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"MacCormick, Neil"
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MacCormick's Scotland
This book analyses in depth the distinctively Scottish themes in the work of Sir Neil MacCormick, the world-renowned legal philosopher and prominent Scottish public intellectual who died in 2009 after holding the Regius Chair in Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations at Edinburgh University for thirty-six years. MacCormick's work, and works about MacCormick, attract both a domestic and an international audience. Readers will gain an understanding of how MacCormick's Scottish roots, interests and commitments coloured his work - both his distinctively Scottish writings and the overall intellectual outlook that informed his broader legal and philosophical writings.
eBook
MacCormick's Scotland
A Gedenkschrift to one of Scotland's most prominent jurists and legal thinkers.
eBook
Hart on Legal Powers as Legal Competences
This paper first recapitulates the objections by H.L.A. Hart to the ways in which John Austin’s command model of law obfuscated the importance and the very existence of power-conferring laws. Although those objections are familiar in the world of contemporary legal philosophy, their insightfulness is highlighted here because they contrast so sharply with Hart’s own neglect of power-conferring laws at some key junctures in his theorizing. In the second half of this paper, I ponder a few of the junctures where Hart failed to heed the admonitions which he had so deftly leveled against Austin.
Journal Article
Is Constitutional Pluralism (Il)liberal? On the Political Theory of European Legal Integration in Times of Crisis
This Article uncovers the normative political theory underlying the legal doctrine of constitutional pluralism, as it is used in the EU today. Constitutional pluralism, once described as a semi-official legal doctrine in the EU, is now being used by some member states to challenge its authority and rules. By reconstructing the political thought of one of its founders, N. MacCormick, this Article takes issue with two most common interpretations of constitutional pluralism: On the one hand, it has been claimed that the normative political content of constitutional pluralism is virtually identical, or at least compatible, with that of Kantian rights-based cosmopolitanism; on the other, it has been contended, especially with regard to its uses in Hungary and Poland, that it was an inherently dangerous, illiberal, normative theory. This Article offers to move away from current legal debates to go back to the origins of constitutional pluralism. It argues that constitutional pluralism is not a purely liberal theory indeed. But neither is it inherently illiberal. Rather, both liberal and illiberal readings are possible, but partial, interpretations of MacCormickian constitutional pluralism. A more systematic interpretation shows that constitutional pluralism opens a path to move beyond this somewhat archetypical divide.
Journal Article
Teilnehmerperspektive und Rechtssatzlehre: Eine problematische Beziehung
The Concept of Law by H. L. A. Hart is well known for drawing the distinction between an internal and an external point of view towards the law. German authors often refer to the same distinction in order to separate “normative” from “descriptive” legal statements. This article argues against such a reading of Hart’s theory: Though it might be justified to interpret The Concept of Law this way, Hart modified and refined his position later. The reasons for these changes are explained here. They reveal important insights into the nature of legal discourse. According to Hart’s final conception (influenced by Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz) legal statements may be “normative” but “detached”. In this case, the utterance of a legal statement does not commit the speaker to the normative view it expresses.
Journal Article
Guidance and Constraint: The Action-Guiding Capacity of Neil Maccormick's Theory of Legal Reasoning
In this article I explore the action-guiding capacity of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning. More specifically, my aim is to determine whether this theory will take us further than the so-called legal method, and, if so, whether it can give us the kind of concrete guidance we need when confronted with a hard case. Suppose a judge or an attorney or an administrator really understood and could apply this theory. Would it be of any use to him when faced with a hard case? Would it be able to guide him to a decision when the interpretive arguments conflict with one another? I argue that in many cases MacCormick’s theory can indeed give judges the kind of concrete guidance they need. The reason why MacCormick’s theory is successful in this regard is that it offers judges a reasonably firm ranking of the interpretive arguments, and that it is rather easy to understand and apply. The importance of the latter fact can hardly be exaggerated, because it means that judges will be able to apply the theory even though they may lack a deep understanding of the relevant field of substantive law.
Journal Article
