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Political scientists frequently interpret the results of conjoint experiments as reflective of majority preferences. In this article, we show that the target estimand of conjoint experiments, the average marginal component effect (AMCE), is not well defined in these terms. Even with individually rational experimental subjects, the AMCE can indicate the opposite of the true preference of the majority. To show this, we characterize the preference aggregation rule implied by the AMCE and demonstrate its several undesirable properties. With this result, we provide a method for placing bounds on the proportion of experimental subjects who prefer a given candidate feature. We describe conditions under which the AMCE corresponds in sign with the majority preference. Finally, we offer a structural interpretation of the AMCE and highlight that the problem we describe persists even when a model of voting is imposed.

In this paper we consider decision functions in which voters have three options and one of them is abstention or indifference and the output is a binary decision between two alternatives so that a tie is not possible. These resolute decision functions appear frequently in grading, in some sport competitions, in voting situations in which the status quo is put to the vote, etc. It is a more restricted case of the voting context considered in the seminal article by Kenneth May on decision functions, published in Econometrica in 1952, because the output set does not admit a tie. Among these resolute decision functions we focus on the study of majority functions, in which the number of favorable votes to an alternative must be strictly greater than the number of votes against it. This work provides an axiomatic characterization for the set of majority functions and for the relative majority function with status quo bias. Both characterizations are based on weaker versions of neutrality. Other complementary characterizations are also provided.

In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters' choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the politician's optimal experiment. With a nonunanimous voting rule, she exploits voters' heterogeneity by designing an experiment with realizations targeting different winning coalitions. Consequently, under a simple-majority rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse off due to the politician's influence. We characterize voters' preferences over electoral rules and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the politician to supply a more informative experiment.

In this paper we have introduced a new parameter inverse majority neighborhood number of a graph nM−1(G) of G and this number determined for various classes of graphs. Bounds and its relationship with some other know parameter are also investigated. Majority Neighborhood set, Majority Neighborhood Number and Inverse Majority Neighborhood Number of a graph

Previous scholarship has demonstrated that female lawmakers differ from their male counterparts by engaging more fully in consensus-building activities. We argue that this behavioral difference does not serve women equally well in all institutional settings. Contentious and partisan activities of male lawmakers may help them outperform women when in a polarized majority party. However, in the minority party, while men may choose to obstruct and delay, women continue to strive to build coalitions and bring about new policies. We find strong evidence that minority party women in the U.S. House of Representatives are better able to keep their sponsored bills alive through later stages of the legislative process than are minority party men, across the 93rd–110th Congresses (1973–2008). The opposite is true for majority party women, however, who counterbalance this lack of later success by introducing more legislation. Moreover, while the legislative style of minority party women has served them well consistently across the past four decades, majority party women have become less effective as Congress has become more polarized.

This study uses new data on coups d’état and elections to document a striking development: whereas the vast majority of successful coups before 1991 installed durable rules, the majority of coups after that have been followed by competitive elections. The article argues that after the Cold War, international pressure influenced the consequences of coups. In the post-Cold War era, countries that were most dependent on Western aid were the first to embrace competitive elections after their coups. This theory also helps explain the pronounced decline in the number of coups since 1991. While the coup d’état has been (and still is) the single most important factor leading to the downfall of democratic governments, these findings indicate that the new generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical predecessors.

A major challenge in instrumental variable (IV) analysis is to find instruments that are valid, or have no direct effect on the outcome and are ignorable. Typically one is unsure whether all of the putative IVs are in fact valid. We propose a general inference procedure in the presence of invalid IVs, called two-stage hard thresholding with voting. The procedure uses two hard thresholding steps to select strong instruments and to generate candidate sets of valid IVs. Voting takes the candidate sets and uses majority and plurality rules to determine the true set of valid IVs. In low dimensions with invalid instruments, our proposal correctly selects valid IVs, consistently estimates the causal effect, produces valid confidence intervals for the causal effect and has oracle optimal width, even if the so-called 50% rule or the majority rule is violated. In high dimensions, we establish nearly identical results without oracle optimality. In simulations, our proposal outperforms traditional and recent methods in the invalid IV literature. We also apply our method to reanalyse the causal effect of education on earnings.

Violations of the voting majority required for decisions of the general meeting of shareholders are deemed to be substantial violations of procedure, due to which decisions may be declared invalid. Uncertainty arises when the rule of counting votes is referred to as „majority“ or „simple majority“. This article seeks to determine which elements constitute the content of the vote counting rules in the general meeting of shareholders, and how a „simple“ majority should be understood. The research revealed that determining the majority of votes required for specific decisions of the general meeting depends on the numerator and the base from which the numerator is to be calculated. The decisive factor is the definition of the base. The numerator „simple“ („relative“) majority should be understood as the largest of the groups that make up the base. When the base includes only the votes present and cast, it is sufficient that there are more votes in favour than against. When the base includes all the votes present (or votes of all outstanding shares) then the number of votes in favour should be higher for both the number of votes against and the number of abstentions. Meanwhile, the numerator „absolute majority“ (or simply „majority“) presupposes a larger part of the base (i.e., one vote more than half of the base). Shareholders may also set a larger majority for the decisions of the general meeting in the articles of association by increasing the numerator and/or base.

Scholarship on distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on the internal operations of Congress, paying particular attention to committees and majority parties. This article highlights the president, who has extensive opportunities, both ex ante and ex post, to influence the distribution of federal outlays. We analyze two databases that track the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 24-year period—the largest and most comprehensive panels of federal spending patterns ever assembled. Using district and county fixed-effects estimation strategies, we find no evidence of committee influence and mixed evidence that majority party members receive larger shares of federal outlays. We find that districts and counties receive systematically more federal outlays when legislators in the president's party represent them.

Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during previous election campaigns? This study provides the first large-scale comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with common definitions. We study the fulfillment of over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries, and our findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers. Many parties that enter government executives are highly likely to fulfill their pledges, and significantly more so than parties that do not enter government executives. We explain variation in the fulfillment of governing parties' pledges by the extent to which parties share power in government. Parties in single-party executives, both with and without legislative majorities, have the highest fulfillment rates. Within coalition governments, the likelihood of pledge fulfillment is highest when the party receives the chief executive post and when another governing party made a similar pledge.