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Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this result.

Married women's labor force participation (LFP) increased dramatically in the United States between the 1940 and 1960 cohort. The two cohorts lived under different divorce regimes (unilateral divorce rather than mutual consent). The 1960 cohort also had a lower gender wage gap. We use a quantitative dynamic life-cycle model of endogenous marital status, calibrated to key statistics for the 1940 cohort, to study the effects of these two changes. We find that both drivers combined are able to account for over 50 percent of the increase in married women's LFP and also generate large movements in marriage and divorce rates.

Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we provide evidence that to understand household decisions and evaluate policies designed to affect individual welfare, it is important to add an intertemporal dimension to the by-now standard static collective models of the household. Specifically, we document that the observed differences in labor supply by gender and marital status do not arise suddenly at the time of marriage, but rather emerge gradually over time. We then propose an intertemporal collective model that has the potential of explaining the observed patterns.

Since the early 1990s, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region have made admirable progress in reducing the gap between girls and boys in areas such as access to education and health care. Indeed, almost all young girls in the Region attend school, and more women than men are enrolled in university. Over the past two decades, maternal mortality declined 60 percent, the largest decrease in the world. Women in MENA are more educated than ever before. It is not only in the protest squares that have seen women whose aspirations are changing rapidly but increasingly unmet. The worldwide average for the participation of women in the workforce is approximately 50 percent. In MENA, their participation is half that at 25 percent. Facing popular pressure to be more open and inclusive, some governments in the region are considering and implementing electoral and constitutional reforms to deepen democracy. These reforms present an opportunity to enhance economic, social, and political inclusion for all, including women, who make up half the population. However, the outlook remains uncertain. Finally, there are limited private sector and entrepreneurial prospects not only for jobs but also for those women who aspire to create and run a business. These constraints present multiple challenges for reform. Each country in MENA will, of course, confront these constraints in different contexts. However, inherent in many of these challenges are rich opportunities as reforms unleash new economic actors. For the private sector, the challenge is to create more jobs for young women and men. The World Bank has been pursuing an exciting pilot program in Jordan to assist young women graduates in preparing to face the work environment.

This article develops a quantitative life-cycle model to study the increase in married women's labour force participation (LFP). We calibrate the model to match key life-cycle statistics for the 1935 cohort and use it to assess the changed environment faced by the 1955 cohort. We find that a higher divorce probability and changes in wage structure are each able to explain a large proportion of the LFP increase. Higher divorce risk increases LFP not because the latter contributes to higher marital assets or greater labour market experience, however. Instead, it is the result of conflicting spousal preferences towards the adjustment of marital consumption in the face of increased divorce risk.

Labor force participation of women is expected to decrease the risk of spousal violence by enhancing their bargaining power or diminishing their contacts with abusive partners. The opposite effect is predicted when female employment induces male backlash. I identify the effect of female employment on spousal violence by exploiting the exogenous variations in rural women's working status driven by rainfall shocks and the rice-wheat dichotomy. The instrumental variable regression result indicates that female employment significantly reduces the incidence of spousal violence. This result is mainly driven by the exposure reduction effect that dominates male backlash. There is, however, no evidence on the bargaining effect.

Iran is aging rapidly and is expected to see negative population growth rates later this century. This change is generating significant concern for policymakers, whose response is to seek ‘demographic solutions’ to these issues: raise the fertility rate, decrease the divorce rate, and promote marriage among young people. Part of these policies has entailed curtailing access to free family planning services. This ‘call and response’ approach is unlikely to succeed in its stated aim, as it over-simplifies the real challenges of population aging as well as the multiple dimensions of population change. Such policies derive from simple representations of demographic change, most notably using the old-age dependency ratio. Using a microsimulation model, this paper suggests that increasing Iran’s currently low female labor force participation and translating educational gains into rising productivity is a more effective means of responding to the challenges of population aging, even under low fertility conditions. The advancement on previous such microsimulation exercises lies in the fact that this study explicitly considers the comparison between raising fertility and increasing female economic empowerment to offset population aging in a setting characterized by an overt pronatalist policy system. In tandem with reforming stressed institutional systems (such as the pension system), releasing the full potential of Iran’s existing (and future) human capital—especially of its women—is a far more effective policy direction than fertility-promoting policies.

Studies examining determinants of divorce have largely ignored differences between factors that elevate wives' and husbands' initiation of divorce. The authors use longitudinal data and a latent class model embedded in a competing-risks event history model to assess distinct predictors of wives and husbands leaving marriages. They find that when men are not employed, either spouse is more likely to leave. When wives report better-than-average marital satisfaction, their employment affects neither spouse's exit. However, when wives report below-average marital satisfaction, their employment makes it more likely they will leave. The authors' findings suggest that theories of divorce require \"gendering\" to reflect asymmetric gender change.

We review the relationship between female labor supply and marital instability. Traditionally, the sociological literature has focused on the impact of female labor supply on the likelihood of divorce with specific reference to the independence hypothesis. However, recent studies in sociology and economics provide more consistent evidence that the direction of causality may be the other way around. Women might increase their labor supply in the anticipation of divorce. We review the methodological developments in measuring economic independence and the recent evidence on its impact on divorce. Then we turn our attention to the alternative literature on the impact of divorce on female labor supply. We outline the theoretical arguments put forward by this literature, discuss the methodological issues in establishing causality, summarize the findings, and suggest avenues of further research.

As women's labor-force participation and earnings have grown, so has the likelihood that wives outearn their husbands. A common concern is that these couples may be at heightened risk of divorce. Yet with the rise of egalitarian marriage, wives' relative earnings may be more weakly associated with divorce than in the past. We examine trends in the association between wives' relative earnings and marital dissolution using data from the 1968–2009 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that wives' relative earnings were positively associated with the risk of divorce among couples married in the late 1960s and 1970s, and that this was especially true for wives who outearned their husbands, but this was no longer the case for couples married in the 1990s. Change was concentrated among middle-earning husbands and those without college degrees, a finding consistent with the economic squeeze of the middle class over this period.