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The year 2013 in Taiwan was marked by a lackluster economy and stalemated politics. President Ma Ying-jeou’s approval rating hit an all-time low. Still, Taiwan’s relations with China were smooth, and Taiwan was able to make some gains in the international arena.

Beginning with an election triumph for incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou, 2012 proved a difficult year for both Taiwan and Ma; his second term got off to a dismal start. The island’s economy experienced stagflation, while a series of controversies created a governance crisis during which the president’s approval rating hit historic lows.

“Say goodbye to Taiwan,” wrote political scientist John Mearsheimer in a widely read article in the March-April 2014 issue of The National Interest. Threatened by China's rising economic might and abandoned by a weakening United States, one of Asia's most vibrant democracies was facing, in his “realist” analysis, an almost inevitable annexation via economic if not military force. “Time,” he wrote, “is running out for the little island coveted by its gigantic, growing neighbor.” But only days after publication, on March 18, activists and armchair analysts alike said hello to a new reality.

The re-election of Ma Ying-jeou on 14 January 2012 was not as close as had been anticipated. This was in particular because he managed to win the support of some young voters, who at the beginning of the campaign were massively in favour of Tsai Ing-wen. In order to highlight the reasons why Taiwanese in the 20-to-29 age bracket changed their minds, this article analyses their perception of the two candidates, their main preoccupations, and their position in relation to the main themes of the campaign: the economic and social situation, identification with Taiwan, the island's international status, and relations with China.

As the U.S.-China relationship tilts toward competition and confrontation, scholars and policymakers have focused on the strategic choices faced by the citizens of small and medium-sized countries caught between the two great powers. However, methodological deficiencies remain in how public preferences for these strategic choices are measured. This paper attempts to fill this gap by developing a new means of measuring public opinion regarding strategic choices. Using survey data collected in Taiwan in March 2023, we demonstrate how this measure is constructed and why it aligns more closely with the theoretical concept of strategic choices. Our findings indicate that preferences for different strategies in Taiwan follow a U-shaped distribution that is centered either on hedging with the United States or with China. Multivariate analyses show that factors such as the threat of China, the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, skepticism toward the United States, confidence in Taiwan's military, and partisanship are all correlated with public preferences for different strategies. This paper helps us understand these preferences among citizens in small and medium-sized countries and contributes to the literature on public opinion, international relations theory, and policymaking.

As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan's offshore islands. At China's annual National People's Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker's expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi's visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan's offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Yingjeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan's president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan's future relationship with mainland China.

Taiwans election campaign has concluded. Voters went to the polls on Jan. 13. As has been the case in almost every election, cross-Strait relations with China were the central issue, a secondary issue being President Tsai Ing-wens management of the economy. The outcome of the election will largely dictate the course of Taiwan-China relations over at least the next four years. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and President Tsai Ing-wens chosen successor, William Lai Ching-te, the eventual winner, proclaims that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China. It should continue to diversify economic linkages away from China, strengthen military deterrence, and hope that China will eventually offer talks without one-China preconditions. The opposition Kuomintang candidate, Hou Yu-ih, called for expanded cross-Strait economic ties and dialogue with China under the one-China banner to reduce tensions while Taiwan also builds its military deterrence. China has deployed economic sticks, gray-zone military intimidation, and fake news to influence the election.