Explore the vast range of titles available.

This article proposes that, based on the evolution of international investment law and investment arbitration, umbrella clauses are substantially implicated in the interpretation of Chinese concession loan agreements in Nigeria. So far, the outcome of the oversight functions of the National Assembly of Nigeria indicates that umbrella clauses have not been considered a significant legal issue in the negotiation of these agreements. With the growing use of Chinese concession loan agreements in Nigeria, this article offers a historical analysis that should be a guide to organs of government, policy advisers and others charged with the sourcing and negotiation of concession loans for development projects in Nigeria. The article makes the case that a proper understanding of the evolution of umbrella clauses is germane to the negotiation and interpretation of these agreements, compared to standard immunity clauses that appear to have overtaken in the debate about these loans in Nigeria.

Purpose: This research seeks to examine the cross-default and cross-collateral clauses in loan agreement that meet the principles of justice and the principle of balance, especially in developing countries such as Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach: A legal normative review method is used in this study. The cross-default clause and cross-collateral clauses are discussed in relation to existing legal practices in this paper, and a new framework is proposed. The topic in the research centers on the principles of justice and equality for creditors and borrowers. Findings: It concludes that the cross-default and cross-collateral clauses do not fulfill the principles of justice and balance. Cross-default clause shows injustice when associated with subsidiaries' performance. Cross-collateral clause does not fulfill the principle of equality because it has a higher collateral execution position than other non-bank creditors or non-cash management services bank. This study suggests that debtors reconsider the provision of cross-default and cross-collateral clauses. Cross-default can be limited to a minimum default value. Cross-collateral must be abolished to deliver justice to all creditors. Research limitations/implications: The pre-lamination of this research is that it does not address the issue of negotiations between creditors and debtors. Finally, existing creditors are unlikely to change the rights they have already obtained. Further research can be developed by researching the types of businesses that provide a fixed asset guarantee value. Originality/value: This study provides a novelty by rethinking principle of fairness and equality in cross-collateral and cross-default clauses in loan agreement, under insolvency.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the bilateral responsibility character of the loan agreement. At the heart of a research there is a method of the analysis of the existing Russian legislation and law-enforcement practice and the existing European standards for legal unification. Results revealed that the rights of the lessor can be subdivided on precontractual and contractual. The right to reliable information about the borrower belongs to precontract laws of the lessor; right for coordination of contractual conditions. Moreover, it is necessary to differentiate the contract monetary and the contract of a commodity (real) loan in connection with differences in a set of the bilateral rights and duties of the lessor and borrower. In conclusion, in the pre-revolutionary doctrine an opportunity to sign the loan agreement on consensual model in this connection we consider that this legal design can be reproduced in the existing civil legislation was proved.

Using a measure of contract strictness based on the probability of a covenant violation, I investigate how lender-specific shocks impact the strictness of the loan contract that a borrower receives. Banks write tighter contracts than their peers after suffering payment defaults to their own loan portfolios, even when defaulting borrowers are in different industries and geographic regions from the current borrower. The effects persist after controlling for bank capitalization, although bank equity compression is also associated with tighter contracts. The evidence suggests that recent defaults inform the lender's perception of its own screening ability, thereby impacting its contracting behavior.

On 29 June 2020, the Liquidator also lodged a caveat against the Property.9 On 20 January 2021, the PTIBs and the Liquidator filed applications in the Singapore High Court to set aside the Legal Mortgage on the ground that it was a transaction at an undervalue or a voluntary conveyance to defraud creditors.10 In response, on 26 January 2021, RGL filed an application under section 127(1) of the Land Titles Act11 (LTA) for the PTIBs to show cause as to why the PTIBs' caveat should not be removed.12 The High Court Judge found that the Legal Mortgage was not a voluntary conveyance to defraud creditors but decided in favour of the PTIBs and the Liquidator on the basis that the Legal Mortgage was a transaction at an undervalue.13 The Judge, therefore, dismissed RGL's application under section 127(1) of the LTA.14 RGL appealed against the Judge's decision. RGL sought leave to raise new points on appeal, in particular, whether Pictorial became insolvent as a result of the grant of the Legal Mortgage; whether the Liquidator and the PTIBs were estopped from arguing that Pictorial and Mr Ng were insolvent or became insolvent when they granted the Legal Mortgage; and whether the Judge should have voided the Legal Mortgage in view of the previously existing Equitable Mortgage.15 In response, the Liquidator and the PTIBs sought to raise new points relating to the validity and priority of the Equitable Mortgage.16 The Court of Appeal allowed all the applications for leave to raise new points as they were essentially questions of law and no fresh evidence was required for these points to be determined on appeal. (1) Subject to this section and sections 100 and 102, where an individual is adjudged bankrupt and he has at the relevant time (as defined in section 100) entered into a transaction with any person at an undervalue, the Official Assignee may apply to the Court for an order under this section. In considering the proper interpretation and requirements of section 98(3)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, the Court of Appeal noted that \"consideration\" is not defined for purposes of section 98(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, but \"would appear to have the normal meaning ascribed to it by contract\".21 Whereas section 98(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act is concerned only with the existence of consideration in the contractual sense, section 98(3)(c) expressly requires \"a comparison of value between the consideration provided and the consideration received\".22 RGL sought to argue that section 98(3)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act does not require the court to compare the value of the consideration received by the grantor personally with that given by the grantor.23 The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that the comparison of value between the consideration provided and the consideration received should be governed by the following principles: (a) The value comparison exercise has to be undertaken from the perspective of the insolvent grantor (citing Re MC Bacon (No. 1)24 (MC Bacon))}5 Even though the consideration need not be directly received by the grantor, the value of that consideration is relevant only in so far as it accrues to the grantor.26 Further, the grantor's mere perception of value will not suffice.27 (b) The value of the consideration has to be assessed \"in money or money's worth\", thus requiring the value of the

