Explore the vast range of titles available.

This article proposes a new way of understanding grammatical status and grammaticalization as distinctive types of linguistic phenomena. The approach is usage-based and links up structural and functional, as well as synchronie and diachronic, aspects of the issue. The proposal brings a range of previously disparate phenomena into a motivated relationship, while certain well-entrenched criteria (such as 'closed paradigms') are shown to be incidental to grammatical status and grammaticalization. The central idea is that grammar is constituted by expressions that by linguistic convention are ancillary and as such discursively secondary in relation to other linguistic expressions, and that grammaticalization is the kind of change that gives rise to such expressions.

This Essay sketches an originalist methodology using ideas from legal theory and theoretical linguistics, including the distinctions between interpretation and construction and between semantics and pragmatics. The Essay aims to dispel a number of misconceptions about the methods used by originalists. Among these is the notion that originalists rely on dictionary definitions to determine the communicative content of the constitutional text. Although dictionaries may play some role, the better approach emphasizes primary evidence such as that provided by corpus linguistics. Another misconception is that originalists do not consider context; to the contrary, the investigation of context plays a central role in originalist methodology. Part I of this Essay articulates a theoretical framework that draws on ideas from contemporary legal theory and linguistics. Part II investigates methods for determining the constitutional text's semantic content. Part III turns to methods for investigating the role of context in disambiguating and enriching what would otherwise be sparse semantic meaning. Part TV describes an originalist approach to constitutional construction. The Essay concludes with a short reflection on the future of originalist methodology.

In a series of papers, Donald Davidson (Synthese 59(1):3–17, 1984, The philosophical grounds of rationality, 1986, Midwest Stud Philos 16:1–12, 1991) developed a powerful argument against the claim that linguistic conventions provide any explanatory purchase on an account of linguistic meaning and communication. This argument, as I shall develop it, turns on cases of what I call lexical innovation: cases in which a speaker uses a sentence containing a novel expression-meaning pair, but nevertheless successfully communicates her intended meaning to her audience. I will argue that cases of lexical innovation motivate a dynamic conception of linguistic conventions according to which background linguistic conventions may be rapidly expanded to incorporate new word meanings or shifted to revise the meanings of words already in circulation. I argue that this dynamic account of conventions both resolves the problem raised by cases of lexical innovation and that it does so in a way that is preferable to those who—like Davidson—deny important explanatory roles for linguistic conventions.

The nature of color categories in the world's languages is contested. One major view holds that color categories are organized around universal focal colors, whereas an opposing view holds instead that categories are defined at their boundaries by linguistic convention. Both of these standardly opposed views are challenged by existing data. Here, we argue for a third view based on a proposal by Jameson and D'Andrade [Jameson KA, D'Andrade RG (1997) in Color Categories in Thought and Language, eds Hardin CL, Maffi L (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, U.K.), pp 295-319]: that color naming across languages reflects optimal or near-optimal divisions of an irregularly shaped perceptual color space. We formalize this idea, test it against color-naming data from a broad range of languages and show that it accounts for universal tendencies in color naming while also accommodating some observed cross-language variation.

It is widely held that named color categories in the world's languages are organized around universal focal colors and that these focal colors tend to be chosen as the best examples of color terms across languages. However, this notion has been supported primarily by data from languages of industrialized societies. In contrast, recent research on a language from a nonindustrialized society has called this idea into question. We examine color-naming data from languages of 110 nonindustrialized societies and show that (i) best-example choices for color terms in these languages cluster near the prototypes for English white, black, red, green, yellow, and blue, and (ii) best-example choices cluster more tightly across languages than do the centers of category extensions, suggesting that universal best examples (foci) may be the source of universal tendencies in color naming.

Social conventionalism — the position that social conventions governing language use determine or constitute the meanings of our words — has faced two major problems. The first is the Agreement Problem: how could speakers agree to use words in certain ways without already speaking meaningfully? The second is the Novelty Problem: how can conventions fix the meanings of innovative uses of words? David Lewis famously responded to the Agreement Problem but his account flounders on the Novelty Problem. Josh Armstrong emends Lewis’ account to solve the Novelty Problem. I argue that Armstrong's emendation fails and that neither he nor Lewis has an adequate response to the Agreement Problem.

After briefly laying out a cultural-evolutionary approach to speech acts (Sects. 1–2), I argue that the notion of commitment at play in assertion and related speech acts comprises multiple dimensions (Sect. 3). Distinguishing such dimensions enables us to hypothesize evolutionary precursors to the modern practice of assertion, and facilitates a new way of posing the question whether, and if so to what extent, speech acts are conventional (Sect. 4). Our perspective also equips us to consider how a modern speaker might employ an illocutionary analogue of A.N. Prior’s “runabout-inference ticket”, in which the pragmatic “introduction rules” for utterances correspond to evolutionary precursors of modern speech acts, but in which the “elimination rules” correspond to their modern descendants (Sect. 5). Such behavior would be abusive, though not in a way readily discernible without an evolutionary perspective on speech acts that attends to the dimensions of commitment that they encompass. Such behavior also raises the question how we may safeguard against it in public discourse, and I close (Sect. 6) with some suggestions for doing so.

This paper introduces and illustrates a methodology for analyzing corpus data with the goal of identifying regularities in the use of a given element or pattern. In line with the research tradition in construction grammar, one type of these regularities pertains to form-meaning and/or form-function pairings. In addition to this, however, further types of regularities are explored, among them the reciprocal type of regularity that links communicative goals and linguistic forms as well as contextual and social regularities. I pursue three main goals: 1) to lay out the conceptual groundwork of the methodology; 2) to present a manual for applying it; and 3) to illustrate its application with a case study on the sequence . The motivation for developing this methodology, labelled (MDRA), lies in the dynamic, flexible and multi-dimensional notion of linguistic conventions and conventional constructions proposed as part of the Entrenchment-and-Conventionalization Model ( ).

You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations.

Color naming in the world's languages has traditionally been viewed as reflecting either a universal set of focal colors, or linguistic relativity. Recently, a different view has gained support: color naming may be accounted for in terms of the overall shape of perceptual color space. Here, we show that the new shape-based perspective can clarify which languages have color-naming systems that deviate from what universal forces would predict. Specifically, we find that the color-naming systems of two languages that have been held to counterexemplify universals of color naming— Pirahä and Warlpiri— are in fact consistent with the structure of color space. In contrast, two other languages that have not yet been the focus of much attention— Karajá and Waorani— are apparently inconsistent with that structure in a substantial way. We propose that the notion of ' fit to the shape of color space' provides a useful and objective means of determining which languages have genuinely unusual color-naming systems.