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One of Berkeley's best-known arguments for the view that there are no material objects is the so-called Master Argument. There are several good critical discussions of it. That invites the question: is there anything new to say? Well, it will be argued, there are a few things to say. First, although refutations by logical analogy have been advanced against the Master Argument, the strongest such refutation, one which demonstrates its incoherence, has not been. It is here. Second, there are few formal reconstructions of the Master Argument – the great majority of discussions treat it discursively – but a formal reconstruction, and one not found elsewhere, is offered here. Third, the formal reconstruction makes possible identification of the essential mistake of the argument. That mistake is equivocation. The common complaint that Berkeley illicitly introduces the act of conceiving into the content of the concept conceived is not quite correct; but to the extent that it is correct, it's explicable in terms of an underlying equivocation. Fourth, the article presupposes no acquaintance with Berkeley's work and is written in a conversational, easy-to-read style. Given that Berkeley himself wrote in a similar style, he could at least agree that the fourth point is a merit of the article.

We can find in the passages that set out the Master Argument a precursor to the paradox of knowability. That paradox shows that if all truths are knowable, all truths are known. Similarly, Berkeley might be read as proposing that if all sensible objects are (distinctly) conceivable, then all sensible objects are conceived.

It is widely held that as a , Chrysippus’ response to Diodorus Cronus’ Master Argument is that the impossible “this man has died” follows from the possible “Dio has died”. A principal claim of this article is that Chrysippus was not actually committed, against Diodorus, to the tenet that there are deductions and conditionals whereby from the possible the impossible follows. I argue that this is most likely part of a Chrysippean of a real dialectical discussion and it merely reflects a Chrysippean dialectical strategy, a merely instrumental agreement (συγχώρησις) with Diodorus on the admissibility of some single-premised arguments. As historical evidence for my conjecture I highlight two key passages by Sextus Empiricus which help to understand that Chrysippus’ real tenet was an ancient implicational counterpart of a deictic version of the Identity-Elimination Rule, whereas most likely, according to Diodorus the identitarian major premiss of this rule is redundant, so that it must be eliminated.

This is a major reinterpretation of ancient philosophy that recovers the long Greek and Roman tradition of philosophy as a complete way of life--and not simply an intellectual discipline. Distinguished philosopher John Cooper traces how, for many ancient thinkers, philosophy was not just to be studied or even used to solve particular practical problems. Rather, philosophy--not just ethics but even logic and physical theory--was literally to be lived. Yet there was great disagreement about how to live philosophically: philosophy was not one but many, mutually opposed, ways of life. Examining this tradition from its establishment by Socrates in the fifth century BCE through Plotinus in the third century CE and the eclipse of pagan philosophy by Christianity,Pursuits of Wisdomexamines six central philosophies of living--Socratic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, and the Platonist life of late antiquity. The book describes the shared assumptions that allowed these thinkers to conceive of their philosophies as ways of life, as well as the distinctive ideas that led them to widely different conclusions about the best human life. Clearing up many common misperceptions and simplifications, Cooper explains in detail the Socratic devotion to philosophical discussion about human nature, human life, and human good; the Aristotelian focus on the true place of humans within the total system of the natural world; the Stoic commitment to dutifully accepting Zeus's plans; the Epicurean pursuit of pleasure through tranquil activities that exercise perception, thought, and feeling; the Skeptical eschewal of all critical reasoning in forming their beliefs; and, finally, the late Platonist emphasis on spiritual concerns and the eternal realm of Being. Pursuits of Wisdomis essential reading for anyone interested in understanding what the great philosophers of antiquity thought was the true purpose of philosophy--and of life.

This paper presents structural similarities and historical connections between Prior’s rejection of the Barcan formula and his critique of Berkeley’s master argument for idealism in his 1955 paper “Berkeley in Logical Form”. Making use of Mackie’s paper “Self-Refutation—A Formal Analysis”, it concludes with some suggestions concerning what is at stake in the debate between Prior and Berkeley and in structurally similar debates such as whether to accept the Barcan formula.

