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Why was there a meltdown at the Fukushima power plant? Why do some people get cancer and not others? Why is global warming happening? Why does one person get depressed in the face of life's vicissitudes while another finds resilience? Questions like these -- questions of causality -- form the basis of modern scientific inquiry, posing profound intellectual and methodological challenges for researchers in the physical, natural, biomedical, and social sciences. In this groundbreaking book, noted psychiatrist and author Peter Rabins offers a conceptual framework for analyzing daunting questions of causality. Navigating a lively intellectual voyage between the shoals of strict reductionism and relativism, Rabins maps a three-facet model of causality and applies it to a variety of questions in science, medicine, economics, and more. Throughout this book, Rabins situates his argument within relevant scientific contexts, such as quantum mechanics, cybernetics, chaos theory, and epigenetics. A renowned communicator of complex concepts and scientific ideas, Rabins helps readers stretch their minds beyond the realm of popular literary tipping points, blinks, and freakonomic explanations of the world.

Consider the complexity of a living cell after 3.8 billion years of evolution. Is it more awesome to suppose that a transcendent God fashioned the cell at a stroke, or to realize that it evolved with no Almighty Hand, but arose on its own in the changing biosphere?In this bold and fresh look at science and religion, complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman argues that the qualities of divinity that we revere-creativity, meaning, purposeful action-are properties of the universe that can be investigated methodically. He offers stunning evidence for this idea in an abundance of fields, from cell biology to the philosophy of mind, and uses it to find common ground between belief systems often at odds with one another.A daring and ambitious argument for a new understanding of natural divinity,Reinventing the Sacredchallenges readers both scientifically and philosophically.

We question whether the growing popularity of model selection based on information theory (IT) and using the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) represent a useful paradigm shift in data analysis or a substitution of 1 statistical ritual for another, which leaves in place long-standing problems in wildlife science. We discuss the relevance of model selection in science, problems in the IT-AIC algorithm, errors of commission and omission in IT-AIC-based studies, and the role of IT-AIC in knowledge accrual. Model selection is just another minor tool in the grand panorama of science. The human mind, not statistical methods, produces scientific breakthroughs. Although IT-AIC might include elements of hypothetico-deductive science, it is arguably a form of sensitivity analysis, magnitude of effects estimation, or simple description as currently applied. Accordingly, it is largely an inductive approach to knowledge accrual and, therefore, subject to the pitfalls of induction. The algorithm tends to over fit data (i.e, use too many variables), resulting in models that contain useless variables and that generalize poorly. Errors of commission in IT-AIC-based papers include hopelessly uninformative lists of encrypted models and imposition of the model-selection approach on studies better executed in a simple, descriptive format. The major error of omission is an almost universal failure to test selected models on independent data. From our perspective, IT-AIC is a harmless human construct that is being ritualistically applied and therefore cannot be expected to correct long-standing problems in the conduct of wildlife science, such as failure to apply the hypothetico-deductive method. We view the growing application of IT-AIC as problematic because that growth might discourage use of the full panoply of available methods of inquiry. Accordingly, we urge colleagues to avail themselves of the rich pageant of available analytical techniques that can be applied in wildlife research under the hypothetico-deductive method and to keep ecology, rather than statistics, in the forefront of wildlife science.

In Morbid Undercurrents, Sean M. Quinlan follows how medical ideas, stemming from the so-called birth of the clinic, zigzagged across the intellectual landscape of the French Revolution and its aftermath. It was a remarkable \"hotspot\" in the historical timeline, when doctors and scientists pioneered a staggering number of fields—from forensic investigation to evolutionary biology—and their innovations captivated the public imagination. During the 1790s and beyond, medicine left the somber halls of universities, hospitals, and learned societies and became profoundly politicized, inspiring a whole panoply of different—often bizarre and shocking—subcultures. Quinlan reconstructs the ethos of the time and its labyrinthine underworld, traversing the intersection between medicine and pornography in the works of the Marquis de Sade, efforts to create a \"natural history of women,\" the proliferation of sex manuals and books on family hygiene, anatomical projects to sculpt antique bodies, the rage for physiognomic self-help books that taught readers to identify social and political \"types\" in post-revolutionary Paris, the use of physiological medicine as a literary genre, and the \"mesmerist renaissance\" with its charged debates over animal magnetism and somnambulism. In creating this reconstruction, Quinlan argues that the place and authority of medicine evolved, at least in part, out of an attempt to redress the acute sense of dislocation produced by the Revolution. Morbid Undercurrents exposes how medicine then became a subversive, radical, and ideologically charged force in French society.

