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This article examines the rise of a new authoritarianism in Iraq ten years after the invasion that removed Saddam Hussein. It traces the centralization of political and coercive power in the hands of Iraq's Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki. From his appointment in 2006, Maliki successfully moved to constrain the power of parliament and the independent agencies set up by the American-led occupation to oversee the state. He removed key politicians and civil servants who stood in his way. This authoritarian centralization reached its peak with Maliki's control of Iraq's special forces, its army and its intelligence services. The article analyses the civilian institutions of the state, concluding that political corruption has greatly hindered their reconstruction. The result is an Iraqi state with an over-developed armed forces, very weak civilian institutions and a dominant prime minister. Against this background, the sustainability of Iraqi democracy is in question. The article concludes by assessing the ramifications of Iraq's postwar trajectory for military interventions more generally.

In Illusions of Victory author Carter Malkasian describes the cumulative events in Ramadi circa 2007 as comprising \"a turning point of the Iraq War.\" He is correct in terms of the war fought by the US-led coalition in Iraq. Iraqis might have a contrary view given theirs has been of an all but continuous conflict since that coalition attacked in 2003. The turning point from the perspective of the country's citizenry is arguably quite different, far broader in influence, and more negative in consequence: American support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's retaining his position after his loss in the March 2010 election. The internal divides that continue to plague Iraq today are largely due to the overt sectarianism that characterized his tenure. It is therefore legitimate to question why Malkasian's book deserves attention as yet another offering. The answer lies in perspective. His book is at times a broader investigation, one more strategic in perspective, and sometimes counter to the alternative sources on events in Ramadi and al- Anbar province during this critical period.

According to Gause, these states are Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Because the U.S. invasion resulted in Iraq becoming a playing field rather than a player, Gause described Prime Minister Maliki's top priority as solidifying his power domestically to ensure that he remains the prime minister.

The article starts by stressing the distinctive features of Turkish-Iranian relations. It argues that in order to understand the different stages in Turkish-Iranian relations one needs to define the fine line between competition and rivalry, which are usually used interchangeably. It explains the common concerns that united and fostered cooperation between Turkey and Iran as well as the differences that persisted after the US invasion of Iraq. Delineating under what sort of conditions Turkey emerged as a competitor in Iraq, it evaluates the main instruments Ankara and Tehran employed in their efforts to affect the future of that country. In an effort to explain why this competition heightened, carrying the risk of transforming the two countries' relationship to a rivalry, it elaborates on both countries' approaches and concerns vis-à-vis Syria and the role of the US in shaping the two countries' interactions.

(According to a Western official, Essawi \"is the cleanest politician in Iraq.\") In a Dec. 28 New York Times op-ed column, Allawi, Osama al-Nujaifi, speaker of the Iraq Parliament, and Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi urged Obama to make it clear to Maliki that to retain U.S. support he must abide by the power-sharing agreement and dismantle the undemocratic institutions he has created.

Israel's scuttling of the recent peace talks, and the Obama administration's decision to back away from efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, left a vacuum destined to be filled by violence. It was not long in coming. The murder of three young Israeli settlers on June 12, and the torture and burning to death of a 16-year-old Palestinian three weeks later reflected in turn the anger and frustration felt by the Palestinians as hopes of independence faded, and the bitter hatred of Arabs fostered by strident Israeli extremists, many of them members of the government. Israel launched \"Operation Protective Edge\" on July 7, with its most intensive bombing attack on Gaza since 2009, when air strikes killed 1,400 Palestinians. Again, F-16s, Apache helicopters and warships bombarded the densely crowded Gaza Strip day and night, blowing apart apartment houses, offices and homes. Targets were chosen seemingly at random, and aimed at punishing the whole population -- half of whom are children.

At least 29 people were killed, including a 14-year-old boy. [...] army and police units have beaten, arrested or threatened scores of political activists and journalists, their colleagues say.