Explore the vast range of titles available.

This paper studies the role of private sector companies in the development of local amenities. We use evidence from one of the largest multinationals of the 20th century: the United Fruit Company (UFCo). The firm was given a large land concession in Costa Rica—one of the so-called “Banana Republics”—from 1899 to 1984. Using administrative census data with census-block geo-references from 1973 to 2011, we implement a geographic regression discontinuity design that exploits a land assignment that is orthogonal to our outcomes of interest. We find that the firm had a positive and persistent effect on living standards. Company documents explain that a key concern at the time was to attract and maintain a sizable workforce, which induced the firm to invest heavily in local amenities—like the development of education and health infrastructure—that can account for our result. Consistent with this mechanism, we show, empirically and through a proposed model, that the firm’s investment efforts increase with worker mobility.

This article confronts monopsony theory’s predictions regarding workers’ wages with observed wage patterns over the business cycle. Using German administrative data for the years 1985 to 2010 and an estimation framework based on duration models, the authors construct a time series of the labor supply elasticity to the firm and estimate its relationship to the unemployment rate. They find that firms possess more monopsony power during economic downturns. Half of this cyclicality stems from workers’ job separations being less wage driven when unemployment rises, and the other half mirrors that firms find it relatively easier to poach workers. Results show that the cyclicality is more pronounced in tight labor markets with low unemployment, and that the findings are robust to controlling for time-invariant unobserved worker or plant heterogeneity. The authors further document that cyclical changes in workers’ entry wages are of similar magnitude as those predicted under pure monopsonistic wage setting.

Previous research shows that female workers are less sensitive to wages in their decision to switch jobs than male workers, and that this could explain a substantial part of the gender wage gap. This paper studies to what extent gender differences in preferences and personality traits explain the gender gap in the wage-elasticity of job-to-job transitions in the labor market. Using a novel decomposition approach in the context of mediated moderation and using German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (G-SOEP) data for the period 2005-2019, we find that gender differences in risk preferences, patience, trust, reciprocity, altruism, conscientiousness, ambition and self-esteem explain about 25% of the gender gap in wage-elasticities of job separations. A detailed decomposition suggests that risk preferences, trust and ambition contribute most to this gender gap in wage-elasticity.

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms that face search complementarities in the formation of vendor contracts. Search complementarities amplify small differences in productivity among firms. Market concentration fosters monopsony power in the labor market, magnifying profits and further enhancing the output share of high-productivity firms. The combination of search complementarities and monopsony power induce a strong \"Matthew effect\" that endogenously generates superstar firms out of uniform idiosyncratic productivity distributions. Reductions in search costs increase market concentration, lower the labor income share, and increase wage inequality. The model also transforms short-lived negative aggregate shocks into persistent recessions that heighten market concentration.

Offering evidence from both detailed individual country studies and homogenized statistics across the Latin American and Caribbean region, this book examines the impact of the minimum wage on wages, employment, poverty, income distribution and government budgets in the context of a large informal sector and predominantly unskilled workforces.

This paper reviews the range of countertrade activities taking place in international trade and the existing hypotheses that purport to explain their existence. Countertrade may be attractive in the short run in response to some pre-existing market distortion, impediment or disequilibrium.However, unless the countertrade imposed can directly address the distortion then this international transaction mode may prove to be very costly in the long run, if not the short run.This paper concludes that the superiority of countertrade over other transaction modes available in international trade and its efficacy as an economic instrument in circumventing perceived distortions is not clear. Countries that pursue this form of trade policy intervention for industrial development may cause a reduction in national, and perhaps global, welfare.

When jobs offered by different employers are not perfect substitutes, employers gain wage-setting power; the extent of this power can be captured by the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. The authors collect 1,320 estimates of this parameter from 53 studies. Findings show a prominent discrepancy between estimates of direct elasticity of labor supply to changes in wage (smaller) and the estimates converted from inverse elasticities (larger), suggesting that labor market institutions may rein in a substantial amount of firm wage-setting power. This gap remains after they control for 22 additional variables and use Bayesian Model Averaging and LASSO to address model uncertainty; however, it is less pronounced for studies employing an identification strategy. Furthermore, the authors find strong evidence that implies the literature on direct estimates is prone to selective reporting: Negative estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm tend to be discarded, leading to upward bias in the mean reported estimate. Additionally, they point out several socioeconomic factors that seem to affect the degree of monopsony power.

An econometric model of the market for tomatoes in Israel is developed to take into account the distortions brought about by the marketing board and intermediaries. The existence of monopoly and monopsony power is hypothesized by analyzing the middlemen's optimal behavior. Being compelled by the marketing board to purchase all produce, wholesalers exert monopsony power by reducing quantities marketed to consumers by selling surpluses to the marketing board at the minimum price. The empirical results confirm the existence of strong monopsony power together with weak monopoly power in that market.

In August 1994, the Secretary of Agriculture announced the termination of the marketing order and the associated flow-to-market, or prorate, controls for fresh California and Arizona (CA/AZ) lemons. Lemon growers and handlers have expressed concern over the impact of this decision on retail-FOB margins. This study presents an econometric model of fresh lemon marketing margins that tests for the presence of buyer and seller market power during previous periods of marketing order suspension. The results show that buyer and, to a lesser extent, seller market power cause retail-FOB margins to widen during periods of prorate suspension.

What happens if an employer cuts wages by one cent? Much of labor economics is built on the assumption that all the workers will quit immediately. Here, Alan Manning mounts a systematic challenge to the standard model of perfect competition.Monopsony in Motionstands apart by analyzing labor markets from the real-world perspective that employers have significant market (or monopsony) power over their workers. Arguing that this power derives from frictions in the labor market that make it time-consuming and costly for workers to change jobs, Manning re-examines much of labor economics based on this alternative and equally plausible assumption. The book addresses the theoretical implications of monopsony and presents a wealth of empirical evidence. Our understanding of the distribution of wages, unemployment, and human capital can all be improved by recognizing that employers have some monopsony power over their workers. Also considered are policy issues including the minimum wage, equal pay legislation, and caps on working hours. In a monopsonistic labor market, concludes Manning, the \"free\" market can no longer be sustained as an ideal and labor economists need to be more open-minded in their evaluation of labor market policies.Monopsony in Motionwill represent for some a new fundamental text in the advanced study of labor economics, and for others, an invaluable alternative perspective that henceforth must be taken into account in any serious consideration of the subject.