What should we do when two conflicting ontologies are both fruitful, though their fruitfulness varies by context or location? To achieve reconciliation, it is not enough to advocate pluralism. There are many varieties of pluralism and not all pluralisms will serve equally well; some may be inconsistent, others unhelpful. This essay considers another option: local ontology . For a pair of ontologies, a local ontology consists of two claims: (1) each location enjoys a unique ontology, and (2) neither ontology is most fundamental nor most global. To argue for this view and provide an example, I develop a local ontology for two scientific ontologies: processualism and new mechanism. To further support this ontology, I argue against two varieties of pluralism: first, a pluralism based on directly unifying the assumptions of both ontologies and, second, one of allowing both ontologies to coexist within a discipline. I argue that the first option is inconsistent and the second is unhelpful. I conclude that this local ontology provides us with a consistent and fruitful account that includes elements from both mechanism and processualism.

In this paper I use data from interviews conducted with coral scientists to examine the socio-ecological dimensions of science, i.e. how science shapes and is shaped by the living world around it. I use two sets of ideas in particular: niche construction and socio-ecological value frameworks. Using these I offer socio-ecological criteria by which coral scientists evaluate the activities of coral science, more specifically which living systems are intended to benefit from coral science as an activity, and the motivations behind this. The overall picture I present is one of coral science as activity primarily aimed at sustaining a diverse set of living systems, including humans, other organisms, species, and ecosystems, and the social practices associated with these. The value relations between scientists and aspects of these processes dictate how they respond to shifts in the socio-ecological context coral science is embedded in, explaining why the activities associated with coral science are changing as reef ecosystems are threatened. The implication is that natural sciences more generally are entangled with a greater number of social and ecological process than is typically considered, and that shifts in the activities undertaken by scientists may be driven by ecological as well as social and epistemic processes.

I extend work from Krakauer et al. ( 2020 ), who propose a conception of individuality as the capacity to propagate information through time. From this conception, they develop information-theoretic measures. I identify several shortcomings with these measures—in particular, that they are associative rather than causal. I rectify this shortcoming by deriving a causal information-theoretic measure of individuality. I then illustrate how this measure can be implemented and extended in the context of evolutionary transitions in individuality.

Modeling his position on Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude, Derek Turner proposed the Natural Historical Attitude. Although these positions share a family resemblance, Turner’s position differs from Fine’s in two important ways. First, Fine’s contextualism is more fine-grained. Second, Turner’s argument for metaphysical agnosticism seems to lead to the implausible conclusion that we should be agnostic about the mind-independence of ordinary objects – a position in tension with Fine’s “core position.” While this paper presents a textual analysis of Fine’s and Turner’s arguments, the conclusions reached here cohere well with some of the best empirically-informed assessments of the historical sciences. Given the diversity of the historical sciences, the fact that many claims in the historical sciences have enough support to be regarded as true, and the implausibility of Turner’s agnosticism, philosophers studying historical science would be better served by embracing a stance closer to Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude.

Concepts of an organism’s biological environment and of niche construction as how organisms alter their environment and that of other organisms now play prominent roles in multiple sub-fields of biology, including ecology, evolution, and development. Some philosophers now use these concepts to understand the dynamics of scientific research. Others note divergences among the concepts of niche and niche construction employed in these biological fields, with implications for their possible conceptual integration. My (Rouse, 2015 ) account of scientific research as niche constructive and of laws and lawful invariance in scientific practice illuminates these conceptual differences and their implications for integrating those domains of biological research in two ways. First, it accounts for the partial autonomy of these domains and their concepts as characteristic of scientific conceptual development. Second, it provides a more complex understanding of how research domains can be integrated, which shows how those different conceptions of niches and niche construction do not block their appropriate integration. The conclusion situates my account and its application to niche concepts both amid other philosophical uses of niche concepts to understand research environments and as exemplifying my revisionist conception of philosophical naturalism.