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We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013.

In this article, we document and discuss salient features of collective bargaining systems in the OECD countries, with the goal of debunking some misconceptions and myths and revitalizing the general interest in wage setting and collective bargaining. We hope that such an interest may help close the gap between how economists tend to model wage setting and how wages are actually set. Canonical models of competitive labor markets, monopsony, and search and matching all assume a decentralized wage setting where individual firms and workers determine wages. In most advanced economies, however, it is common that firms or employer associations bargain with unions over wages, producing collective bargaining systems. We show that the characteristics of these systems vary in important ways across advanced economies, with regards to both the scope and the structure of collective bargaining.

I discuss the recent literature that has led to new interest in the idea of monopsonistic wage setting. Building on advances in search theory and in models of differentiated products, researchers have used a number of different strategies to identify the elasticity of firm- specific labor supply. A growing consensus is that firms have some wage- setting power, though many questions remain about the sources of that power.

We develop an equilibrium wage-posting model with heterogeneous firms that decide to locate in the formal or the informal sector and workers who search randomly on and off the job. We estimate the model on Brazilian labor force survey data. In equilibrium, firms of equal productivity locate in different sectors, a fact observed in the data. Wages are characterized by compensating differentials. We show that tightening enforcement does not increase unemployment and increases wages, total output, and welfare by enabling better allocation of workers to higher productivity jobs and improving competition in the formal labor market.

We provide evidence that unemployment insurance affects equilibrium conditions in the labor market, which creates significant \"market externalities.\" We provide a framework for identification of such equilibrium effects and implement it using the Regional Extension Benefit Program (REBP) in Austria which extended the duration of UI benefits for a large group of eligible workers in selected regions of Austria. We show that non-eligible workers in REBP regions have higher job finding rates, lower unemployment durations, and a lower risk of long-term unemployment. We discuss the implications of our results for optimal UI policy.

The model of compensating wage differentials is among the cornerstone models of equilibrium wage determination in labor economics. However, empirical estimates of compensating differentials have faced persistent credibility challenges. This article summarizes the Rosen model of compensating differentials and chronicles the advances, setbacks, and lessons learned from empirical studies. The progression from cross-sectional to panel models alleviated biases caused by unobserved human capital but yielded new insights into the importance of other biases, including those caused by labor market frictions and endogenous job mobility. I discuss recent approaches that use matched employer-employee data and quasi-random variation in job amenities to address some of these challenges. I then present two examples of applications of compensating differentials: the evaluation public health and safety policies that rely on the value of statistical life, and the measurement and interpretation of earnings inequality.

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.

We study how workers' wages respond to changes in firm-level physical productivity using Swedish data. We find that technology shocks affect workers' wages through both internal and external forces. Wages respond three times as much to physical productivity shocks that are shared with outside firms within the same sector as they do to firm-level physical productivity shocks. The larger impact of sectoral physical productivity is related to the degree of within-sector labour mobility, suggesting that the productivity evolution among firms that draw their labour from the same market segment is a crucial determinant of the wage growth of incumbent workers.

This paper studies wage determination using the first longitudinal data set containing job-level task information for individual workers. Novel quantitative task measures detail the amount of time spent performing people, information, and objects tasks at different skill levels. These measures suggest natural proxies for on-the-job human capital accumulation and provide new insights about wage determination. Current job tasks are quantitatively important, with high-skilled tasks being paid substantially more than low-skilled tasks. There is no evidence of learning by doing for low-skilled tasks but strong evidence for high-skilled tasks. Current and past high-skilled information tasks are particularly valuable.