urban and rural prospects, and failed efforts to effectively address immigration have paved the way for a populist backlash that disrupts the postwar bargain between political elites and citizens. Whether today's populism represents a corrective to unfair and obsolete policies or a threat to liberal democracy itself remains up for debate. Yet this much is clear: these challenges indict the triumphalism that accompanied liberal democratic consolidation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. To respond to today's crisis, good leaders must strive for inclusive economic growth while addressing fraught social and cultural issues, including demographic anxiety, with frank attention. Although reforms may stem the populist tide, liberal democratic life will always leave some citizens unsatisfied. This is a permanent source of vulnerability, but liberal democracy will endure so long as citizens believe it is worth fighting for.

Both liberals and conservatives believe that using facts in political discussions helps to foster mutual respect, but 15 studies—across multiple methodologies and issues—show that these beliefs are mistaken. Political opponents respect moral beliefs more when they are supported by personal experiences, not facts. The respect-inducing power of personal experiences is revealed by survey studies across various political topics, a field study of conversations about guns, an analysis of YouTube comments from abortion opinion videos, and an archival analysis of 137 interview transcripts from Fox News and CNN. The personal experiences most likely to encourage respect from opponents are issue-relevant and involve harm. Mediation analyses reveal that these harm-related personal experiences increase respect by increasing perceptions of rationality: everyone can appreciate that avoiding harm is rational, even in peoplewho hold different beliefs about guns, taxes, immigration, and the environment. Studies show that people believe in the truth of both facts and personal experiences in nonmoral disagreement; however, in moral disagreements, subjective experiences seem truer (i.e., are doubted less) than objective facts. These results provide a concrete demonstration of how to bridge moral divides while also revealing how our intuitions can lead us astray. Stretching back to the Enlightenment, philosophers and scientists have privileged objective facts over experiences in the pursuit of truth. However, furnishing perceptions of truth within moral disagreements is better accomplished by sharing subjective experiences, not by providing facts.

A sweeping account of the rise and evolution of liberal internationalism in the modern era For two hundred years, the grand project of liberal internationalism has been to build a world order that is open, loosely rules-based, and oriented toward progressive ideas. Today this project is in crisis, threatened from the outside by illiberal challengers and from the inside by nationalist-populist movements. This timely book offers the first full account of liberal internationalism's long journey from its nineteenth-century roots to today's fractured political moment. Creating an international \"space\" for liberal democracy, preserving rights and protections within and between countries, and balancing conflicting values such as liberty and equality, openness and social solidarity, and sovereignty and interdependence-these are the guiding aims that have propelled liberal internationalism through the upheavals of the past two centuries. G. John Ikenberry argues that in a twenty-first century marked by rising economic and security interdependence, liberal internationalism-reformed and reimagined-remains the most viable project to protect liberal democracy.

In the wake of the Terror, France's political and intellectual elites set out to refound the Republic and, in so doing, reimagined the nature of the political order. They argued vigorously over imperial expansion, constitutional power, personal liberty, and public morality. InReimagining Politics after the Terror, Andrew Jainchill rewrites the history of the origins of French Liberalism by telling the story of France's underappreciated \"republican moment\" during the tumultuous years between 1794 and Napoleon's declaration of a new French Empire in 1804. Examining a wide range of political and theoretical debates, Jainchill offers a compelling reinterpretation of the political culture of post-Terror France and of the establishment of Napoleon's Consulate. He also provides new readings of works by the key architects of early French Liberalism, including Germaine de Staël, Benjamin Constant, and, in the epilogue, Alexis de Tocqueville. The political culture of the post-Terror period was decisively shaped by the classical republican tradition of the early modern Atlantic world and, as Jainchill persuasively argues, constituted France's \"Machiavellian Moment.\" Out of this moment, a distinctly French version of liberalism began to take shape.Reimagining Politics after the Terroris essential reading for anyone concerned with the history of political thought, the origins and nature of French Liberalism, and the end of the French Revolution.