Issue Title: THE 37TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR EXACT PHILOSOPHY (SEP 09) In the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus suggested that the proper analysis of modality required not just moments of time but also \"moments of nature\". In making this suggestion, he broke with an influential view first presented by Diodorus in the early Hellenistic period, and might even be said to have been the inventor of \"possible worlds\". In this essay we take Scotus' suggestion seriously devising first a double-index logic and then introducing the temporal order. Finally, using the temporal order, we define a modal order. This allows us to present modal logic without the usual interpretive questions arising concerning the relation called variously 'accessibility', 'alternativeness', and, 'relative possibility.' The system in which this analysis is done is one of those which have come to be called a hybrid logic.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

In this paper we examine Prior's reconstruction of Master Argument [4] in some modal-tense logic. This logic consists of a purely tense part and Diodorean definitions of modal alethic operators. Next we study this tense logic in the pure tense language. It is the logic$K_t 4$plus a new axiom$(p):p \\wedge Gp \\supset PGp'$. This formula was used by Prior in his original analysis of Master Argument. (P) is usually added as an extra axiom to an axiomatization of the logic of linear time. In that case the set of moments is a total order and must be left-discrete without the least moment. However, the logic of Master Argument does not require linear time. We show what properties of the set of moments are exactly forced by (P) in the reconstruction of Prior. We make also some philosophical remarks on the analyzed reconstruction.

In this book review, the authors critically explore Bedrettin Yazan's Autoethnography in Language Education, which addresses theoretical, methodological, and ethical dimensions of autoethnography in applied linguistics and teacher education. Organized as a reconstructed scholarly dialogue between a doctoral advisor - Ufuk, and a doctoral researcher - Meryem, the review systematically outlines the book's central arguments, chapter structure, and contributions to qualitative research. Attention is given to Yazan's positioning of autoethnography as an onto-ethico-epistemological stance, his engagement with debates surrounding legitimacy and rigor, and his discussion of reflexivity, identity, and emotional labor in research. The review also highlights the book's practical guidance on autoethnographic data generation, analysis, and representation, as well as its relevance for language teachers and teacher educators. Overall, the reviewers find the book to be a timely and accessible resource that advances self-study research and supports emerging scholars navigating autoethnography in language education contexts. Keywords: Critical Autoethnographic Narrative (CAN), language teacher identity transformation, self-reflexivity, self-study research, ethics in autoethnography, dialogic scholarship, methodological tensions around autoethnography

  The quasi-experimental, two-group (treatment and comparison), pretest–posttest study of metacognition, epistemological beliefs, and science content achievement explored the effectiveness of argument-based inquiry (ABI) instruction as opposed to traditional teacher-directed lectures and structured activities. Participants included 60 eight-grade students attending two intact classes of a middle school located in an urban area. One class was treated as the treatment group and the other as the comparison group. The students in the treatment group were taught for 13 weeks with the ABI approach while those in the comparison group were taught using traditional instruction. Data were gathered by administering the Epistemological Belief Questionnaire, Metacognitive Awareness Inventory, and Science Content Achievement Test as pretest and posttest and were analyzed using t- test and MANOVA. The findings revealed that the treatment group significantly outperformed the comparison group in terms of science content achievement, metacognition, and epistemological beliefs. Treatment group students’ scores in science content achievement, epistemological beliefs (i.e., justification and development), and most of the dimensions of metacognition (i.e., declarative knowledge, planning, information management, debugging, monitoring, and evaluation) significantly improved as ABI was applied. However, the ABI approach was not found to improve students’ epistemological beliefs concerning the source and tentative nature of scientific knowledge, or their metacognition with respect to procedural knowledge and conditional knowledge.

In the most influential chapter of his most important philosophical work, thePhenomenology of Spirit, Hegel makes the central and disarming assertions that \"self-consciousness is desire itself\" and that it attains its \"satisfaction\" only in another self-consciousness.Hegel on Self-Consciousnesspresents a groundbreaking new interpretation of these revolutionary claims, tracing their roots to Kant's philosophy and demonstrating their continued relevance for contemporary thought. As Robert Pippin shows, Hegel argues that we must understand Kant's account of the self-conscious nature of consciousness as a claim in practical philosophy, and that therefore we need radically different views of human sentience, the conditions of our knowledge of the world, and the social nature of subjectivity and normativity. Pippin explains why this chapter of Hegel'sPhenomenologyshould be seen as the basis of much later continental philosophy and the Marxist, neo-Marxist, and critical-theory traditions. He also contrasts his own interpretation of Hegel's assertions with influential interpretations of the chapter put forward by philosophers John McDowell and Robert Brandom.