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It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.

Background and Aims Moral courage is vital in nursing, enabling professionals to make ethical decisions and uphold values, even in challenging situations. Nursing students often struggle with moral decision‐making due to limited experience and insufficient ethical training. This study proposes a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to evaluate the effectiveness of scenario‐based ethics training compared to traditional methods in improving professional moral courage among nursing students. Methods and Analysis This RCT involved a 3‐month scenario‐based ethics training program delivered under faculty supervision, targeting sixth‐semester undergraduate nursing students. Participants (n = 48) were randomly assigned to either the intervention group or the control group. Both groups received traditional ethics education, however, the intervention group also participated in two workshops focused on core and derived ethical concepts (e.g., autonomy, confidentiality) utilizing a scenario‐based approach. This was followed by weekly online follow‐ups and discussions conducted via WhatsApp Messenger. The outcomes will be assessed using the Sekerka Professional Moral Courage Questionnaire at four time points: immediately before, immediately after, and at 1 and 3 months postintervention. The questionnaire has demonstrated acceptable validity and reliability in previous studies, with Cronbach's α exceeding 0.8, and a value of 0.977 reported in an Iranian validation study. In this study, face validity was confirmed by ten nursing faculty members. The data will be analyzed using t‐tests, χ2 tests, and ANCOVA to evaluate changes in professional moral courage (SPSS v22, p < 0.05). Conclusion This protocol outlines a trial to evaluate the impact of scenario‐based training on enhancing nursing students' professional moral courage and improving ethics education in clinical settings. Trial Registration Iranian Clinical Trials Registry: IRCT20240319061338N1.

Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness , argues in favour of de-moralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what ‘de-moralizing’ means. Then the paper assesses Crisp’s argument for de-moralizing and puts forward arguments against de-moralizing.

Thick moral terms – such as theft, fraud, and counterfeiting – are terms whose very use implies a definitionally necessary moral evaluation of their content. In this paper, I shall argue that the philosophy of statism – that is, a philosophy grounded in the belief in the normative justifiability and desirability of monopolistic apparatuses of initiatory violence – is necessarily amoral insofar as it cannot apply thick moral terms in a logically consistent manner. By the same token, I shall argue that libertarianism – i.e., the view that only consensual social relations are morally acceptable – is the only general sociopolitical doctrine capable of accomplishing this task, thus, in contrast to statism, making its prescriptions susceptible to genuine moral evaluation.

This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional responses from divergent emotional perspectives. I offer a theory that is in line with that of Prinz (The emotional construction of morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). I build an analogy between moral properties and what I call emotion-dispositional properties. These properties are picked out by predicates such as ‘annoying’, ‘frightening’ or ‘deplorable’ and appear to be uncontroversial and frequent cases of attribution error—the attributing of subjective emotional states as mind-independent properties. I present a linguistic analysis supporting the claim that moral properties and their related concepts are reducible to a subset of emotion-dispositional properties and concepts. This is grounded in the observation that utterances featuring moral predicates function linguistically and conceptually in analogous ways to emotion-dispositional predicates. It follows from this view that asserted moral utterances are truth-apt relative to ethical communities, but that speakers misconceive the extensions of predicates. I show how the framework of Cognitive Linguistics allows us to explain this error. Further analysis of moral and non-moral utterances exposes the deeper conceptual schemas structuring language through cognitive construal processes. An understanding of these processes, coupled with an emotionist elucidation of moral properties and concepts, makes the attribution error an expected upshot of the emotionist thesis, rather than an uncomfortable consequence.