[...]waging war placed an enormous economic strain on the country, which expended nearly 28 per cent of national wealth in the conflict; and this came after losing over 15 per cent in the First World War.1 Despite such immense exertions, the British were only able to continue thanks to external financial aid. Truman announced on 21 August the abrupt end of Lend-Lease.4 The new British prime minister, Clement Attlee, told the House of Commons on 24 August how the country faced a ‘very serious financial position’ and announced that the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, and the government's chief economic adviser, Lord Keynes, would depart shortly for the United States to discuss the situation. The diary of Frederic Harmer, a temporary civil servant in the Treasury and close aide to Keynes, and the Washington reports of Robert Brand, head of the Treasury Delegation in Washington, provide invaluable insights into this crucial period in Britain's relations with North America. During a trip to meet some shipping agents he left his homburg hat in a New York taxi and, when asked if he recalled the five-digit number of the cab, he said he did not but he did know it was divisible by 37.

Bankruptcy scholars have long organized their field around a stylized story, a paradigm, of lender control. When lenders extend credit, the story goes, they insist on the borrower agreeing to strict covenants and granting blanket liens on its assets; then, if the borrower later encounters financial distress, they use their bargained-for rights as prods to steer the company toward a resolution favorable to themselves, whether or not that resolution is value maximizing for the investors as a group. As fruitful as the lender-control heuristic has been, however, it no longer corresponds to reality. This Article introduces a new interpretive paradigm that better accounts for a changed world. Today, more often than not, equity sponsors rather than senior lenders have practical control over the way that distressed companies respond to their financial problems. Lenders no longer hold the big sticks that they once wielded to establish precedence, and the people guiding today's modal large, distressed business have powerful incentives to preserve the value of sponsor investments. The predictable effect of the new locus of control has been to stand familiar restructuring dynamics on their head. Indeed, a number of seemingly unconnected trends in reorganization practice may best be understood as resulting from sponsors' first-order incentives to postpone a reckoning that might crystallize losses. Identifying the dynamics of sponsor control thus promises to shed light on a variety of scholarly and policy debates around corporate reorganization.

Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that there are sharp and substantial employment cuts following loan covenant violations, when creditors gain rights to accelerate, restructure, or terminate a loan. The cuts are larger at firms with higher financing frictions and with weaker employee bargaining power, and during industry and macroeconomic downturns, when employees have fewer job opportunities. Union elections that create new labor bargaining units lead to higher loan spreads, consistent with creditors requiring compensation when employees gain bargaining power. Overall, binding financial contracts have a large impact on employees and are an amplification mechanism of economic downturns.

We study the role of borrower accounting quality in debt contracting. Specifically, we examine how accounting quality affects the borrower's choice of private versus public debt market and how the design of debt contracts vary with accounting quality in the two markets. We find that accounting quality affects the choice of the market, with poorer accounting quality borrowers preferring private debt, i.e., bank loans. This is consistent with banks possessing superior information access and processing abilities that reduce adverse selection costs for borrowers. We also find that accounting quality has an economically significant but differential impact on contract design in the two markets consistent with differences in recontracting flexibility across the two markets. In the case of private debt, since there is greater recontracting flexibility, both the price (i.e., interest) and non-price (i.e., maturity and collateral) terms are significantly more stringent for poorer accounting quality borrowers, unlike public debt where only the price terms are more stringent. The impact of accounting quality on interest spreads of public debt is 2.5 times that of the private debt, since the price terms alone reflect the variation in accounting quality.