In an era of Market Triumphalism, this book follows the quest to address a myriad of prominent socio-economic pathologies in Western democracies – such as skyrocketing financial inequality, marketization, hereditary privileges, as well as dysfunctional types of merit-based justice – without surrendering their liberal foundation altogether in favor of an entirely different political framework. The author argues that classical liberalism should be regarded as a valuable doctrine worth keeping, and that the liberal tradition is not inevitably destined to succumb into the neoliberal and increasingly plutocratic as well as nepotistic manifestation responsible for the growing discontentment with the 'liberal order' during the past approximately four decades. Instead, the meritocratic promise inherent to classical liberalism must be taken more serious as a principle of justice and efficiency which – in turn – should be instrumentalized as an imperative for the provision of substantially greater equality of opportunity. The argument culminates in an advocacy for significantly higher levels of state regulations – for example via taxation to make higher education accessible to all sufficiently talented students independent of their family background – based on the claim that such interventions are justified if they bring about the levelled playing field necessary to a genuine meritocracy. Correspondingly, the author proposes policies more frequently associated with the postulates of social welfare egalitarians, however, he does so exclusively from within the pond of classical liberal principles. Until 2018, Peter Wedekind studied Practical Philosophy of Economics and the Environment as well as Economics/Politics and Philosophy at Kiel University. In 2022, he received his PhD in Political Science with a focus on Political Philosophy at Charles University, Prague. During his studies, he completed several research stays at the University of Richmond and as a Barrande Fellowships scholarship recipient at Montpellier Business School. Today, he serves in the teaching profession at a secondary school in the state of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany. - In einer Ära des Markttriumphalismus' widmet sich dieses Buch dem Versuch, eine Vielzahl prominenter sozioökonomischer Pathologien – darunter exorbitante finanzielle Ungleichheit, Vermarktlichung, herkunftsbedingte Privilegien sowie dysfunktionale Formen von Leistungsgerechtigkeit – in westlichen Demokratien zu adressieren ohne dabei deren liberales Fundament leichtfertig zugunsten einer gänzlich anderen Gesellschaftsblaupause aufzugeben. Der Autor argumentiert dabei, dass klassischer Liberalismus eine erhaltenswerte und reiche Tradition verkörpert, welche nicht zwangsläufig in jener neoliberalen und zunehmend plutokratischen sowie nepotistischen Manifestation verenden muss, die ihr in den vergangenen rund vier Jahrzehnten eine höchst umstrittene Reputation eingebracht hat. Stattdessen sollten die im Liberalismus angelegten meritokratischen Gerechtigkeits- und Effizienzprinzipien zu Ende gedacht und ernstgenommen werden, welche ihrerseits als Imperative für substanziell größere Chancengerechtigkeit instrumentalisiert werden können. Das Argument kulminiert in der Konklusion, dass signifikante staatliche Eingriffe, beispielsweise in Form von Besteuerung zur Förderung von Hochschulbildung unabhängig vom familiären Hintergrund, dann gerechtfertigt sind, wenn sie der Herstellung eines adäquaten Fundaments einer genuinen Verdienstgesellschaft dienlich sind. Der Autor bewirbt damit Policies, welche typischerweise eher mit egalitären Sozial- und Wohlfahrtsstaatstheorien assoziiert werden – tut dies jedoch rein aus dem Ökosystem klassisch liberaler Prinzipien heraus. Peter Wedekind studierte bis 2018 Praktische Philosophie der Wirtschaft und Umwelt sowie als Lehrämtler Wirtschaft/Politik und Philosophie an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel. Bis 2022 promovierte er im Rahmen des Politikwissenschaftsprogramms mit einem Schwerpunkt auf politischer Philosophie an der Karls Universität in Prag, und absolvierte dabei Forschungsaufenthalte an der University of Richmond sowie als Stipendiat des Barrande Fellowships an der Montpellier Business School. Seit dem abgeschlossenen Forschungsdoktorat ist er im Schuldienst des Landes Schleswig-Holstein tätig.

