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In November 1997, the world media converged on Vancouver, Canada to cover a meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). A predictable student protest met unusually strong police response.

Warnings that a breakdown in multilateral trade liberalization would bring about an upsurge in protectionist sentiment, the possible collapse of the multilateral trading system and, in the most doomsday of scenarios, the fragmentation of the global economy have been an intrinsic part of trade negotiations since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was first negotiated. What is seldom acknowledged, however, is the role that this language of crisis and collapse - what might be called a 'crisis discourse' - has had on framing trade negotiations and in maintaining forward momentum in the liberalization process. This discourse has played a role in facilitating the kind of institutional development that the GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has undergone - helping to push through bargains among GATT contracting parties and WTO members that have been (and remain) deeply asymmetrical - and driving the trade agenda forward at moments when the institution appears deadlocked; and it has continued to play a role in the current round of negotiations. The aims of the paper are twofold. First, the paper explores the content of the crisis discourse. Second, it examines the way in which the discourse has been deployed as a means of reframing trade negotiations in such a way that the likelihood of their continuation and ultimate conclusion increases. The paper does this by focusing on the collapse and resumption of the negotiations in the wake of the WTO's 2005 Hong Kong ministerial meeting, though the crisis discourse and its intensification at moments of intransigence has been a key feature of trade negotiations since the Allies first sat down to develop a trade architecture in the wartime and early post-war years.

Explanations for ASEAN's inability to more successfully influence Myanmar over the last decade have shifted from accusations that the organization does nothing to live up to its on-paper commitments to the belief that what it does is wholly ineffective. The reasons for this ineffectiveness are found in the normative and institutional architecture of ASEAN, specifically its lack of punitive sanction-based compliance mechanisms. Through focusing on ASEAN's use of public pronouncements to express interests and desires, this article takes issue with such assertions. Specifically, ASEAN has been engaged in a strategy of rhetorical action to promote compliance with regional standards. To date it has been unsuccessful in that attempt not because of a lack of courts and commissions, but because it has been incoherent in its political strategy. At crucial moments ASEAN and its members remained more concerned with creating a unified position against external pressure than on developing a single policy towards Myanmar. This reaction fatally undermined the ability of ASEAN to influence Myanmar as it ensures the regime the continued external political cover from pressure that animated its desire to join ASEAN in 1997. This article suggests that correcting this shortcoming through the development of greater coherence is achievable within the existing ASEAN approach to managing regional affairs.

This article analyses the work of the Bologna Follow Up Group as the main institution of the Bologna Process and the perceptions of the policy actors involved concerning the character of the process in terms of its functioning in contrast to similar multi‐level multi‐actor European processes, its modes of communication and consensus seeking, as well as its effectiveness in terms of policy formation and implementation. It argues that the Bologna Process is a unique multi‐level multi‐actor process shaped by its informality, the actors' political commitment and the participation of stakeholders. Its format seems to be more effective and suitable for purposes of policy formation than for those of policy monitoring or coordination of implementation.

Canada advocated the transformation of the Arctic environmental protection strategy into an organization that would include the existing strategy working groups and their programs, but would also address a broader range of Arctic issues. Thus, the mandate of the Arctic Council includes \"common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic...\"5 Excluded, however, are \"matters related to military security.\" In addition, and most significantly, Arctic indigenous groups were given privileged membership to ensure that their voices were included in discussions. As a result, the Arctic Council has various levels of membership - a practice developed in the Arctic environmental protection strategy. Those with voting privileges and the ability to determine policy and to make project-related decisions include the eight Arctic Member States - all of which were members of the Arctic environmental protection strategy. The main \"products\" of the Arctic Council are policy recommendations and guidelines. These are usually drawn from the assessments (as well as discussions, results, and projects) of the Arctic Council's six working groups, ad hoc task forces, and expert groups. The six working groups include the four Arctic environmental-protection-strategy working groups, namely: the protection of the Arctic marine environment (currently chaired by Iceland), the Arctic monitoring and assessment program (currently chaired by a Canadian), the conservation of Arctic flora and fauna (currently chaired by a Russian); and the emergency prevention, preparedness, and response working group (currently chaired by a Norwegian). In order to reflect the broader mandate of the Arctic Council, two additional groups have been added: the sustainable development working group (chaired by a Swede) and the Arctic contaminants action program (chaired by a Russin). Each working group has a chair, management board, or steering committee and is supported by a secretariat offered by a state member. For instance, the Arctic monitoring and assessment program secretariat has always been located in Oslo and has, according to Timo Koivurova, been hugely influential through various chairships.) Working Groups generally meet several times a year to assess progress and advance its work. The protection of the Arctic marine environment group, for example, is headed by a chair and vice-chair, which rotate among the Arctic countries. The chair reports to the senior Arctic officials, and through them, to the ministers of the Arctic Council. The working groups (task forces and other subsidiary bodies) may establish their own operating guidelines, but the composition and mandates of such bodies must be agreed to by the Arctic states. Many of the reports and studies conducted by the working groups are now touchstone documents; for example, the 2004 Arctic climate impact assessment, a collaborative project led by a steering committee of members from the conservation of Arctic flora and fauna group, the Arctic monitoring and assessment program, the International Arctic Sciences Committee (an observer), and experts from around the world, is widely read by states, NGOs, and academics worldwide. The assessments serve not only to educate the wider public, but to report on important and rigorously tested scientific findings. The working groups also conduct many studies about preparing for the future. The Arctic marine shipping assessment, for example, engaged a private company to assist the protection of the Arctic marine environment group to create \"scenario narratives\" on the future of Arctic marine navigation via a process of scenario planning, in order to challenge wishful thinking and to provide an academic framework with which to plan for the future of Arctic marine shipping.13

This article examines the processes behind the evolution of preventive diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum. The Forum's potential to establish meaningful preventive diplomacy mechanisms is likely to remain highly limited unless it departs from the rules of the “ASEAN Way” of institution building. This departure would only be a prerequisite, not a solution.