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In November 2008, the Federal Reserve faced a deteriorating economy and a financial crisis. The federal funds rate had already been reduced to virtually zero. Thus, the Federal Reserve turned to unconventional monetary policies. Through “quantitative easing,” the Fed announced plans to buy mortgage-backed securities and debt issued by government-sponsored enterprises. Subsequent purchases would eventually lead to a five-fold expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet, from$900 billion to $ 4.5 trillion, and leave the Fed holding over 20 percent of all mortgage-backed securities and marketable Treasury debt. In addition, Fed policy statements in December 2008 began to include explicit references to the likely path of the federal funds interest rate, a policy that came to be known as “forward guidance.” The Fed ceased its direct asset purchases in late 2014. Starting in October 2017, it has allowed the balance sheet to shrink gradually as existing assets mature. From December 2015 through June 2018, the Fed has raised the federal funds interest rate seven times. Thus, the time is ripe to step back and ask whether the Fed’s unconventional policies had the intended expansionary effects—and by extension, whether the Fed should use them in the future.

We provide evidence on the transmission of monetary policy shocks in a setting with both economic and financial variables. We first show that shocks identified using high frequency surprises around policy announcements as external instruments produce responses in output and inflation that are typical in monetary VAR analysis. We also find, however, that the resulting \"modest\" movements in short rates lead to \"large \"movements in credit costs, which are due mainly to the reaction of both term premia and credit spreads. Finally, we show that forward guidance is important to the overall strength of policy transmission.

We quantify government spending multipliers in US data using Bayesian prior and posterior analysis of a monetary model with fiscal details and two distinct monetary-fiscal policy regimes. The combination of model specification, observable data, and relatively diffuse priors for some parameters lands posterior estimates in regions of the parameter space that yield fresh perspectives on the transmission mechanisms that underlie government spending multipliers. Short-run output multipliers are comparable across regimes—posterior means around 1.3 on impact—but much larger after 10 years under passive money/active fiscal than under active money/passive fiscal—90 percent credible sets of [1.5, 1.9] versus [0.1, 0.4] in present value, when estimated from 1955 to 2016.

We document the transmission of large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve to the real economy using rich borrower-linked mortgage-market data and an identification strategy based on mortgage market segmentation. We find that central bank QE1 MBS purchases substantially increased refinancing activity, reduced interest payments for refinancing households, led to a boom in equity extraction, and increased aggregate consumption. Relative to QE-ineligible jumbo mortgages, QE-eligible conforming mortgage interest rates fell by an additional 40 bp and refinancing volumes increased by an additional 56% during QE1. We estimate that households refinancing during QE1 increased their durable consumption by 12%. Our results highlight that the transmission of unconventional monetary policy to the real economy depends crucially on the composition of assets purchased and the degree of segmentation in the market.

We analyze a unique episode in the history of monetary economics, the 2016 Indian “demonetization.” This policy made 86% of cash in circulation illegal tender overnight, with new notes gradually introduced over the next several months. We present a model of demonetization where agents hold cash both to satisfy a cash-in-advance constraint and for tax evasion purposes. We test the predictions of the model in the cross-section of Indian districts using several novel data sets including: the geographic distribution of demonetized and new notes for causal inference; night light activity and employment surveys to measure economic activity including in the informal sector; debit/credit cards and e-wallet transactions data; and banking data on deposit and credit growth. Districts experiencing more severe demonetization had relative reductions in economic activity, faster adoption of alternative payment technologies, and lower bank credit growth. The cross-sectional responses cumulate to a contraction in aggregate employment and night lights–based output due to the the cash shortage of at least 2 percentage points and of bank credit of 2 percentage points in 2016Q4 relative to their counterfactual paths, effects that dissipate over the next few months. Our analysis rejects monetary neutrality using a large-scale natural experiment, something that is still rare in the vast literature on the effects of monetary policy.

We study how monetary policy in China influences banks’ shadow banking activities. We develop and estimate the endogenously switching monetary policy rule that is based on institutional facts and at the same time tractable in the spirit of Taylor (1993). This development, along with two newly constructed micro banking datasets, enables us to establish the following empirical evidence. Contractionary monetary policy during 2009–2015 caused shadow banking loans to rise rapidly, offsetting the expected decline of traditional bank loans and hampering the effectiveness of monetary policy on total bank credit. We advance a theoretical explanation of our empirical findings.

This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents’ partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded “cognitive discounting” parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is “neo-Fisherian” in the long run, Keynesian in the short run.

We propose a “dominant currency paradigm” with three key features: dominant currency pricing, pricing complementarities, and imported inputs in production. We test this paradigm using a new dataset of bilateral price and volume indices for more than 2,500 country pairs that covers 91 percent of world trade, as well as detailed firm-product-country data for Colombian exports and imports. In strong support of the paradigm we find that (i) noncommodities terms-of-trade are uncorrelated with exchange rates; (ii) the dollar exchange rate quantitatively dominates the bilateral exchange rate in price pass-through and trade elasticity regressions, and this effect is increasing in the share of imports invoiced in dollars; (iii) US import volumes are significantly less sensitive to bilateral exchange rates, compared to other countries’ imports; (iv) a 1 percent US dollar appreciation against all other currencies predicts a 0.6 percent decline within a year in the volume of total trade between countries in the rest of the world, controlling for the global business cycle. We characterize the transmission of, and spillovers from, monetary policy shocks in this environment.

To overcome the limits on traditional monetary policy imposed by the effective lower bound on short-term interest rates, in recent years the Federal Reserve and other advanced-economy central banks have deployed new policy tools. This lecture reviews what we know about the new monetary tools, focusing on quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance, the principal new tools used by the Fed. I argue that the new tools have proven effective at easing financial conditions when policy rates are constrained by the lower bound, even when financial markets are functioning normally, and that they can be made even more effective in the future. Accordingly, the new tools should become part of the standard central bank toolkit. Simulations of the Fed’s FRB/US model suggest that, if the nominal neutral interest rate is in the range of 2–3 percent, consistent with most estimates for the United States, then a combination of QE and forward guidance can provide the equivalent of roughly 3 percentage points of policy space, largely offsetting the effects of the lower bound. If the neutral rate is much lower, however, then overcoming the effects of the lower bound may require additional measures, such as a moderate increase in the inflation target or greater reliance on fiscal policy for economic stabilization.

This paper employs an approximation that makes a nonlinear term structure model extremely tractable for analysis of an economy operating near the zero lower bound for interest rates. We show that such a model offers an excellent description of the data compared to the benchmark model and can be used to summarize the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policy. Our estimates imply that the efforts by the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy since July 2009 succeeded in making the unemployment rate in December 2013 1% lower, which is 0.13% more compared to the historical behavior of the Fed.