Previous literature has shown contradictory results regarding the relationship between economic liberalism at the country level and firms' engagement in corporate social action (CSA). Because liberalism is associated with individualism, it is often assumed that firms will engage in mostly symbolic rather than substantive social and environmental actions; in other words, they will practice \"greenwashing.\" To understand how cultural beliefs in the virtues of liberalism affect the likelihood of greenwashing, we disentangle the effects of the distinct and co-existing beliefs in the virtues of economic liberalism. We begin by conducting an exploratory qualitative analysis of managers' sentiments on this matter, based on a focus group methodology. We then use these investigative elements to articulate a comparison of the conflicting theoretical arguments: in liberal contexts, are firms, as social entities, inherently selfish or pro-active when it comes to CSA? We empirically test our hypotheses on a large-scale dataset. Finally, we show paradoxically that in countries where beliefs in the virtues of competition are strong, firms are more likely to greenwash, while in countries where beliefs in the virtues of individual responsibility are prominent, firms are more likely to focus on concrete actions. These findings suggest that in contexts where weak governments are seen as ideal, firms might feel the need to step into fill institutional voids, in contexts in which competitive mindsets dominate, this tendency is counterbalanced.

Research in political psychology indicates that liberals are less motivated than conservatives by epistemic, existential, and relational needs to reduce uncertainty, threat, and social discord, and are therefore more prone to challenge the status quo. In a compelling extension of this work into the field of consumer behavior, Jung, Garbarino, Briley, and Wynhausen (this issue) demonstrate that people residing in more liberal (vs. conservative) areas register more complaints with the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and dispute more resolutions offered in response to their complaints. Furthermore, liberals were found to object more strongly to the hypothetical imposition of an unanticipated banking fee, and this effect was mediated by system justification. Inspired by Jung and colleagues, we investigated the hypothesis that liberals would also be more likely to buy and boycott consumer products for political reasons. We analyzed data from the American National Election Studies and European Social Surveys and discovered that, even after we adjusted for demographic factors, liberals in the United States and leftists in all 15 European countries were more likely than conservatives and rightists to report having bought a product—or refrained from buying a product—for political reasons.

We examine the views toward libertarian-paternalistic (soft) governmental interventions in a series of online experiments conducted in three countries. We use both standard and new methods to elicit attitudes toward soft interventions in various hypothetical scenarios. The majority of the participants accept these types of interventions by the government. However, a substantial proportion opposes them and would prefer that the government simply provide information to help the public make the right choice rather than use a more effective choice architecture intervention. Some even refuse to make the choice that the government promotes, although they would have done so in the absence of the intervention. The opposition to soft interventions appears to be driven by concerns about manipulation and the fear of a slippery slope to nonconsensual interventions. Opposition to soft interventions is reduced when they are implemented by employers rather than the government.

The present research investigates the associations between holding favorable views of potential Democratic or Republican candidates for the US presidency 2016 and seeing profoundness in bullshit statements. In this contribution, bullshit is used as a technical term which is defined as communicative expression that lacks content, logic, or truth from the perspective of natural science. We used the Bullshit Receptivity scale (BSR) to measure seeing profoundness in bullshit statements. The BSR scale contains statements that have a correct syntactic structure and seem to be sound and meaningful on first reading but are actually vacuous. Participants (N = 196; obtained via Amazon Mechanical Turk) rated the profoundness of bullshit statements (using the BSR) and provided favorability ratings of three Democratic (Hillary Clinton, Martin O'Malley, and Bernie Sanders) and three Republican candidates for US president (Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, and Donald Trump). Participants also completed a measure of political liberalism/conservatism. Results revealed that favorable views of all three Republican candidates were positively related to judging bullshit statements as profound. The smallest correlation was found for Donald Trump. Although we observe a positive association between bullshit and support for the three Democrat candidates, this relationship is both substantively small and statistically insignificant. The general measure of political liberalism/conservatism was also related to judging bullshit statements as profound in that individuals who were more politically conservative had a higher tendency to see profoundness in bullshit statements. Of note, these results were not due to a general tendency among conservatives to see profoundness in everything: Favorable views of Republican candidates and conservatism were not significantly related to profoundness ratings of mundane statements. In contrast, this was the case for Hillary Clinton and Martin O'Malley. Overall, small-to-medium sized correlations were found, indicating that far from all conservatives see profoundness in bullshit statements.

This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of the expansion of mass schooling and the long-term legacy of educational institutions. Based on a new provincial-level dataset for Italy in the period 1861–1911, we argue that different models of schooling provision adopted by the different pre-unification polities influenced primary-education organizations across macro-regions up to WWI. As a result, school access and the capability to generate literacy given current rates of enrollment differed substantially, with the Northern regions aiming to increase schooling for all, while the Center and the South implemented a more elitist model.